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the People’s Republic of China –  





In 2006, in an effort to nurture its corporate rescue culture, the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) enacted a rescue-oriented bankruptcy law, the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 2006 (the 
EBL 2006). However, it remains unknown as to how effective the implementation of this new 
corporate rescue regime will be. This thesis aims to address this uncertainty by drawing upon 
data from an empirical study, which covers a period of nearly five years of enforcement, 
investigating how this law has been translated from the law in the books into the law in action. 
This thesis has four research questions. The first question examines the extent to which 
China’s new corporate rescue law is used to rehabilitate troubled companies. The second 
seeks to identify which party dominates the existing corporate rescue processes. The third 
explores how economic value is preserved and distributed in corporate rescues. The final 
question assesses whether court confirmation of reorganization plans is adequate in fulfilling 
the goals of the corporate reorganization regime in China.  
By reviewing and analysing the collected data, this thesis has found that the PRC Bankruptcy 
Law has been mainly used to reorganize large companies in China. As for the nature of 
control over the legal process in rescues, this thesis has found that most PRC rescues use an 
administrator-in-possession model. The data suggest that China’s new rescue law has been 
effective in preserving going concern value as it has increased the average unsecured creditor 
recovery rate from less than ten per cent in liquidations to thirty-four per cent in 
reorganizations.  
But, great challenges arise in distributing value, especially in listed company reorganizations, 
as this thesis finds that two fundamental distribution principles – the absolute priority and 
pari passu principles - are often breached in China’s corporate rescue cases. Finally, the data 
demonstrate that China’s courts are currently unable to fulfil the legal policy goals of the 
PRC’s corporate rescue regime when confirming corporate reorganization plans; this failure 
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The prevailing corporate reorganization regime has been developing in the US since the 
late nineteenth century,
1
 but still remains relatively new for many countries, even in most 
western countries.
2
 In the UK, for example, it was the Cork Report of the early 1980s which 
marked the official starting point of corporate reorganization awareness.
3
  
In China, it was as late as 1995 when the corporate rescue regime was formally 
acknowledged by its lawmakers shortly after its new round of bankruptcy law amendments 
began to be made.
4
 Bearing in mind the merits of the corporate reorganization regime in 
preserving the going-concern value of troubled companies and, more importantly, in saving 
jobs, China eventually embraced the corporate rescue culture. This was reflected in the 
passage of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law of 2006 (the EBL 2006) which placed the 
corporate reorganization procedure at the top of China’s all three bankruptcy procedures.5 
The EBL 2006 came into force on 1 June 2007.
6
  
After nearly five years of implementation, an empirical study of China’s corporate 
rescue law in action was needed to examine how this new rescue law operated in reality in 
China. This thesis aims to undertake such a task.  
                                                 
 
1
 See Charles J Tabb, ‘The Future of Chapter 11’ (1992-1993) 44 South Carolina Law Review 791. See 
also Charles Warren, Bankruptcy in United States History (DA Capo Press 1972).  
2
 It may be part of the globalization of commercial law, as corporate reorganization has been transplanted 
into many jurisdictions in the late 20
th
 century, see further at Jay Lawrence Westbrook, ‘The Globalisation of 
Insolvency Reform’ (1999) New Zealand Law Review 401, 402.  
3
 Department of Trade, Insolvency Law and Practice: Report of the Review Committee: Presented to 
Parliament by the Secretary of State for Trade by Command of Her Majesty (Cmnd 8558, 1982). See also Muir 
Hunter, ‘The Nature and Functions of a Rescue (1999) 104 Commercial Law Journal 426, 434.  
4
 See generally at Weiguo Wang, ‘Adoption of Corporate Reorganization Regime in China – a 
Comparative Study’ in Weiguo Wang and Roman Tomasic (eds), Reforms of PRC Securities and Insolvency 
Laws (Press of China’s University of Political and Legal Science, Beijing, China 1999, in Chinese). 
5
 The making of China’s Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 2006 has been reviewed by Charles D Booth, ‘The 
2006 PRC Enterprise Bankruptcy Law: The Wait is Finally Over’ (2008) 20 Singapore Academy of Law Journal 
275. See also Roman Tomasic (ed), Insolvency Law in East Asia (Ashgate 2006).  
6
 The preface of China’s Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 2006 states that it took effect on 1 June 2007.  
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In this thesis, the terms corporate reorganization and corporate rescue are used 
interchangeably. In general, corporate rescue includes formal and informal rescue processes: 
an informal rescue takes place outside the court, which is largely driven by commercial 
forces; whilst a formal rescue is a judicial bankruptcy procedure that aims to rehabilitate a 
bankrupt company and is strictly subject to procedural and substantive bankruptcy rules.
7
 In 
this thesis, corporate rescue only refers to formal rescue under the bankruptcy law, unless 
stated otherwise.  
Furthermore, in China, the EBL 2006 has two procedures both of which can be used to 
rescue a troubled company: the reorganization and the compromise procedures.
8
 Given that 
the corporate reorganization procedure in the EBL 2006 is the main rescue process, this thesis 
only focuses on the rescue procedure known as corporate reorganization. This means that the 
corporate compromise procedure in the EBL 2006 is excluded from this thesis, although it 
should be kept in mind that this procedure can also be invoked to reorganize a bankrupt 
company.  
By the same token, in this thesis, corporate rescue in the US concerns the formal 
corporate reorganization procedure under Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code 1978. In 
the UK, the formal rescue focuses on administration, the main rescue procedure, under the 
UK Insolvency Act 1986.  
2. NECESSITIES OF THIS THESIS  
As for the research on China’s new corporate rescue law, in China there are several 
active Chinese bankruptcy scholars
9
 writing widely in this area. Unfortunately, most of them 
                                                 
 
7
 See generally Vanessa Finch, ‘Corporate Rescue: a Game of Three Halves’ (2012) 32 Legal Studies 302 
(noting the distinction between formal and informal rescues). See also Michelle J White, ‘Corporate Bankruptcy 
as a Filtering Device: Chapter 11 Reorganizations and Out-of-Court Debt Restructuring’ (1994) 10 Journal of 
Law, Economics, & Organization 268.  
8
 See Hailin Zou, ‘China’s Corporate Rehabilitation System – Theories and Application’ (2007) 25 
Journal of China University of Political Science and Law (in Chinese) 48.  
9
 There are several leading Chinese scholars worth mentioning here: Professors Wang Weiguo, Li 
Yongjun and Li Shuguang from China University of Political and Legal Science, Professor Wang Xingxing 
from Renmin University of China, Professor Han Changyin from Shanghai Jiaotong University, Professor Wang 
Shihu from Southwest University of Political and Legal Science and Professor Zou Hailin from China Academy 
of Social Science Institute of Law. Professor Shi Jingxia also has some research interests in China’s corporate 
bankruptcy law research.  
 3 
 
share one weakness: they lack a broad-ranging understanding, in both theory and practice, of 
corporate rescue law outside China.
10
  
In the western world, some bankruptcy scholars have shown great interest in China’s 
bankruptcy law, but, partly because of linguistic barriers, little research into the details of 
China’s bankruptcy laws has been done. 11  Although there have been some international 
comparative studies by western scholars,
12
 few of these shed much light on China’s 
bankruptcy laws.  
We have recently seen the publication of two China-related comparative bankruptcy law 
studies. In 2009, Palmer and Rapisardi published a study of China’s new Enterprise 
Bankruptcy Law which was written from an American comparative perspective.
13
 Around the 
same time, Dr Haizheng Zhang completed a PhD thesis in England that compared China’s 
corporate rescue regime with that of the UK.
14
 Without doubt, these works have contributed 
considerably to the English-language literature on China’s corporate rescue law research.  
Palmer and Rapisardi’s book, however, largely focused on practical issues, as they are 
practising lawyers, and paid little attention to theoretical analyses. More importantly, in their 
book, only a small section was dedicated to discussing corporate reorganizations in China. 
With regard to Dr Haizheng Zhang’s PhD thesis, this, in contrast, would be the first 
comparative corporate rescue study between China and the UK written in English. But 
Zhang’s thesis concentrates on comparing the statutory rules of China’s new bankruptcy law 
                                                 
 
10
 See Bruce G Carruthers and Terence C Halliday, ‘Negotiating Globalization: Global Scripts and 
Intermediation in the Construction of Asian Insolvency Regimes’ (2006) 31 Law & Social Inquiry 521, 561. 
11
 Some western scholars should be noted as they contribute a great deal to China’s bankruptcy law 
research: Professor Roman Tomasic from University of South Australia, Professor Charles D Booth from 
University of Hawai’i at Mānoa, Professor Rebecca Parry from Nottingham Trent University. Professors Bruce 
G Carruthers and Terence C Halliday are also interested in China’s bankruptcy law research, although they 
analyse it from the sociological perspective. A recent China bankruptcy law study in English was that of 
Rebecca Parry and others (eds) China’s New Enterprise Bankruptcy Law: Context, Interpretation and 
Application (Ashgate 2010). 
12
 For example, a comparative study of corporate rescue in the US and the UK was undertaken by 
Professor Gerard McCormack in his book, Corporate Rescue Law – An Anglo-American Perspective (Edward 
Elgar, 2008). Meanwhile, other much-quoted comparative studies can, selectively, be found in Theodore 
Eisenberg and Shoichi Tagashira, ‘Should We Abolish Chapter 11? The Evidence from Japan’ (1994) 23 The 
Journal of Legal Studies 111, and, Timothy C G Fisher and Jocelyn Martel, ‘Should We Abolish Chapter 11: 
Evidence from Canada’ (1999) 28 Journal of Legal Studies 233. 
13
 See Deryck A Palmer and John J Rapisardi, The PRC Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, The People’s Work in 
Progress (Beard Books 2009).  
14
 See Haizheng Zhang, ‘Making an Efficient and Well-Functioning Corporate Rescue System in Chinese 
Bankruptcy Laws: From the Perspective of a Comparative Study between England and China’ (PhD thesis, 
University of Leicester 2008).  
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with those of the UK and has not shed much light on other advanced jurisdictions, especially 
the US which is probably the most developed country in corporate rescue research.  
Moreover, one common characteristic of these two valuable studies is that they did not 
draw upon empirical evidence, especially from China, to build their arguments. They knew 
what had been written on statutory books, but learned little on what was happening in reality. 
Time may have not permitted them to do so, as it was only on 1 June 2007 that the EBL 2006 
formally took effect. Given the less-developed legal infrastructure in China, there probably 
were no available judicial statistics for them to review how this law had been translated 
through the statute books into actual practice. 
This thesis attempts to address two gaps. The first and foremost is the gap between 
China’s corporate rescue regime as seen from the statute books and that which operates in 
practice. It is an empirical study. Admittedly, such a gap exists in all jurisdictions; however, 
due to a lack of a well-developed rule of law,
15
 it can be argued that this gap could be 
considerably greater in China. This further merits an empirical study. The second gap is the 
gap in the corporate rescue research involving China and its western counterparts.
16
 In 
particular, lessons learned from the US and the UK, if applicable, will be referred in this 
study in order to enhance the understanding of China’s new corporate rescue regime.  
3. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In designing research questions, this thesis takes into account the international debate on 
corporate rescue law as well as the challenges flowing from corporate rescue law practice in 
China. Specifically, this thesis seeks to answer four questions: 
The first is whether China’s new corporate reorganization law is frequently used, and if 
not, what are the main obstacles hindering its application. 
The second asks who is primarily in control in China’s corporate reorganizations. This is 
because control is always at the heart of a corporate reorganization process and has a 
                                                 
 
15
 See generally Stanley Lubman, ‘Bird in a Cage: Chinese Law Reform after Twenty Years’ (2000) 20 
Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business 383. 
16
 See generally Charles C Ragin, The Comparative Method – Moving beyond Qualitative and 
Quantitative Strategies (University of California Press 1987).  
 5 
 
considerable effect on both the incentives of relevant parties to use this procedure and the 
outcomes of value distribution. 
 The third is examining how value preserved through corporate rescues is distributed 
between interested parties in China’s corporate reorganizations. In particular, this question 
will focus on investigating the application of the pari passu and the absolute priority 
principles. 
The fourth and final question asks whether the courts’ confirmation of corporate 
reorganization plans is adequate to fulfil the policy goals of the corporate reorganization 
regime. Under the EBL 2006
17
 a reorganization plan, which has been voted by all classes of 
impaired parties, must be ultimately confirmed by the court.  
4. STRUCTURE OF THIS THESIS  
After the introduction in chapter 1, chapter 2 is devoted to a literature review, as existing 
studies are critical to an understanding of the fundamental principles of corporate rescue. In 
chapter 3, a contextual background discussion of the making of China’s corporate rescue law 
will be undertaken. Chapter 4 describes the methodology, explaining how the data were 
collected from China. The thesis used a combination of qualitative and quantitative research 
approaches to investigate the implementation of China’s new corporate rescue law. Chapters 
5 and 6 report the empirical findings. In particular, chapter 5 reports the corporate rescue law 
implementation in China as a whole, based on the collected data, which are mainly 
quantitative, at the national level; chapter 6 reports the fieldwork interview results conducted 
in one Chinese province, Zhejiang, as this province produced a large proportion of China’s 
corporate rescue cases and was for this reason selected for a case study. Chapters 7 and 8 
discuss the findings reported in the two preceding chapters, and some international 
experience or lessons will be referred to. Chapter 9 – conclusions – examines the extent to 
which the above four research questions have been answered, and the potential for reform in 
this area of Chinese law will be raised, and some future areas of research will be suggested.  
                                                 
 
17






Corporate reorganization, as a broadly defined concept,
1
 emerged from the US railway 
bankruptcy receiverships over one hundred years ago; eventually, it evolved into Chapter 11 
of the US Bankruptcy Code of 1978, which is widely regarded as the benchmark for the 
modern corporate rescue regime across the world.
2
 In fact, since the 1970s, there seems to 
have been a global wave of bankruptcy law reform and one of its significant features was to 
establish a rescue-friendly bankruptcy system.
3
 In the UK, for example, its insolvency law 
was substantially updated in 1986 so as to embrace the corporate rescue culture. Germany 
amended its bankruptcy statute in 1994 in favour of a new bankruptcy rescue regime.
4
 China 




Partly because corporate reorganization has long been developing in the US and is 
nascent in many other countries, most academic literature on this issue emanates from the US. 
In recent decades, some UK scholars joined the debate because of the emergence of corporate 
rescue in Britain after the 1980s. In China, because of the novelty of the new corporate rescue 
                                                 
 
1
 See Gabriel Moss, ‘Chapter 11 – an English Lawyers Critique’ (1998) 11 Insolvency Intelligence 17, 18 
(noting that rescue largely means preserving the company’s business in England; whereas in the US, it is mainly 
directed to saving the entity of the company).  
2
 The corporate reorganization was gradually shaped from the railway receiverships from the late 1800s. 
See further Charles Jordan Tabb, ‘The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States’ (1995) 3 American 
Bankruptcy Institute Law Review 5, 21.  
3
 See generally Jay Lawrence Westbrook, ‘The Globalisation of Insolvency Reform’ (1999) New Zealand 
Law Review 401, 403. 
4
 See Ian F Fletcher, ‘UK Corporate Rescue: Recent Developments – Changes to Administrative 
Receivership, Administration, and Company Voluntary Arrangement – The Insolvency Act 2000, The White 
Paper 2001, and the Enterprise Act 2002’ (2004) 5 European Business Organization Law Review 119 
(overhauling all rescue instruments in the UK law). See also Klaus Kamlah, ‘The New German Insolvency Act: 
Insolvenzordnung’ (1996) 70 American Bankruptcy Law Journal 417.  
5
 See generally Rebecca Parry and Haizheng Zhang, ‘China’s New Corporate Rescue Laws: Perspectives 
and Principles’ (2008) 8 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 113. 
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regime and its education system,
6
 there were not many valuable academic articles written on 
this subject. Therefore, the literature reviewed in this chapter is mostly from the US and the 
UK and is written in English. 
To explore the relevant literature, this chapter, in response to the four research questions 
set out in chapter 1, focuses on four areas: the commencement, the control, value distribution, 
and the courts’ confirmation of reorganization plans of the corporate reorganization system. 
The remainder of this chapter is accordingly arranged into five Parts: (i) Part 2 discusses 
issues concerning the commencement of a corporate rescue procedure; it also contains 
arguments regarding the goals of the corporate rescue regime and instruments to induce an 
early rescue. (ii) Part 3 sheds light on control in corporate rescue processes. (iii) Part 4 is 
devoted to analysing the value distributional norms, and (iv) Part 5 centres on criteria used by 
courts to confirm reorganization plans. (v) Part 6 concludes and reviews the foregoing 
arguments.  
2. COMMENCEMENT OF CORPORATE RESCUE 
Prior to a formal corporate reorganization procedure, the first question which must be 
asked would be what goals this regime is designed to accomplish. Answering this question is 
vital, since it has significant effects on a series of issues flowing from rescue processes. In 
general, as to the goals of a corporate reorganization regime, there were two mainstream 
views.  
2.1. Maximisation of Creditors’ Returns 
In 1982, an article written by Thomas H Jackson was published in the Yale Law Journal; 
this might mark the starting point of the debate as to what goals the corporate rescue regime 
should pursue.
7
 Jackson upheld that the bankruptcy reorganization regime should operate in 
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the best interests of creditors; in particular, he argued that maximising creditor recovery 
should be the exclusive goal of the corporate reorganization regime.  
Some years later, in 1989, Jackson reinforced his view in a co-authored article,
8
 where 
he and Robert E Scott argued that bankruptcy might have other goals, such as value 




From the economic perspective, Thomas H Jackson’s view would be understandable and 
even justifiable. A company is widely seen to be owned by shareholders when it is solvent; 
accordingly, when the company becomes insolvent, its ownership is seen to transfer to 
creditors. Given that creditors have become the company’s new owner, the company in 
bankruptcy (the estate) should undoubtedly operate in the best interests of creditors. 
Jackson’s viewpoint seems to be consistent with the conventional theory of shareholder 
primacy in company law,
10
 where it is thought that a company is, in the absence of 
insolvency, owned by shareholders whose benefit is seen as being at the centre of the 
company’s objectives.  
In the legal sense, however, the story may be totally different. A company is an 
independent legal entity - the company is a subject, not an object. The company belongs to 
itself; shareholders are not the owners of the company. In strict legal terms, shareholders only 
invest for control and dividends, and unable to acquire or claim the company’s ownership.  
In the meantime, as argued by Margaret M Blair and Lynn A Stout in 1999, a company, 
especially a public company, serves the interests of a wide range of interested parties, 
including shareholders, employees, creditors and local communities etc. The company rather 
acts as a connection between these parties.
11
 Shareholders are only part of a group whom the 
company should serve.  
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Thus, in the legal sense, one the one hand, shareholders are not the owners of the 
company, and on the other, they are also not the exclusive party that the company is 
serving.
12
 Creditors, thus, could not inherit the ownership status that even shareholders do not 
have. At least in theory, thus, placing creditor interests absolutely at the centre of corporate 
reorganization reflected in Jackson’s creditor recovery maximisation theory seems to be 
untenable. 
But, Jackson’s theory still had a huge impact. In 2002, partly relying on Jackson’s 
creditor interests’ maximization theory, Douglas G Baird and Robert K Rasmussen argued 
that corporate reorganization should be abolished on the grounds that corporate 
reorganization could be replaced by effective asset or going concern sales. From the 
viewpoint of Baird and Rasmussen, the company’s control must be transferred to creditors 
immediately at the time when the company gets bankrupt, and it is up to creditors to decide 
whether to sell the assets piecemeal or as a going concern, and the debtor should be excluded 
because it has no economic interests in the company any more. This was mainly because 
Baird and Rasmussen contended that the reorganization system might have been misused by 
debtors at the expense of creditors.
13
  
Baird and Rasmussen’s argument should be appreciated in its context. In US corporate 
reorganization, it is the norm rather than the exception for a debtor to stay in control when a 
corporate reorganization procedure is entered. So, the thrust of Baird and Rasmussen’s 
corporate reorganization abolition proposal is to exclude debtors from formal corporate 
rescue procedures in the belief that only creditors have direct interests in the company after 
insolvency.  
The problem of Baird and Rasmussen’s argument is that the means proposed by them are 
not fit for accomplishing their goal. They advocated that corporate reorganization had the 
sole goal of maximising creditor recovery but suggested a less optimal, and even 
counterproductive, means to pursue the aim. In particular, neither transferring the control of 
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the company to creditors nor encouraging the company’s asset sale would contribute to the 
maximisation of creditors’ returns in bankruptcy. 
This is because, in the first place, protecting creditors in corporate reorganization is 
unlikely to be achieved by giving them the control of the company. Allocating control to 
creditors must take into account whether the latter are capable and competent to conduct the 
debtor’s bankruptcy process. In general, it is the debtor, in particular its old managers, who 
have the information and knowledge to turn the company around, especially when it is deeply 
in distress. By and large, creditors are not able to run the company in bankruptcy because 
they are not familiar with the debtor’s business operation. In the second place, excluding the 
debtor, particularly its old management, will inevitably cause loss of the company’s going 
concern value, as a result of which creditors’ returns will be accordingly reduced. 14  In 
addition, allowing creditors to sell the company is also not an optimal way to maximising 
creditors’ returns, because the sale of the company has to face the illiquidity of the market for 
troubled companies; in other words, the company sale price will be severely depressed by 
market illiquidity. Thus, the sale of the company (piecemeal or going concern sale) will 
reduce recovery for creditors rather than increase it.
15
  
In short, it may be counterproductive to set up creditor interests’ maximisation as a sole 
goal of the corporate reorganization regime. To tackle the deficiency of this theory, value 
redistribution as a goal of corporate reorganization emerged shortly after Jackson’s 1982 
article.  
2.2. Value Redistribution 
In 1987, Robert E Scott argued that corporate reorganizations should have multiple goals, 
rather than have the exclusive goal of maximising creditor returns.
16
 He agreed that creditors 
must be well protected but analysed that other parties, in particular debtors, should also be 
looked after in corporate reorganizations; value redistribution should be one of the goals of 
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the corporate reorganization regime, which means that risks should be shared by all relevant 
parties.  
In the same year, Elizabeth Warren also expressed her sharply defined view that 
corporate reorganization is designed to redistribute value between the interested parties rather 
than to exclusively concentrate on maximising creditor returns.
17
  
The theoretical underpinning for Scott and Warren’s arguments is that business failure is 
more ‘an unanticipated common disaster … much like a hurricane or an earthquake’ than a 
consequence of the debtor’s incompetence or mismanagement.18 Business failures, as a result, 
are worthy of sympathy, and risks should be shared; it is unfair for innocent debtors to bear 
risks in their entirety. 
Indeed, value redistribution as the goal of corporate reorganization may be used to 
justify a debtor-in-possession as well as departure from absolute priority in US corporate 
reorganizations.
19
 It should, however, be made clear that value redistribution must be 
premised upon the condition that the business failure is exogenous or at least is because of 
honest mistakes; otherwise it may create moral hazard. At the same time, concerns arise as to 
where to draw the line in sharing risks between parties, in particular, between creditors and 
shareholders. The fundamental principle of distributing value between shareholders and 
creditors is the absolute priority principle according to which shareholders can receive 
nothing unless and until creditors are paid in full. To strike a fair balance between creditor 
and shareholder, it is worth noting that the deviation from absolute priority in corporate 
reorganization must be undertaken with the consent of disadvantaged parties; otherwise, 
value redistribution will undermine market efficiency, because creditors’ certainty and 
predictability in the wider market will be compromised or even jeopardized. 
In 2000, Brian A Blum echoed Scott and argued that the continued popularity of 
corporate reorganization in the US had suggested that corporate rescue should have a two-tier 
goal, namely both creditor recovery maximisation and value redistribution should be the 
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goals of a corporate reorganization regime.
20
 Blum argued that the social goals of businesses 
should be borne in mind when deciding whether to rescue a troubled company, and that 




Blum’s view is likely to be compatible with the pro-rescue mechanisms in the US as 
Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code of 1978 allows a debtor to keep on running the 
company after it enters the corporate reorganization procedure, and even the absolute priority 
rule can be relaxed in favour of the debtor in an effort to deliver a more feasible rescue. 
Value redistribution may also be in harmony with the maximisation of creditor interests, as 
inviting debtors to join rescues will usually give a better return to creditors. Corporate 
reorganization is therefore not a zero-sum game between creditors and the debtor, and it 
could be carried out in the interests of both creditors and the debtor.  
Whether creditor interest maximisation or value redistribution is adopted, a rescue would 
be more likely to be achievable if it can be filed as early as possible. In the next section, we 
review mechanisms to encourage early rescues.  
2.3. Encouraging Early Rescues 
In 2008, Gerard McCormack discussed mechanisms in the US and the UK designed to 
encourage an early rescue; this occurred in his far-reaching comparative study, ‘Corporate 
Rescue Law – an Anglo-American Perspective’. 22  McCormack argued that, in the US, 
debtors are incentivized to file for reorganization in a timely manner because they are 
allowed to stay in control under a debtor-in-possession approach; more importantly, the 
debtor-in-possession aims to take advantage the debtor’s experience and information so as to 
make the rescue more achievable. A debtor-in-possession was dubbed as a ‘carrot’ policy 
which gives an incentive to the debtor in exchange for its voluntary and timely rescue filing. 
By contrast to the US, the UK has no debtor-in-possession policy; rather than a ‘carrot’, there 
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is the ‘stick’ or the use of wrongful trading; this provides a warning that forces the debtor to 
take early rescue actions; otherwise, the debtor company directors will be personally liable 
for creditors’ losses.23  
In order to encourage early rescue filings, however, both the debtor-in-possession and 
the wrongful trading approach seem not to be enough. Under the debtor-in-possession 
approach, a debtor might be induced to file a voluntary rescue petition, but its prospect is 
likely to be slim because of the absolute priority principle in distributing the company’s value 
in insolvency. The absolute priority principle means that shareholders will receive nothing 
unless creditors are fully paid. Given the insolvency of the company, filing for reorganization 
in court will largely lead to cancellation of shareholders’ interests; as a result, the debtor, in 
particular its equity managers, will definitely try to avoid filing for a formal rescue in spite of 
the debtor-in-possession, because their own or their principal’s equity may be wiped out in 
the coming bankruptcy rescue process.
24
 This fear has been corroborated by an empirical 
study from the US which showed that the majority of voluntary reorganization filings 
essentially occurred because of imminent liquidation threats from creditors;
25
 in other words, 
filing for reorganization was mainly used by debtors to keep creditors at bay. It is more a 
strategy of the debtor to seek to stay in business longer. Thus, the debtor-in-possession 
approach is necessary but not sufficient to persuade debtors to take early formal rescue action. 
Its effectiveness also depends on whether the absolute priority principle could be applied with 
certain flexibility.  
 As for the use of the wrongful trading procedure to warn or force debtors to take early 
rescue action, their efficacy is considerably undermined by the difficulties that arise in its 
enforcement. Andrew Keay argued that the main problem in the use of the wrongful trading 
was that it was difficult to identify the point at which directors knew or should have known 
that the company could not avoid liquidation. Moreover, fearful of its chilling effect upon 
entrepreneurship, British authorities are unlikely to penalize directors by using the wrongful 
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 So, this mechanism is not frequently applied in practice to force early 
rescues in the UK.  
Until recently, Vanessa Finch was sceptical of the use of the wrongful trading approach 
to facilitate early rescues. She contended that “the current law under-deters directors from 
excessively sustained trading in spite of an array of constraints including the potential for 
wrongful trading and misfeasance actions”.27  
Meanwhile, in comparing the British rescue regime with the US Chapter 11, Lijie Qi 
argued that, for the sake of an early rescue, it is more desirable for policymakers to reward 
rather than threaten debtors to take early actions, because the debtor-in-possession seems to 
have a better effect than the wrongful trading approach has.
28
 Rebecca Parry also raised 
concerns that the UK might lack “an effective debtor in possession procedure (especially) for 
medium and large companies” so as to promote the corporate rescue culture.29  
Transplanting the debtor-in-possession into the UK’s insolvency law might, however, 
not be an easy task on the grounds that it will encounter a series of obstacles ranging from the 
different social attitudes towards business failures to the judicial path dependency.
30
  
In sum, in pursuit of an early rescue, a host of tools should be available, including a 
debtor-in-possession, the flexibility of absolute priority and, more importantly, a stringent 
individual debt enforcement system.  
3. THE CONTROL OF CORPORATE RESCUE 
In regard to the control in corporate rescue, there are two leading models worldwide: 
namely the debtor-in-possession model found in the US and the practitioner-in-possession 
model found in the UK.
31
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As noted above, a debtor-in-possession model assumes that, in principle, the debtor will 
remain in control after the formal corporate rescue process begins, although during the rescue 
procedure the management are imposed with fiduciary duties to act in the best interests of a 
wide range of stakeholders.
32
 By way of contrast, in British corporate rescue proceedings, 
mainly administration procedures, the management will be automatically replaced by an 
outside administrator, usually an insolvency practitioner, when the formal rescue procedure 




In addition, Rebecca Parry has argued that there is a modified debtor-in-possession 
approach enshrined in both the German and Chinese bankruptcy rescue laws, where a debtor 
can be authorized to regain control of the company from the administrator after the rescue 
procedure has been entered, but is subject the latter’s supervision afterwards.34  
3.1. The Debtor-in-Possession Model 
Through examining the history of the debtor-in-possession model used in the US’s 
bankruptcy law, Harvey R Miller noted that the fundamental underpinning of a debtor-in-
possession model is that “the entity best suited to administer and effect a rehabilitation and 
reorganization of a financially and operationally distressed debtor would, in most 
circumstances, be the debtor”. 35  The debtor, in particular its managers, has specific 
information and experience on the company’s position; therefore, a practical rescue has to 
rely on the involvement of the debtor. But the danger here is that the debtor is not an 
impartial or disinterested party in the rescue process and may unfairly exploit control at the 
expense of other parties, especially the creditors.  
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The concern of debtors’ biased control is not unnecessary. Lynn M LoPucki once 
reported, in one of his empirical studies, that the debtor-in-possession was really abused by 
some debtors in the US, since he found that most debtors filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
only to remain in business longer or to avoid immediate liquidation by creditors. In particular, 
he revealed that, in his studied cases, only twenty-six per cent of debtors using Chapter 11 
survived rescue procedures; put differently, the majority of debtors were not really suitable 
for the rescue procedure and they misused Chapter 11 in order to postpone the business 
closure. LoPucki, thus, contended that there was a systemic failure in the debtor-in-
possession model and proposed that there should be more creditor control in Chapter 11 
procedures in the US.
36
  
 The high failure rate of Chapter 11s, which is used to attest the misuse of the debtor-in-
possession procedure, as demonstrated by LoPucki, may, however, be interpreted differently. 
A later empirical study conducted by Elizabeth Warren and Jay Lawrence Westbrook found 
that, in the US, some debtors might seek to file under Chapter 11 to unfairly exploit the 
debtor-in-possession procedures, but these inappropriate filings would be quickly jettisoned 
by bankruptcy judges. More specifically, as revealed by Warren and Westbrook, nearly half 
of the Chapter 11 cases were dismissed by judges within six months of filings, because these 
debtors were indeed not suitable candidates for rescue, i.e., the high failure rate under 
Chapter 11 reflects the efficiency of the US bankruptcy system in curbing the abuse of the 
debtor in possession procedure.
37
  
It should also be noted that the use of the US debtor-in-possession procedure does not 
mean that debtors can conduct rescue processes entirely at their own discretion. Instead, there 
is a series of supervision and counter-abuse mechanisms. Harvey Miller argued that there are 
several approaches available to minimise, if not eliminate, the negative effects of the debtor-
in-possession model. at first, a debtor would be replaced by a trustee if its business failure can 
be ascribed to fraud or dishonesty; this means that a potential debtor-in-possession must first 
satisfy the pre-failure intention test; the availability of the debtor in possession is not 
guaranteed. Furthermore, the debtor-in-possession can only manage the company in the 
ordinary course of business, and any substantial business activities should be undertaken with 
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the court’s permission. More importantly, the debtor is subject to the fiduciary duty to serve 
all interested parties rather than to continue its role as the agent of the shareholders. In 
addition, the debtor should be subject to the scrutiny of the mandatorily organized creditors’ 
committee, amongst other things.
38
  
It is noteworthy that a debtor-in-possession model does not mean that the debtor’s 
managing team can be kept intact during the rescue process. On the contrary, an empirical 
study by Stuart C Gilson in 1990 reveals that approximately half of company directors, in the 
cases studies, lost their jobs after the companies’ financial crisis.39 In other words, on the face 
of it, the old management team as a whole was retained; however, its composition would 
often be substantially changed. But Gilson’s aforementioned data should be read carefully. 
His sampled cases included Chapter 11 cases and other non-bankruptcy debt restructurings, 
and there was no exact figure to describe directors’ removal exclusively during Chapter 11s. 
It, therefore, is not quite accurate to reach the conclusion that half of the directors would be 
sacked after the Chapter 11 process begins.
40
 But one point is certain: many senior managers 
of debtors would be ousted, although a debtor-in-possession was used in these rescue 
processes. 
3.2. The Practitioner-in-Possession Model 
Unlike the dominant debtor-in-possession model as found in the US’s Chapter 11, under 
the UK’s corporate rescue procedures, mainly administration,41 a company’s directors will be 
entirely replaced by an administrator, who will be a qualified insolvency practitioner (IP). 
This situation may thus be called a practitioner-in-possession model.
42
 Strictly speaking, 
however, a practitioner-in-possession is also available in the US under Chapter 11 where a 
debtor could also be replaced by a trustee if the court believes that the company’s failure 
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could be attributed to fraud or dishonesty.
43
 So, the practitioner-in-possession model is not 
unique to UK insolvency administration.  
As for the justification for the practitioner-in-possession model in the UK, Gerard 
McCormack has maintained that British social attitudes towards business risk-taking and 
failures do not favour a debtor-in-possession approach.
44
 In the UK, business risk-taking is, in 
general, not widely preferred by society at large. Failed businessmen are, as a result, more 
likely to be blamed rather than to be sympathized with. And it seems to be socially 
unacceptable for businessmen who are responsible for failures to be entrusted to continue 
their positions during formal rescue processes.
45
  
Using the UK’s general social attitudes towards business failure to warrant a 
practitioner-in-possession model, may however create controversy. This is because social 
attitudes are too broad and elusive in character. In the corporate bankruptcy context, it can 
largely be interpreted as attitudes of creditors, since it is creditors who are directly affected by 
corporate bankruptcy. Primarily, frustration or anger would be the immediate reaction of 
creditors when they are informed of bankruptcy, as their financial interests will inevitably be 
harmed. Thus, the so-called British social attitudes towards business failures can be 
understood as the frustration of creditors towards a debtor’s failure. The key concern here, 
however, is that creditors’ frustration does not justify removing the debtor from the corporate 
rescue process, because such an instinctive response to punish the debtor or demand a 
scapegoat fails to appreciate the diverse causes of business failures.  
As for causes of business failures, Harvey Miller argued that they may be identified at 
two levels.
46
 At the first level, a business failure could be occasioned by either endogenous or 
exogenous factors. regarding exogenous factors, there may be a sudden economic recession 
or even a substantial default of a creditor that brings down the company; therefore, in the case 
of exogenous reasons for a failure, it is unfair to punish the debtor who is not culpable for the 
business distress. At the second level, even where a business failure is endogenous, as 
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examined by Bruce G Carruthers and Terrence C Halliday, it may be related with totally 
different intention of the debtor: an honest mistake, reckless business speculation, or fraud.
47
 
Accordingly, if it is the debtor’s honest mistake which results in the bankruptcy, removing 
the debtor from the rescue process seems to be disproportional. Hence, it seems to be 
irrational to scapegoat the debtor and sack it immediately, no matter whether the failure is 
exogenous and whether it is an honest mistake causing the distress.  
In short, using general social attitudes to justify the debtor-displacement in rescues might 
be untenable, since it fails to take into account the diverse causes of business failures.  
Furthermore, John Armour and his co-authors have argued that the UK practitioner-in-
possession model might have been shaped by the concentrate ownership structure as well as 
the concentrate debts of most UK companies. On the one hand, corporate ownership 
concentration means that these companies are largely owner-managed. When a corporate 
bankruptcy reorganization process begins, in order to prevent biased control of the debtor, it 
is essential that the debtor be replaced by an independent IP. On the other hand, given that 
most UK companies rely heavily on bank finance, banks as the main creditors could more 
effectively manage a debtor-displacing rescue procedure because of the convenient 
coordination between them and the administrator. In other words, the potential friction or 
coordination challenges between creditors could be minimised. Armour and his co-authors 




Some key factors might, however, have been overlooked by Armour and his co-authors. 
With regard to concentrated ownership, it is true that most UK companies are closely held,
49
 
as is widely the case elsewhere where the majority of businesses are SMEs.
50
 This means that 
these companies are not only closely owned but also shareholder managed; in other words, 
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they are directly controlled by shareholders. In theory, it seems desirable that shareholder 
managers be replaced when a bankruptcy reorganization procedure is entered, because of the 
worry that they may misuse their control to the detriment of creditors. But, one difficulty 
arises immediately; the alleged biased control would be eliminated by replacing shareholder 
managers with an IP; however the feasibility of rescue will be materially undermined, 
because an IP is often technically unable to effectively rescue a troubled company due to his 
lack of information and specific understandings of the company’s affairs. 51  Therefore, 
rescuing a closely held company will be adversely affected by replacing the shareholder 
managers with an outside, independent IP.  
Meanwhile, as for striking a balance between the feasibility of rescue and the prevention 
of biased control of debtors, it is worth remembering the historic development of the debtor-
in-possession model in the US. It was reported by Charles Jordan Tabb that, when the debtor-
in-possession model was officially recognized and inserted into Chapter XI of the Chandler 
Act in the US in 1938, it was exclusively designed for small and medium enterprises, or 
closely held companies, on the grounds that it was unrealistic to rescue these companies 
without the involvement and continued service of shareholder-managers.
52
 To a certain extent, 
US lawmakers have tried to weigh creditor protection against the feasibility of corporate 
rescues, especially when troubled companies are closely held. There is a real concern here 
about the potential biased control of the debtor-in-possession, but this could be minimised by 
a range of supervision measures, as argued before. Thus, the US such experience suggests 
that concentrated corporate ownership needs more a debtor-in-possession than a practitioner-
in-possession approach. 
As for concentrated debts of most UK companies, admittedly, from the point of view of 
financial creditors, namely banks, with a practitioner-in-possession available, it would be 
quite efficient and effective for them to appoint an administrator to take control of the 
company and pursue their own agenda in a timely fashion. But this brings a danger here that a 
new type of biased control emerges – the biased control exercised by banks. As argued by 
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 a bank-appointed administrator would prioritise banks’ interests at the 
expense of other creditors, in particular unsecured trade creditors. Interestingly, in the UK, it 
was mainly the biased control of banks in corporate rescues which led to the radical 
amendment of the UK insolvency law in 2002, as a result of which the former system of 
administrative receivership was virtually abolished.
54
 In other words, lawmakers in the UK 
have recognised that concentrated debts had negatively affected the practitioner-in-possession 
approach, and that the biased control wielded by concentrated debts should be prevented. 
Concentrated debt is a problem for a practitioner-in-possession model. Thus, it seems 
inappropriate to use concentrated debts to justify a practitioner-in-possession model in the 
UK’s rescue regime. 
 Nevertheless, Gerard McCormack concluded that although the UK is different from the 
US in regard to prevailing social attitudes to entrepreneurship and different types of debt 
markets, ‘there is no single knockout or standout reason’ that could explain why the UK has a 
debtor-displacement rescue regime that is distinctive from the US debtor-in-possession.
55
 It is 
noteworthy that Vanessa Finch recently remained sceptical of the efficacy of a practitioner-
in-possession in the UK administration procedure and argued that UK rescues might have 
been considerably undermined by the automatic removal of debtors.
56
   
Probably, in the near future, British policy-makers may rethink the pros and cons of its 
practitioner-in-possession model and revise it to enhance the UK’s corporate rescue regime.  
4. VALUE DISTRIBUTION 
By and large, value distribution in corporate reorganization is bound by two fundamental 
norms: the absolute priority and the pari passu principles. The absolute priority principle 
deals with value distribution between shareholders and creditors in corporate bankruptcy; in 
particular, this principle means that shareholders will receive nothing unless creditors are 
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paid in full, and it asserts that “debt should be paid before equity”.57 Unlike the absolute 
priority principle, the pari passu principle governs value distribution between creditors 
similarly situated; specifically, the principle requires that “creditors holding formally similar 
claims under non-insolvency law are to be paid back the same proportion of their debt in their 
debtor's insolvency”.58 Since there are few controversies about the pari passu principle in 
corporate rescue, this Part of the literature review focuses on the absolute priority principle 
and its deviation.   
4.1. The Absolute Priority Principle  
In English literature, it is widely known that the absolute priority principle was originally 
formulated in the case of Northern Pacific Railway Company and Northern Pacific Railroad 
Company v. Joseph H. Boyd (hereinafter the Boyd case) adjudicated by the US Supreme 
Court in 1913
59
 wherein the Court upheld that shareholders could not retain an interest, in the 
form of either equity or control or both, in the reorganized company until and unless creditors 
have been paid in full.  
In substance, the absolute priority principle was not ‘created’ or ‘established’ by the 
Boyd case; instead, this case simply formalised this rule because it was derived from 
principles of equity. To some extent, this principle is also compatible with the limited liability 
principle: shareholders are shielded with limited liabilities,
60
 and the price paid for this is that 
they consent to subordinate their claims to creditors in the event of insolvency. But the Boyd 
case gave rise to a concern: the absolute priority principle seems to be quite harsh to 
shareholders, especially to shareholder-managers, because they are not allowed to hold an 
interest of any form, either in equity or in control, in the reorganized company. 
In reality, it can be argued that shareholders, especially shareholder-managers, in the 
reorganized company should be treated differently. If a shareholder-manager is, due to his or 
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her expertise and experience in running the business, invited by the new owner to join the 
company in the wake of the corporate reorganization process, and even is given some equity, 
it may not raise concerns of violation of the absolute priority principle. The issue may, 
however, be changed dramatically in nature; it is a breach of absolute priority if such an offer 
is agreed to by the end of the reorganization process; it may even amount to a kind of 
collusion. This problem may become very subtle or tricky, so that whether it is a breach of 
absolute priority will depend on when a shareholder-manager enters an agreement with the 
company’s new owner to sell his or her experience and knowledge in exchange for an interest 
in the new company. 
It was mentioned by Elizabeth Warren that, after the Boyd case, the absolute priority 
principle remained as a common law rule until the enactment of the US Bankruptcy Code of 
1978; this was partly because law-makers in the US were fully aware of the dilemma 
regarding this principle’s application in corporate rescues. 61  In 1978, this principle was 
eventually codified, but certain flexibility was also provided for.  
It should be noted that, before 1978, the absolute priority principle, as a common law 
rule, was exclusively applicable in in US Chapter X reorganization involving large 
companies; by contrast, in the then Chapter XI reorganization procedure (which was 
essentially a compromise process), this principle was not mandatory. In the Bankruptcy Code 
of 1978, a new Chapter 11 was created by merging the previous Chapters X and XI, and, 
more importantly, the absolute priority principle became a default rule in the new law. 
With regard to the rationale of the absolute priority principle, it was argued by Barry E 
Adler that the absolute priority principle may, by implication, reflect bargains between 
creditors and shareholders by which ‘equity investors purchase residual claims subordinate to 
those of creditors, in return, these equity investors gain both control of the firm and the right 
to any value in excess of the amount the firm owes creditors’. 62  Undoubtedly, absolute 
priority was intended to protect creditors and to prevent shareholders and their agents from 
unfairly taking advantage of their position as insiders.
63
 Absolute priority might result from 
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implied bargains between creditor and shareholder; however, in a strictly legal sense, it is a 
statutory obligation for shareholders to prioritize creditors’ claims.  
The absolute priority principle is necessary to protect creditors, but is not enough. In 
theory, in the event of insolvency, shareholders will get nothing unless and until creditors’ 
claims are met in full. The worry here, however, is that shareholders may have obtained what 
they have expected long before the company’s insolvency through their own or their agents’ 
control, and the company may have become an empty shell at the time of insolvency, which 
makes creditors’ priority meaningless. Thus, the goals that the absolute priority principle 
aims to accomplish will rather depend on a full investigation of the company’s business when 
the company is insolvent. Shareholders and their agents should be held accountable if they 
misuse their control for illegal pre-insolvency gains. Investigating the company’s business, 
however, raises the concern of costs, especially when there are few assets left in the bankrupt 
company. 
As far as the application of the absolute priority principle is concerned, it was noted by 
Elizabeth Warren that ‘the application of the absolute priority rule produces little controversy’ 
in a corporate liquidation, though it becomes complicated in a corporate reorganization.
64
 In 
fact, even in a liquidation, on the face of it, the absolute priority rule seems to be stringently 
followed: however, deviation from it is, in real terms, still often seen.  
For example, B Espen Eckbo and Karin S Thorburn reported that, in Sweden, there is a 
strict bankruptcy liquidation system whereby a bankrupt company will be automatically 
auctioned and a corporate reorganization regime does not exist; but the deviation from the 
absolute priority rule usually occurs when a sale-back is concluded.
65
 In a sale-back, the 
company’s business or its assets are, partly because of market illiquidity for troubled 
companies, sold back to the former managers some of whom are equity-holders. More 
importantly, Eckbo and Thorburn noted that the average price of a sale-back is always lower 
than that of sales to outsiders.
66
 Obviously, the difference in the company’s’ value goes to the 
equity-managers, although creditors are not fully paid. This means the deviation from 
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absolute priority can still happen, although against the backdrop of a stringent liquidation 
system.  
In the UK’s formal bankruptcy procedures, it was mentioned by Julian R Franks and his 
co-authors that the absolute priority rule is rigorously applied.
67
 However, it was also 
mentioned by Vanessa Finch that at least in some UK pre-packaged administrations 
departures from this rule can still be observed when businesses are sold to management-
connected parties at undervalued prices.  
Thus, in company liquidations, the absolute priority rule is formally complied with; 
however, in real terms, deviations from the rule can still happen but in a subtle way. In 
corporate reorganizations, by way of contrast, this rule does give rise to many controversies, 
and these will be reviewed in this next section.  
4.2. Deviations from the Absolute Priority Principle 
Different in liquidation, the deviation from the absolute priority principle takes place 
more visibly in corporate reorganization, partly because its rigorous application may be 
unproductive.  
Walter J Blum and Stanley A Kaplan have argued that sometimes serious concerns arise 
when absolute priority is considered and applied in corporate reorganization. First, inaccurate 
asset evaluations will undermine the objectives of absolute priority. Unlike in a liquidation 
where the company’s sale is real, the company sale in a reorganization is hypothetical, and 
the company’s price is determined by an asset valuation result. The difficulty here, however, 
is that asset valuation always involves uncertainties and inaccuracies. More specifically, 
Blum and Kaplan stated that:  
The valuation procedure always produces a dollars and cents figure; although that figure 
looks mathematically exact, it actually reflects in a single number a whole series of highly 
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conjectural and even speculative judgements concerning long-range business expectations 
and hazards as well as future social and general economic conditions.
68
 
Therefore, considering inaccurate valuations, if a company’s assets are undervalued, it 
may be quite unfair to extinguish the interests of junior investors, especially shareholders and 
unsecured creditors, simply by mechanically applying the absolute priority rule. The contrary 
is equally true: if a company’s assets are overestimated, senior investors have to concede part 
of the company’s value to junior ones, which means that junior parties may unfairly take 
advantage of the overvaluation. Thus, applying absolute priority has to face the problems 
occasioned by inaccurate asset valuation.  
Second, Blum and Kaplan contended that that applying absolute priority would 
undermine the feasibility of rescue, because the equity-managers who have the information 
and experiences to run the company will be driven away. At the same time, the disappearance 
of these equity-managers would also lead to the loss of the company’s going concern value, 
since their expertise and experience are a significant part of the company’s know-how.69  
In addition, Blum and Kaplan argued that it seems to be justifiable under the absolute 
priority doctrine for a company’s liquidation value to entirely go to creditors; however, the 
company’s going concern value generated from the continued service of old equity-managers 
should be treated in a different way. In other words, these equity-managers should be allowed 
to share the value created by their continued service in the new company; otherwise, they 
have no reasons to remain and provide their expertise.
70
  
Perhaps, for these reasons, Douglas G Baird and Donald S Bernstein mentioned that the 
departure from absolute priority is commonplace in US corporate reorganization, though it is 
fiercely debated.
71
 In the UK, as reported by Julian R Franks and his co-authors,
72
 it is rare to 
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see the deviation from absolute priority in formal rescue procedures; however, in informal 
rescues, such deviation is not uncommon.
73
  
The deviation from absolute priority may, however, only be suitable and justifiable in 
the reorganizations of SMEs.
74
 Most SMEs are personally owned and managed. Given that 
SMEs are personally managed, a going concern sale rescue is highly unlikely because it 
would be quite difficult and even unrealistic in some instances for an outside buyer to step in 
and turn the company around. Meanwhile, without the involvement of old equity-managers, 
the going-concern value of these SMEs will be materially reduced; in turn, creditor interests 
will also be jeopardised. Perhaps, because of these concerns, prior to the US’s Bankruptcy 
Code of 1978, absolute priority was not mandatory in reorganizations of SMEs.
75
 
Interestingly, this may echo corporate rescues in Japan where, according to Theodore 
Eisenberg and Shoichi Tagashira,
76
 absolute priority can be legally put aside in bankruptcy 
rescues of SMEs.  
But, the deviation from absolute priority is also hotly disputed, because it raises serious 
concerns about its negative effects on market efficiency. First and foremost, Douglas G Baird 
argued that deviating from absolute priority in pursuit of a pragmatic rescue may compromise 
the legal certainty and predictability of creditors in the market.
77
 Without deviating from 
absolute priority, creditors would be more confident in extending credit, since they are aware 
that the absolute priority rule provides them the protection in case of the debtor’s insolvency. 
In anticipation of potential deviation from absolute priority, however, creditors would be 
either more hesitant to extend credit or charge higher interest rates to cover potential and 
extra losses. Stanley D Longhofer noted that creditors are ‘unwilling to provide any funding 
to these borrowers at any rate of interest’ if they are aware that the absolute priority rule will 
be breached in the event of bankruptcy.
78
  
                                                 
 
73
 For example, in the informal rescue case of British Energy, the absolute priority rule was relaxed to 
facilitate the rescue. See Committee of Public Accounts, The Restructuring of British Energy (HC 2006-07, 
892). 
74
 Baird and Rasmussen (n 57) 947-8.  
75
 John D Ayer, ‘Rethinking Absolute Priority after Ahlers’ (1989) 87 Michigan Law Review 963, 977.  
76
 Theodore Eisenberg and Shoichi Tagashira, ‘Should We Abolish Chapter 11? The Evidence from Japan’ 
(1994) 23 The Journal of Legal Studies 111, 150.  
77
 Baird (n 24) 590-2.  
78
 Stanley D Longhofer, ‘Absolute Priority Rule Violations, Credit Rationing, and Efficiency’ (1997) 6 
Journal of Financial Intermediation 249, 259. 
 28 
 
As a consequence, if creditors are unwilling to provide credit or charge higher interest 
rates because of the deviation from absolute priority in corporate rescues, market efficiency 
will inevitably be harmed.  
Second, Lucian A Bebchuk suggested that deviation from the absolute priority rule may 
also give rise to moral hazard, since rewarding equity managers by relaxing absolute priority 
may send the wrong message to the market - managers will not be responsible for their own 
mistakes that have caused company failures.
79
 Business ethics could thus be at stake.  
Bebchuk continued to argue that
80
 moral hazard may also be caused by reckless business 
ventures by managers when they anticipate deviating from absolute priority in incipient 
formal rescues. Because of the potential deviation from absolute priority, the company’s 
managers may be emboldened to engage in high-risk-and-high-reward ventures. They know 
that if the venture succeeds, they will be rewarded because of deviating from absolute priority 
in future formal rescues, but they have nothing to lose if the venture fails, as it is creditors 
who have to bear the full costs. This creates moral hazard. Thus, deviating from absolute 
priority may raise business ethical concerns and place creditor interests in greater jeopardy.  
These worries, however, may be superfluous, because they fail to consider the 
preconditions for deviating from the absolute priority rule in corporate reorganization. First, it 
is worth noting that deviating from absolute priority is not unconditional; instead, it must be 
strictly premised upon the consent of disadvantaged parties in corporate rescues, whether it is 
a formal or informal rescue.
81
 This suggests that creditors’ legal certainty and predictability 
about absolute priority will not be sacrificed or undermined. Instead, creditors are given more 
options. They can choose to be paid out of the company’s entire liquidation value without the 
continued service of old equity-managers. Alternatively, they can invite the equity-managers 
to rebuild the company together and share the going concern value in excess of liquidation 
value contributed by the latter. So, in real terms, market efficiency will not be compromised.  
Second, it is true that business ethnics would be threatened if managers are not 
responsible for their own mistakes or misconduct that lead to the company bankruptcy. It 
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should, however, be remembered that the corporate rescue regime is only designed and is 
open to companies whose failures are not due to dishonesty or fraud; in other words, a 
company will be excluded from the corporate rescue procedure if there is evidence that its 
failure involves morally unacceptable conduct.
82
 So, the concern about moral hazard will, in 
theory, at least, be ruled out because dishonest companies and their managers will not be 
allowed to enter formal rescue processes at the first stage. Of course, in practice, a screening 
test
83
 of rescue eligibility should be stringently enforced so as to prevent moral hazard from 
arising. 
In sum, deviating from absolute priority is aimed to facilitate a viable and pragmatic 
rescue, and, at the same time, market efficiency will be enhanced rather than undermined if 
the deviation can be processed under the established rules.  
5. COURT CONFIRMATION OF REORGANIZATION PLANS 
The reorganization plan is at the heart of a corporate reorganization procedure. After the 
reorganization plan is voted on by all classes of impaired parties, it may be subject to court 
confirmation, although this varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In the US, for example, 
under its bankruptcy law, a reorganization plan must be confirmed by the court.
84
 By contrast, 
in the UK, a reorganization plan (a proposal) will take effect immediately after being voted 
on by creditors without the need to be confirmed by the court.
85
 China seems to have 
followed the US practice, since a reorganization plan in China’s corporate reorganization 
must be eventually confirmed by the court.
86
  
If a reorganization plan has been accepted by the majority of all classes of voters, it may 
be subject to a normal court confirmation procedure. In some instances, however, if a 
reorganization plan has failed to win support from all classes of voters, its proponent can still 
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ask for court confirmation if certain requirements are met by the plan; this kind of strong 
judicial intervention is dubbed as a cram-down
87
 in the US corporate reorganization regime. 
China has also transplanted cram-downs into its bankruptcy law.  
This part of the literature review focuses on the criteria used by courts to assess 
reorganization plans in both normal and cram-down confirmation processes.  
5.1. General Requirements 
To be confirmed by the court, a reorganization plan must, in general, pass the following 
tests. First, Kenneth N Klee argued that a reorganization plan cannot be confirmed unless and 
until it has been accepted by at least one class of impaired parties that are not insiders.
88
 Such 
a requirement might provide quite a low threshold, especially under Chapter 11 in the US 
where creditors are often divided into many classes to reflect their distinctive claims.
89
 The 
more such these classes are created, the more easily this test is passed. It can be argued that 
the US has a pro-rescue regime, so that policymakers tend to see more rescue plans 
confirmed by reducing the hurdles of approval.  
Second, as discussed by H Miles Cohn, a reorganization plan should be made in good 
faith if it seeks confirmation.
90
 Put simply, a reorganization plan should be made with 
honesty and with real intention to implement it. The good faith test, however, appears to be 
very subjective and elusive. Interestingly, the US Bankruptcy Code does not give the exact 
definition as to what constitutes good faith.
91
 In practice, judges in the US are given a great 
deal of leeway to interpret good faith. It is suggested that this test concentrates on assessing 
whether the proponent of the plan has fully disclosed information to objecting parties. 
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Third, Kenneth N Klee has argued that a reorganization plan must also pass the creditor-
best-interest test: creditors must be paid no less than they would be in liquidation.
92
 The 
underlying rationale here is that a rescue task cannot be pursued to the detriment of creditors. 
More specifically, the test makes clear that the company’s liquidation value must be entirely 
used to meet creditors’ claims. But, as for the company’s going concern value in excess of its 
liquidation value, this test is silent and does not specify who should be the statutory recipients. 
John D Ayer has argued that the US lawmakers initially intended that a company’s total 
going concern value should go to creditors,
93
 but this test seems to somehow deviate from 
this intention. Probably, the distribution of the company’s going concern value in excess of 
its liquidation value is left to renegotiations between creditors and shareholders, so that this 
test is aimed to give more flexibility to interested parties.  
In practice, this test faces difficulties caused by inaccuracies inherent in making asset 
valuations.
94
 As discussed before, asset valuations are always subjective and inaccurate. This 
test, as a result, will be more easily met if the company’s assets are undervalued; also, this 
test may put higher pressure on related parties in the event of overestimation. It was argued 
by Water W Miller Jr
95
 that the main danger here is in making under-valuations. Given that a 
company is deeply distressed, the relevant parties’ expectations to the company’s future will 
be supressed, and this may naturally lead to low valuations of assets. In the case of under-
valuations, junior parties, in particular unsecured creditors and shareholders will be harmed, 
although the creditor-best-test is superficially passed. 
Fourth, Kenneth N Klee argued that
96
 a reorganization plan must comply with the 
absolute priority principle, unless the disadvantaged parties have agreed with its deviation. 
This requirement is critical for protecting creditors; in turn, it may minimise the negative 
effects in the wider market caused by deviating from absolute priority. It is worth noting here 
that the absolute priority principle is a default rather than mandatory rule in corporate rescues; 
the flexibility of absolute priority can be used only at the option of creditors. This 
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requirement is also consistent with the creditor-best-interest test, which paves the way for 
shareholders (mainly shareholder managers) to share the going concern value in excess of the 
company’s liquidation value. It is rather for mutual benefits if creditors decide to invite 
equity-managers to join the rescue by relaxing the absolute priority doctrine, because the 
continued service of the latter will certainly increase the company’s going concern value.  
Apart from these general tests, a reorganization plan must pass another important test, 
the feasibility test, which will be reviewed separately in the next section because of its 
significance.  
5.2. The Feasibility Test 
Nancy Rhein Baldiga argued that, in the US, in order to get a reorganization plan to be 
confirmed by the court, the proponent must first convince judges that the plan is feasible; 
namely, that it is most likely for the debtor to survive if the plan is confirmed.
 97
 Baldiga 
pointed out that, although the feasibility test is rather subjective, at its heart is it likely to 
require cash injection, because the provision of cash is crucial for both the company’s 
ongoing business operation and paying creditors as promised in the plan.
98
 In reality, 
however, Baldiga argued that judges in the US seemed not to be very competent in assessing 
the feasibility of reorganization plans on the grounds that there were still many reorganization 
plans that passed judges’ feasibility tests but eventually failed.99 Such facts suggested that 
judges might not be highly competent in assessing the feasibility of reorganization plans, but 
these can also be understood as they promoted rescue outcomes by being lenient to rescue 
plans.  
In general, a reorganization plan may be comprised of two basic sub-plans: the first is to 
restructure the company’s business, and the second is to distribute the company’s value 
among interested parties. Thus, the feasibility test should concentrate on examining the sub-
plan on business restructuring. Given that the business restructuring plan is rather a 
commercial judgement, it requires the judge assessing the plan to have relevant knowledge of 
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both the company’s own business model and market conditions. Judges, however, are legal 
experts, so assessing a corporate business restructuring plan, which is replete of commercial 
decisions, may be far beyond the capacity of judges. Not surprisingly, as observed by Harvey 
R Miller that, in the US, bankruptcy judges have ‘only limited authority, ability, resources, 
and expertise’ to evaluate a plan’s feasibility.100  
Baldiga continued to argue that in practice judges tend to rely on ammunition provided 
by rejecting parties to assess whether the plan is feasible, since these parties have incentives 
to challenge the restructuring plan with their own insight and understanding.
101
 Listening to 
opposing views would be quite useful for a judge in helping her to reach a proper feasibility 
judgement. In particular, it seems to be advisable for judges to consider dissenting views 
presented by the company’s banks and main suppliers, because the latter usually possess a 
depth of understanding of the company’s business through their close monitoring and long-
term business relationships. 
Furthermore, to reach a sound feasibility judgement, in some instances, judges may hire 
business management experts to give professional evidence, but this raises the problem of 
increasing costs.  
Interestingly, bearing in mind that the feasibility test is largely a commercial judgement, 
Klaus Kamlah reported 
102
 that, in Germany, judges are not required to assess a 
reorganization plan’s feasibility, and this is left for creditors to decide whether a 
reorganization plan should be allowed to go. But German practice should be understood in its 
own historic context of the bankruptcy system. Germany did not have a formal corporate 
rescue regime until 1994, which means that there would be few experienced judges to fulfil 
the role in assessing a reorganization plan’s feasibility. Meanwhile, there is no separated 
bankruptcy court system in Germany; perhaps, as a result, there might not be many judges 
specialising in corporate bankruptcy. It is realistic not to require judges to do such highly 
technical jobs.
103
 By contrast, in the US, the corporate reorganization regime has been 
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developing for over a hundred years, and there is a relatively mature bankruptcy judicial 
system with trained and experienced bankruptcy judges in office.
104
  
In a nutshell, the feasibility test gives objecting parties a chance to challenge the 
seriousness of a rescue plan and opens the door to necessary state intervention. With regard to 
the scope of state intervention, it is recommended that judges conservatively play their 
judicial roles in assessing the feasibility of a reorganization plan; in particular, a plan will be 
deemed to be feasible if it has been supported by the majority of impaired parties or if there 
are no substantial feasibility challenges raised by objecting parties.
105
   
 5.3. The Use of Cram-downs 
Ideally, prior to seeking confirmation, a reorganization plan has been accepted by all 
classes of impaired parties, and is therefore subject to a normal confirmation process. For 
various reasons, however, a plan may have failed to win sufficient votes in some classes; 




Perhaps because of concerns that cram-downs may undermine freedom of contract,
107
 
this mechanism is not available in the UK and many European continental countries,
108
 nor is 




 For the sake of efficiency of corporate 
reorganization procedures, China borrowed this procedure from the US, transplanting it into 
its new EBL 2006.
111
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Kenneth N Klee argued that, although cram-downs have been included in Chapter 11 of 
the US Bankruptcy Code, policy makers did not expect it to be used frequently, and it was 
rather intended to facilitate negotiations between interested parties.
112
 More specifically, it 
was emphasized by Jack Friedman that cram-downs were actually designed to improve the 
efficiency of rescue processes and to prevent unnecessary delays.
113
 So, a cram-down is 
rather a rule that is intended to be a last resort; it provides a chance for a fair and equitable 
reorganization plan to be confirmed in an efficient way. Given that a cram-down reflects 
strong state intervention, certain conditions must be met if a cram-down is imposed.  
Jack Friedman found that, in general, there are two extra tests which must be passed if a 
cram-down is issued. First, objecting parties cannot be discriminated against in the plan; 
second, the plan should be fair and equitable.
114
 Friedman noted that the first test is, in 
essence, to ensure that the pari passu principle is complied with and the second test is used to 
determine whether the absolute priority principle has been applied.
115
  
Obviously, these two tests are used to ensure fairness and equity between creditors as 
well as between creditors and shareholders. Within creditors, the fundamental principle of 
collectivity requires that they share the company’s value commensurate with each claim; 
namely, they recoup pro rata where their claims cannot be fully met out of the company’s 
value. Meanwhile, as to relationships between shareholder and creditor, the absolute priority 
principle sets out the boundaries regarding how the company’s value can be distributed 
between these two groups.  
Given that these two tests are compulsory in the cram-down confirmation procedures, 
the contrary should also be well understood: if it is a normal confirmation procedure, the pari 
passu and absolute priority rules can be relaxed with the consent of disadvantaged parties, 
and this may, as argued before, give considerable flexibility to relevant parties to pursue a 
rescue outcome.  
In sum, a series of tests are designed for courts to assess whether a reorganization plan 
can be confirmed. A court confirmation procedure might be essential in order to ensure that 
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some basic corporate bankruptcy principles are complied with and that impaired parties are 
treated with fairness and equity.  
6. CONCLUSIONS 
In reviewing the above literature, several issues about the corporate reorganization 
regime have been addressed.  
First, in regard to entry into a corporate reorganization procedure, a review of literature 
indicates that consideration must be given to encouraging early rescue petitions. For the sake 
of an early rescue, the US resorts to a debtor-in-possession approach so as to induce debtors 
to file for reorganization, and the UK seeks to rely on a wrongful trading mechanism to warn 
debtors to take early rescue actions. In practice, a debtor-in-possession system seems to be 
more effective than wrongful trading in producing more early rescues. But, it can be argued 
that a debtor-in-possession is necessary for an early rescue but it is not sufficient. Attention 
should also be paid to empowering creditors to use liquidation to collect outstanding debts. A 
debtor-in-possession is not enough to instigate an early rescue unless there is powerful 
liquidation pressure from creditors.  
 With regard to control in corporate reorganization, different countries have their own 
different models. In the US, debtors are generally allowed to remain in charge but have to 
bear fiduciary duties to serve all impaired parties in rescue processes. In the UK, debtors will 
be automatically replaced by IPs in rescues, because UK business culture does not have 
confidence in the ability of debtors who have brought companies into troubles to be able to 
turn them around. Given that debtors possess the information and knowledge of troubled 
companies, the involvement of debtors in rescues seem to be more effective to accomplish 
rescue goals. Of course, to prevent abuse, debtors running rescues should be under intense 
scrutiny by courts, creditors or by both of them.  
Concerning value distribution in corporate reorganization, through this review of the 
literature, it was found that absolute priority is strictly applied in UK corporate rescues, but in 
US Chapter 11 proceedings, deviations from it are possible but are subject to certain 
conditions. Absolute priority is one of the most fundamental principles in bankruptcy law, 
and the worry here is that deviation from it in corporate rescues may negatively affect the 
legal certainty and predictability of creditors in the wide market which in turn may undermine 
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market efficiency. But the existing studies show that the potential drawbacks of deviating 
from absolute priority in reorganization have been addressed and taken into account. In 
particular, it has been learned from the existing literature that deviations should first occur 
with the consent of disadvantaged parties and, second, deviations should be aimed at 
preserving and increasing company going concern values. Creditors’ legal certainty and 
predictability, as a result, will not be compromised, and more importantly, their interests will 
be enhanced by the flexibility of absolute priority in reorganization.  
Regarding the court confirmation of reorganization plans, it was found that, in US 
Chapter 11s, a series of tests have been established for courts to ensure fairness and equity in 
reorganization plans. These tests are of importance in safeguarding some basic bankruptcy 
principles. Some may view court confirmation as state intervention, but it can also be 
contended that this is more like state protection.  
The corporate reorganization regime is multifaceted and should be understood and 
implemented by taking into account all its principles and preconditions; otherwise, we may 
be unable to distinguish the essential from the secondary. 
After reviewing the relevant literature, the next chapter will describe the contextual 
background of China’s corporate reorganization law. In particular, it will give a brief history 
of Chinese bankruptcy law, and the making of the Chinese new corporate rescue system will 






The previous chapter reviewed relevant literature on some major principles and practices 
of the corporate reorganization regime and formed a tentative view that corporate 
reorganization will create a situation wherein both creditors and debtors would benefit from 
rescue outcomes. In the meantime, a review of the literature suggested that some concerns on 
the negative effects of the rescue regime are really exaggerated, as the potential downsides of 
this regime have already been taken into account and some counter-abuse mechanisms have 
also been made available.  
 In the light of the apparent merits of the corporate rescue regime, in recent decades there 
seemed to have been a global trend for many countries to establish or enhance their own 
corporate bankruptcy reorganization laws.
1
 For example, based on the recommendations of 
the Cork Report in the UK, the Insolvency Act 1986 was enacted so as to nurture a corporate 
rescue culture; moreover, for the sake of strengthening the rescue regime, the UK 
administrative receivership was virtually abolished by the Enterprise Act 2002 so as to give 
way to the new administration procedure, thereby creating a purer rescue process.
2
 Similar 
rescue-friendly insolvency law reforms have also been undertaken in the US
3
 and in more 






 as well as in other European countries.
7
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Many efforts have also been made by international institutions, as well as some regional 
ones, to facilitate the spread of the corporate rescue culture. For example, in 2005 a 
Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law was prepared by the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL); this Guide gives support to the idea that a second 
chance should be given to financially distressed companies for the common good.
8
 The 
World Bank was also involved in promoting the corporate rescue culture worldwide, and this 
is reflected in the Bank’s Insolvency Principles and Guidelines (April 2001), and both formal 




Apart from the UN and the World Bank, much promotion of the corporate rescue culture 
has been undertaken by the OECD and the IMF.
10
 In particular, in partnership with the Asian 
Development Bank and others, between 1999 and 2009, the OECD organized a series of 
bankruptcy law conferences to consult with experts in Asian countries as to updating their 
national bankruptcy systems.
11
 During this period, the merits of corporate reorganization 
were widely discussed and debated in Asia.
12
   
In response to this global move to revamp corporate bankruptcy laws, China, as the 
second biggest economy in the world,
13
 seemed to have been influenced by the changing 
focus of corporate bankruptcy norms. In 1993, China started to revise its corporate 
bankruptcy legislation with a view to establishing a rescue-oriented corporate insolvency 
system.
14
 Its progress to a modern rescue-friendly bankruptcy regime took twelve years to 
achieve, as the new rescue-oriented law, the P. R. China Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 2006 
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(the EBL 2006), was not passed by China’s People’s Congress until 27 August 2006, 15 
coming into effect on 1 June 2007.
16
  
On the face of it, the EBL 2006 is rescue-friendly and even rescue-centred. The face that 
its chapter on bankruptcy reorganization comes before chapters on liquidation and 
compromise suggests that corporate reorganization would be intended to be the first option 
when corporate bankruptcy procedures are considered.
17
 
This chapter explores the contextual background of China’s corporate reorganization law. 
Given that corporate rescue law is part of corporate bankruptcy law, a brief history of China’s 
bankruptcy law will also be investigated. The remainder of this chapter is divided into four 
parts. (i) Part 2 describes China’s successive bankruptcy laws before 1949, and in particular 
the notion of a second chance or a fresh start in these bankruptcy laws will be examined. (ii) 
Part 3 analyses the China EBL 1986 that was the first corporate bankruptcy legislation of the 
Communist Administration after 1949; much attention will be paid to its corporate 
reorganization procedure and its implementation.
18
 (iii) Part 4 concentrates on analysing 
China’s most recent corporate rescue law, the EBL 2006. The legal framework of the new 
corporate rescue regime will be discussed. Finally, (iv) Part 5 will present some conclusions. 
2. CHINA’S BANKRUPTCY LAWS BEFORE 1949 
In China’s feudal societies before the 20th century, agriculture was at the heart of the 
national economy; by contrast, commercial activities, such as trade, were largely constrained, 
because China’s authorities traditionally believed that it was agriculture not commerce that 
was critical to social prosperity.
19
 As a consequence, commerce was rather marginalized in 
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China’s feudal societies. The lack of commercial activities in ancient China may partly 
explain the absence of bankruptcy law, because bankruptcy is firmly associated with debts 
that in turn flow from trading.
20
  
In the ancient China, as in most western countries, defaulting in debt payment was 
deemed to be a criminal offence that would result in penalties being imposed upon the debtor 
ranging from being flogged to being imprisoned; such an approach remained in force in 
China until the end of the Qing Dynasty in 1911.
21
 In addition, there was a long-standing 
custom in China for debts to be inherited, which was encapsulated as the saying ‘the son pays 
his father’s debts’.22 Recent research indicated that such a custom is still practiced in some 
regions in China today.
23
  
Thus, given that commerce was constrained, and that there was a harsh debt enforcement 
system, there appears to be little room for bankruptcy law to develop in the ancient China.  
In the middle of the 19
th
 century, however, China’s authorities increasingly realised24 the 
importance of commerce and industry because they acknowledged that the widening gap 
between the East and the West at that time was mainly attributed to China’s underdeveloped 
industry and trade systems. As a response, major economic policies started to change. In 
particular, after the defeats in two Opium Wars in the 1860s, China campaigned to establish 
its own industries.
25
 Although it would be premature to jump to the conclusion that the 
radically changed economic policies at that time directly resulted in China’s first bankruptcy 
law, at least the proliferation of businesses after that period did pave the way for a bankruptcy 
law to emerge. 
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Near the end of the Qing Dynasty, partly due to the government’s determination to 
establish a modern commercial law system mainly by borrowing from abroad
26
 and partly 
because of the practical need to handle business crises,
27
 China’s first bankruptcy law was 
enacted in 1906.  
2.1. The Bankruptcy Law of 1906 
In May 1906,
28
 the Bankruptcy Law 1906, the first Chinese bankruptcy law, obtained the 
royal assent and was promulgated.
29
 This law had been proposed by the Ministry of 
Commerce. The 1906 law had nine chapters containing sixty-nine articles.
30
  
The 1906 law had a wide scope of application. Specifically, both individuals and 
companies could file for bankruptcy. 
31
 Meanwhile, the bankruptcy procedure under the 1906 
law was largely a civil society supervised process, i.e., there was little state
32
 involvement in 
bankruptcy procedures.
33
 A debtor could file for bankruptcy before a local Chamber of 
Commerce, the non-governmental organization, which was responsible for appointing a 
trustee who would take over the debtor’s assets and business affairs. Although bankruptcy 
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To seek equality between creditors, the pari passu principle was set out in the 1906 law. 
Including the pari passu principle in the bankruptcy law was a significant step towards 
building a modern bankruptcy law in China, because before the 1906 law, creditors were 
treated differently according to their different status. In particular, before 1906, in the case of 
a business bankruptcy, foreign creditors were placed at the top of the payment ranking 
followed by state creditors, with other domestic creditors ranked at the bottom.
35
 Thus, the 
1906 law was revolutionary, as this was the first time that all creditors were treated equally in 
China’s bankruptcy proceedings. 
More importantly, the 1906 law was intended to provide a fresh start for unfortunate but 
honest debtors; Article 66 stipulated that unpaid debts could be discharged on condition that 
the bankruptcy did not involve bad faith.
36
 In the event of fraud or dishonesty, defaulted debts 
could not be discharged; instead, Chapter 6 of the 1906 law set out how to open a criminal 
investigation and to prosecute unscrupulous debtors.
37
  
After the 1906 law came into effect, there was an unexpected backlash from business 
sectors, especially the banking businesses in Shanghai, Ningbo and Zhenjiang, etc. It was 
rumoured that banks objected to the pari passu principle, among other objections.
38
 The 
banks’ voices were so strong that in November 190739 a proposal was made by the Ministry 
of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce (the former Ministry of Commerce)
40
 to the Emperor, 
stating that the 1906 law should be ‘deliberated’ further because of the resistance it 
encountered. It was also suggested that the 1906 law should be amended to comply with the 
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incipient commercial code. This proposal received the royal approval shortly afterwards.
41
 
Controversially, this royal assent was widely regarded as a revocation of the Bankruptcy Law 
1906, although the proposal did not explicitly state that the law should be nullified.
42
  
Perhaps because of the ambiguity inherent in the above proposal, the 1906 law was still 
used in some regions in China after this time,
43
 but was suspended in other regions after 
1907.
44
 However, this law was entirely abandoned in 1911 when the Qing Dynasty, the last 
feudal royal family in China, crumbled because of the Republican Revolution.
45
   
2.2. The Bankruptcy Bill of 1915 




In 1915, the Republic Warlords Government in Beijing
47
 released a Bankruptcy Bill that 
had three parts containing 337 articles.
48
 Unfortunately, the 1915 Bill was never officially 
passed by the legislature.
49
 Interestingly, in 1926, after being shelved for over ten years, the 
Ministry of Justice of the Warlords Government circulated the 1915 Bill to Chinese law 
courts, instructing them that the principles embedded in the Bill could be used by judges to 
try bankruptcy disputes.
50
 Despite the ambiguity of its status, some features of the 1915 Bill 
are still worth mentioning.  
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In order to give a fresh start to debtors, the 1915 Bill stipulated that income earned by a 
debtor after the bankruptcy declaration was excluded from the estate, which meant that this 
would enable the debtor to have a more viable recovery after bankruptcy.
51
 At the same time, 
to encourage a potential rescue, the 1915 Bill allowed debtors to initiate reconciliation plans 




Unlike the 1906 law that used a Chamber of Commerce to supervise bankruptcy, the 
1915 Bill designated law courts to do this job. It was a court that was empowered to appoint a 
trustee to manage the estate, and even a meeting of creditors should also be convened by the 
court.
53




Without a valid bankruptcy law, China’s courts mainly relied upon local custom55 and 
some basic legal principles
56
 when adjudicating bankruptcy disputes during this period.  
The 1915 Bill did not survive long. The Beijing Warlords Government was defeated in 
an internal power struggle in 1928, and after that the central Republic Government moved its 
capital from Beijing to Nanjing.
57
 Several years later, the Kuomintang-dominated Nanjing 
Republic Government officially enacted a new bankruptcy law.  
2.3. The Bankruptcy Law of 1935 
The Bankruptcy Law 1935 was promulgated by the Legislative Yuan, the parliament of 
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The 1935 law assimilated many principles derived from UK and French bankruptcy 
statutes. It had four parts and 159 articles. The four parts were general principles, conciliation, 
liquidation, and bankruptcy offences, respectively.
59
  
The 1935 law was acclaimed by many scholars as a masterpiece of legal transplantation 
that integrated foreign advanced bankruptcy norms with local conventions.
60
 For instance, the 
1935 law advocated China’s business practice of conciliation by placing the conciliation 
procedure as the first option in bankruptcy; the law even went a step further: a conciliation 
agreement supervised either by a law court or by a local Chamber of Commerce could be 
recognized under the 1935 law.
61
  
Although the 1935 law was well regarded, little was known of its implementation. 
Perhaps this was because after it came into effect, China was mired in civil war for decades,
62
 
and it may largely have remained a dead letter in the statute books.  
Unfortunately, the 1935 law also had a premature death; in 1949, when the Communist 
Party won the civil war and founded a new government, all statutes enacted by the former 
Kuomintang Government were revoked. The 1935 law was also revoked.
63
 This law 
remained in force only in Taiwan after 1949, and remains so today.
64
  
Overall, between 1906 and 1949, there were three bankruptcy statutes in China that were 
mainly designed to provide an orderly debt collection procedure for creditors and to relieve 
honest but unfortunate debtors.  
With regard to the bankruptcy rescue culture that may have developed, it is fair to say 
that there were almost no explicit concepts of rescue found in these statutes. But, it is 
noteworthy that some implied rescue principles can still be seen in these laws. For instance, it 
was evident from all these bankruptcy laws that bankruptcy relief, in the form of discharging 
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debts, could be given to honest debtors. Furthermore, an honest but unfortunate debtor could 
even be allowed to retain some assets on humanitarian grounds. More importantly, a 
conciliation procedure was highlighted in the successive bankruptcy laws, which suggested 
that, with debt forgiveness, a debtor might have a better chance to survive in the future.  
After 1949, because of the command economy imposed by the new Communist 
Government, the bankruptcy system was deemed to be unnecessary in China for almost 40 
years afterwards.  
3. CHINA ENTERPRISE BANKRUPTCY LAW OF 1986 
In 1978, after China’s Cultural Revolution, the Communist Government in China made 
efforts to reform its economy so as to bring the country back on track,
65
 and its loss-making 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were seen as being in need of special attention.
66
 To tackle 
heavily indebted SOEs, China’s policy-makers realised that a bankruptcy law would be a 
useful tool to cull inefficient SOEs.
67
  
Not surprisingly, bankruptcy reorganization was also discussed and deliberated by 
China’s bankruptcy law drafters at this time, although their knowledge and understanding on 
this subject were quite limited.
68
 Some proposals were raised in China, particularly, it was 
suggested some troubled SOEs could be reorganized rather than liquidated in bankruptcy, 
because liquidating inefficient SOEs had to be weighed against its social effects.
69
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After a fierce debate
71
 as to whether it was politically sensible to have an enterprise 
bankruptcy law within a socialist regime, the reformers won the battle; the Enterprise 
Bankruptcy Law 1986 (For Trial Implementation) (the EBL1986) was eventually passed by 
China’s People’s Congress on 2 December 1986, coming into force on 1 November 1988.72 
3.1. The Main Features of the EBL 1986 
The EBL 1986 had a limited scope of application: it only applied to SOEs.
73
 This meant 
that individuals and non-state-owned enterprises could not seek bankruptcy relief under the 
EBL 1986. Such a limited scope of application was set up because the government only 
intended to have a bankruptcy law to help reform SOEs; in other words, this law was not 
aimed at creating a debt collection system for creditors.
74
 In particular, this law had two 
specific goals.  The first was to liquidate distressed SOEs if the government thought it was 
necessary to do so.
75
 The second was warning managers of underperforming SOEs that the 
central government was serious, and that some money-losing SOEs would be liquidated if 
they could not regain profitability as required by the government.
76
 Thus, it is clear that the 
EBL 1986 was not made for creditors as part of the debt collecting systems.  
Meanwhile, the EBL 1986 established strong government control in bankruptcy, 
although, at first sight, bankruptcy procedures were court-supervised.
77
 Firm government 
control can be seen in many aspects. For example, a bankruptcy procedure could not be 
entered until and unless government permission was given.
78
 When accepting a bankruptcy 
filing, the court had to appoint a government organized liquidation committee as the trustee 
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 The government’s dominance in the bankruptcy of SOEs seemed to 
reflect the socialist ideology whereby a socialist bankruptcy law should, as argued by one 
legal scholar in China, prioritize state interests,
80
 and in order to achieve this goal, it was a 
necessity to place government at the helm of the SOE bankruptcy procedure.  
Furthermore, bankruptcy procedures under the EBL 1986 called for little involvement by 
professionals, such as lawyers and accountants. As mentioned above, a trustee had to be a 
government organized liquidation committee that was comprised of senior officials from 
relevant government agencies;
81
 professionals, such as lawyers, did not have the chance to be 
included on these committees,
 82
 although China’s legal profession had been restored years 
before the promulgation of the EBL 1986.
83
  
Moreover, a glance at the EBL 1986 suggests that this law was pro-rescue or rescue-
friendly, as there was one chapter dedicated to bankruptcy reorganization. Even the corporate 
reorganization procedure seemed to be arranged as the first option in the bankruptcy law as 
the chapter on reorganization was placed before that on liquidation.
84
  
But, the corporate reorganization procedure under the EBL 1986 appeared to be deeply 
flawed mainly because of its application process. Under Article 17 of the EBL 1986, a 
reorganization procedure could not be straightforwardly filed in court; instead, it had to be 
based upon a liquidation procedure that has already been filed by creditors. More 
contentiously, converting a liquidation into a reorganization procedure had to be requested by 
a government agency that supervised the debtor SOE - neither creditors nor debtors were 
allowed to directly petition for reorganization under the EBL 1986.  
If the court agreed with the government’s reorganization request, a liquidation procedure 
would change into a reorganization, and the EBL 1986 gave the government up to two years 
to restructure the debtor.
85
 Before the deadline, the debtor that was supervised by the 
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government was liable to submit a reorganization plan for a vote to a meeting of creditors,
86
 
and the reorganization process might lead to a successful conclusion if the plan was accepted 
by the creditors’ meeting and was later confirmed by the court.87 
Although the EBL 1986 was criticized for being too simple and ambiguous, it was the 
first attempt by the socialist China to develop its legal framework on corporate bankruptcy. 
Given that the EBL 1986 was only applicable to SOEs, China later enacted a law to regulate 
the bankruptcy of non-state-owned enterprises.  
3.2. Bankruptcy Law for Non-State-Owned Enterprises 
To fill the gap left by the EBL 1986, a chapter regulating the bankruptcy of non-state-
owned enterprises was inserted into China’s Civil Procedure Law 1991.88 Thereafter, China 
established a bifurcated bankruptcy law system;
89
 the bankruptcy of SOEs was regulated by 
the EBL 1986 and the bankruptcy of non-state-owned enterprises was subject to the Civil 
Procedure Law 1991. It is noteworthy that the concept of a non-state-owned enterprise was 
broadly interpreted in China, as it included collectively-owned, private and foreign-invested 
enterprises. 
Under Article 199 of China’s Civil Procedure Law 1991, a bankruptcy liquidation 
procedure could be petitioned either by a debtor or its creditors in the event of insolvency. A 
similar corporate reorganization procedure was also made available in this law. Under Article 
202, during a liquidation procedure, the debtor could propose a reconciliation plan, and a 
possible rescue outcome could be reached if the plan was agreed to by the creditors’ meeting 
and was confirmed by the court. Again, the application process of a conciliation procedure 
had the same drawback as that found in the EBL 1986. A conciliation procedure could not be 
filed directly; it also had to be based on a liquidation procedure that had already been filed by 
creditors. More contentiously, only the debtor enterprise was allowed to propose a 
conciliation plan. Overall, like the EBL 1986, the bankruptcy chapter in China’s Civil 
Procedure Law 1991 was also too simple, lacking details for its effective implementation. 
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In addition to the EBL 1986 and the Civil Procedure Law 1991, several judicial 
interpretations were issued by China’s Supreme People’s Court that sought to clarify 
bankruptcy issues.
90
 The corporate reorganization procedures were also given some further 
guidelines by the Court in these documents.
91
  
3.3. Weak Implementation 
From 1989, when the first bankruptcy law, the EBL 1986, came into effect, China’s 
courts began to handle enterprise bankruptcy. In practice, however, there were not many 
bankruptcy cases. Figure 1 shows that the number of enterprise bankruptcy cases rose from 
98 in 1989 to 8939 in 2001, although between these dates there were fluctuations. The 
number then declined gradually to 2857 in 2006.  
It was estimated that about 800,000 enterprises were dissolved each year in China.
92
 
Therefore, bearing in mind such a number, only a very small proportion of dissolving 
enterprises used corporate bankruptcy procedures to settle defaulted debts.  
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Si Yuan Think Tank, Beijing 2011
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With regard to the relatively small number of corporate bankruptcy cases, it can be 
argued that this was mainly due to the Chinese government not wanting to see many 
enterprises being liquidated for fear of massive unemployment,
93
 because the vast majority of 
SOEs were technically bankrupt when the EBL 1986 was promulgated. Put differently, if the 
EBL 1986 had been rigorously implemented in China, nearly all the SOEs should have been 
liquidated – this was something that the Chinese government could not afford to do 
politically.  
Although the EBL 1986 was the principal bankruptcy law made for SOEs, a large 
proportion of existing enterprise bankruptcy cases, as shown in Figure 1, were actually used 
to liquidate collectively-owned enterprises
94
 that were also directly managed or controlled by 
government.
95
 For example, it was noted by Prof. Li Shuguang, a leading Chinese bankruptcy 




Presumably, the majority of bankrupt SOEs were quietly dissolved by the government 
through administrative processes, because, by comparison with court-involved bankruptcy 
procedures, administrative processes might give the government a great deal of leeway in 
solving troubled SOE problems.  
In addition, the small number of enterprise bankruptcy cases would also be attributed to 
the insurmountable entry into bankruptcy procedures for private enterprises.
97
 Under Chapter 
19 of the Civil Procedure Law 1991, private companies in China were allowed to file, or to 
be filed by creditors, for bankruptcy. In reality, however, China’s courts virtually denied 
bankruptcy filing for private enterprises.
98
 Without entering bankruptcy procedures, these 
                                                 
 
93
 See a provincial study which indicated the fragility of the social security in China at the Financial 
Committee of Liaoning Provincial Congress of China, ‘Report of Corporate Bankruptcy in Liaoning Province’ 
(1995) 2 Review of Economy（in Chinese）24, 25.  
94
 Weidong Wang, ‘The Scope of Bankruptcy Law and Its History in China’ (2008) 4 Commercial Times 
(in Chinese) 59, 60.  
95
 For example, in Shenyan, one of the bankruptcy trial cities in China, there were eleven local government 
agencies in charge of all collectively-owned enterprises in the city. See further Yongjie Chen and Tao Su, ‘An 
Investigation of Collectively-owned Enterprises Bankruptcy in Shenyan’ (1986) 2 Finance and Economy (in 
Chinese) 34, 35.  
96
 Li (n 77) 1.  
97
 See generally Mike Falke, ‘China’s New Law on Enterprise Bankruptcy: A Story with a Happy End?’ 
(2007) 16 International Insolvency Review 63, 67.  
98
 Weijing Wu, ‘Commencement of Bankruptcy in China: Key Issues in the Proposed New Enterprise 
Bankruptcy and Reorganization Law’ (2004) 35 Victoria University Wellington Law Review 239, 244.  
 53 
 
private company owners often simply chose to walk away from their enterprises,
99
 which 
meant that, on the one hand, they could not access bankruptcy relief, and on the other hand, 
creditors were deprived of this powerful liquidation means to collect debts.  
Overall, China’s enterprise bankruptcy regime was not well implemented before 2006. 
3.4. Corporate Reorganization after the EBL 1986 
As noted above, the EBL 1986 was designed to be a law for liquidation as well as for 
reorganization of enterprises. The reorganization procedure of the EBL 1986, however, was 
rarely used in practice;
100
 this was mainly because of the flaws in its complicated application 
process.  
In fact, the application process of the reorganization procedure of the EBL 1986 was 
somewhat contradictory. Under Article 17 of the EBL 1986, a reorganization procedure had 
to be requested by the government agency that supervised the debtor SOE after a liquidation 
procedure had been filed by creditors. In practice, however, without government permission, 
it was impossible for a liquidation procedure to be entered in the first place. It, therefore, 
seemed to be paradoxical for a government agency to, firstly, agree with a creditor to 
liquidate the debtor in court and, later, to ask the court to convert liquidation into 
reorganization. If the government agency intended to restructure the debtor SOE, it did not 
need to use this superficially complicated route; instead, it could directly restructure the 
debtor enterprise by itself outside the court. This strange route to a formal reorganization 
procedure might, as a result, be one of the main factors that stifled the use of the rescue 
regime under the EBL 1986. 
Similar to the reorganization procedure in the EBL 1986, a corporate rehabilitation 
process for non-state-owned enterprises was made available in Chapter 19 of China’s Civil 
Procedure Law 1991. But, as noted above, it was quite difficult for these enterprise 
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liquidation applications to be accepted by courts at the first stage, let alone to be converted 
into the bankruptcy reorganization procedure at a later stage.
101
  
It is not an exaggeration to say that both reorganization procedures under the EBL 1986 
and China’s Civil Procedure Law 1991 remained a dead letter on the statute book.  
The absence of formal bankruptcy reorganization, however, did not mean that there were 
no informal ones, especially given a huge number of troubled SOEs in China. In fact, outside 
courts, Chinese government efforts to restructure and reorganise money-losing SOEs have 
never stopped after the enactment of the EBL 1986.  
In 1996, for example, the Chinese central government campaigned to reorganize some 
loss-making SOEs by merging them with financially healthy SOEs.
102
 Prof. Li said that in 
1996 a total of 1,192 troubled SOEs were merged with their healthy fellows in China’s fifty-
six central-government-designated experimental cities, and in 1997 this number increased to 
1509.
103
 But such a campaign faced immediate resistance from SOEs.  
One study reveals that this campaign was opposed by both the host and the merged, and 
that it was complaint that government-initiated mergers were like forced marriages, because, 
on the one hand, the government paid little attention to each side’s willingness to join 
together; on the other hand, the commercial feasibility of mergers was always overridden by 
the government’s own political agenda.104 In some instances, the merger led to the collapse of 
two SOEs, because both sides were unhappy with the marriage.
105
  
Given this resistance, China’s central government stopped the merger campaign after 
1997, and soon after the central government’s policy changed to ‘supporting the large SOEs 
and letting go the small ones’, according to which most of the small and uneconomic SOEs 
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were to be declared bankruptcy, sold, shutdown, or privatized, whilst large and strategic 
SOEs were further subsidised and became stronger.
106
  
As noted above, many troubled SOEs were actually reorganized by the government 
without using the formal rescue law under the EBL 1986;
107
 however, troubled private 
companies sometimes had to resort to the informal rescue mechanism under the contract law 
to seek survival,
108
 which might be very difficult in practise. 
After the EBL 1986, China experienced the dramatic move from centrally-planned to a 
market-based economy, as well as remarkable economic growth. These changes required the 
introduction of a modern corporate bankruptcy law. This eventually led to the promulgation 
of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 2006 (the EBL 2006).  
4. CHINA’S ENTERPRISE BANKRUPTCY LAW OF 2006 
As early as 1993, voices were heard requesting the amendment of the EBL 1986,
109
 but 
the pressure to modernise the bankruptcy law probably emanated mostly from rapid changes 
of China’s economy in recent decades.  
4.1. Economic Growth after the EBL 1986 
After 1986, China made substantial progress in its economy. Both its economic structure 
and its status in the global market were reshaped.  
First, the state owned sector in China’s economy shrank considerably after the EBL 1986. 
From 1980 to 1996, for example, the share of industrial output from SOEs in China fell from 
80.2 to 43.2 per cent, being almost halved.
110
 After that, the reduction in the state sector 
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continued. According to the OECD, from 1998 to 2003, the registered share of state 
ownership in China’s industrial firms declined from 37.3 to 13.8 per cent.111  Moreover, 
nationwide SOE reforms were almost finished by 2000: this was because, as noted above, 
nearly all unwanted and loss-making SOEs had been closed down or sold.
112
 In other words, 
concerns over potential massive unemployment caused by bankrupting SOEs were no longer 
relevant.  
Second, in recent decades, there was a burgeoning private sector in China. One report 
has shown that in 2003 the private sector, perhaps for the first time, contributed 52.3 per cent 
of China’s national industrial added value, exceeding the state-owned sector.113 With the 
emergence of a strong private sector, China’s economy at large grew at a striking speed after 
1986. China’s annual gross domestic product (GDP) rose to $10,129 billion in 2010 from 
$4,157 billion in 2003; China maintained its annual economic growth rate at around ten per 
cent for nearly a decade.
114
 As noted above, in 2010, overtaking Japan, China became the 
second largest economy in the world.
115
  
Third, after 1986, China increasingly became a global player in the international 
business community. This was marked by China’s accession to the WTO in 2001.116 Three 
years later, China’s international trade jumped to $53.51billion a year, emerging as the third 
biggest trader worldwide.
117
 In 2006, there were 450 of the World’s Fortune 500 companies 
which directly invested in China.
118
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These economic changes apparently required a revamp of China’s bankruptcy laws.119 
During the same period, pressures from outside China also increased, and this might have 
played an even greater role in persuading China to enact a bankruptcy law that could reflect 
basic internationally-recognized bankruptcy principles. Partly because China did not have an 
effective corporate bankruptcy system, the European Union and the US refused to recognise 
China’s market economy status before 2006,120 which might have substantially disadvantaged 
China in the global market. 
Thus, the combination of domestic needs and external pressures led to the enactment of 
the EBL 2006. 
4.2. Preparing the EBL 2006 
On 18 September 1993, a national conference on bankruptcy was held in Beijing, and a 
proposal to amend the bankruptcy law was raised by Mr Cao Siyuan, the architect of the EBL 
1986.
121
 Perhaps triggered by Mr Cao’s motion, China formally started, through the Financial 




In March 1995, a meeting of bankruptcy law drafters was held in Chengdu, Sichuan 
Province, China, and Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code 1978, the iconic rescue regime, 
was formally introduced and discussed in the meeting. Bearing in mind the merits of Chapter 
11, the drafters added a chapter on corporate reorganization in the bankruptcy law.
123
 In fact, 
back in early 1993, a bespoke article discussing the virtues and vices of the US Chapter 11 
appeared in a leading Chinese academic journal that might have influenced the law-makers to 
develop a rescue-friendly bankruptcy law in China.
124
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The drafting process was progressed as planned. In September 1995, the final version of 
the draft was submitted for deliberation to China’s People’s Congress Standing Committee, 
the top legislative voting vehicle of the Congress.
125
 However, this draft was unexpectedly 
shelved by the Committee without explanation.
126
 The Congress was probably concerned 
about the social consequences of bankrupting SOEs, because, as discussed above, at that time, 
nearly all SOEs were technically insolvent.
127
  
Three years later, in 1998, the bankruptcy law amendment was resumed
128
 presumably 
because, at the time, China was in intense negotiations with other WTO members concerning 
its potential membership of the Organization; an effective bankruptcy law system was 
definitely seen as a sign of China’s commitment to be a competent contender.129 On 26 
November 1999, a leading Chinese bankruptcy scholar, Prof. Wang Weiguo, who was a key 
member of China’s new bankruptcy law drafting team, was even invited to give a lecture130 to 
China’s Politburo, the top policy-making body in China’s ruling Communist Party. The 
merits of corporate bankruptcy reorganization regimes abroad were introduced and 
recommended. The then President Jiang Zeming who chaired the lecture also expressed his 
interests in having a corporate reorganization law in China.
131
 Support for introducing a 
rescue-oriented bankruptcy law was high; however, this was easier said than done.  
The major difficulty in reforming China’s bankruptcy law during this period was how to 
deal with the bankruptcy of troubled SOEs, and the progress on drafting a new bankruptcy 
law was stalled by disagreements among academics as well as among top political leaders 
after 1998. Among academics who joined the drafting team, the disagreement focused on 
whether the SOEs should be subject to the new bankruptcy law or whether there should be a 
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separate bankruptcy statute exclusively made for SOEs, given some distinct problems faced 
by most SOEs.
132
 Whereas, in political circles, the then Chairman of the People’s Congress 
insisted that employees’ claims in SOE bankruptcy should take priority over those of secured 
creditors; however, the Premier gave more consideration to banks, the principal secured 
creditors.
133
 These elites could not persuade each other; so the standstill arose after 1999. 
In January 2001, a draft bankruptcy law entitled ‘P. R. China Enterprise Bankruptcy and 
Reorganization Law’ emerged and was submitted for consideration to the People’s Congress 
Financial and Economic Committee.
134
 There was no publicly available information as to 
what has been fiercely debated behind the scenes, but one point was certain - the 2001 reform 
effort failed once again.  
In August 2003, the People’s Congress Financial and Economic Committee formed a 
new bankruptcy law drafting team,
135
 and perhaps because of external pressures or lobbying 
that will be discussed later, the process of updating the bankruptcy law accelerated. On 21 
June 2004, a formal draft of the bankruptcy law was finalized by the Congress Financial and 
Economic Committee and was sent to the Congress Standing Committee for deliberation.
136
 
Surprisingly, it took over two years for the Standing Committee to examine the draft in three 
focused meetings.
137
 In the interim, a major OECD-State Council co-sponsored insolvency 
conference was held in Beijing in April 2006 and this might expedite the momentum for 
reform.
138
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In total, it took twelve years to make the EBL 2006.
140
 During this long process, pressure 
or influence from outside China probably played a significant role in urging China to enact a 
modern bankruptcy law as so to enhance its market economy and protect investors. 
4.3. International Influence 
As for the international influence on the creation of the EBL 2006, it seems to have been 
a two-way process; from inside China, its willingness (mainly in the form of academic 
debate
141
) to assimilate so-called international ‘best practice’ of corporate insolvency norms 
was strong; from outside China, many international institutions were proactive in consulting 
or even pressuring China to advance its bankruptcy law reforms more quickly. This section 
describes the efforts made by international bodies that helped to enact the EBL 2006.  
A. Forum on Asian Insolvency Reform (FAIR) 
From 1999, to foster insolvency law reform in Asia, the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) has been organizing a series of international 
conferences entitled ‘Forum on Asian Insolvency Reform (FAIR)’ in collaboration with the 
Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation Forum (APEC) and the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB).
142
 At the time of writing, seven meetings of the FAIR have taken place (Indonesia in 
2001, Thailand in 2002, Korea in 2003, India in 2004, China in 2006, Thailand in 2009; and 
Manila in 2013) in addition to the initial conference held in Sydney in 1999.
143
 FAIR was of 
importance in introducing some international bankruptcy principles to China’s law-makers.144 
A prominent Chinese bankruptcy law expert, Prof. Wang Weiguo, was a frequent meeting 
participant of FAIR, acting as a bridge between China and the western world.
145
   
Under the umbrella of FAIR, the ADB also made efforts to persuade China to embrace a 
world class and workable bankruptcy regime.
146
 In particular, the ADB hired an eminent 
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Australian lawyer, the late Mr Ron Harmer, the architect of Australia Bankruptcy law 
reforms,
147




The impact of FAIR on China’s bankruptcy law making, however, could not be 
overestimated. For instance, the ADB, the major collaborator of FAIR in Asia, liaised with 
China’s National Development and Reform Commission, a ministry of China’s central 
government, which was not exactly the body responsible of drafting the new bankruptcy 
law.
149
 Therefore, it might only have indirect influence on the real law makers.  
In addition, it appears that the ADB’s enthusiasm to enhance China’s bankruptcy law 
reforms might not have been seriously appreciated by China. Back in 1996, the ADB was 
requested by China’s central government to give advice on its bankruptcy law reform, and as 
a result, a special report was prepared and was delivered by the ADB to China’s side in a 
timely manner. The report made many recommendations, including, among others, the 
creation of a corporate rescue regime and the establishment of a body of insolvency 
practitioners. Five years later, surprisingly, when the ADB reminded China about some 
advice made in the report, the latter replied that the report had been physically lost, and more 




Like the ADB, the OECD also had its own Chinese partner, the Development Research 
Centre of the State Council, when it organized the 5
th
 meeting of FAIR in Beijing in 2006,
151
 
and again this Centre was not the direct law drafting body. Thus, probably the only effects of 
FAIR were enriching academic debates in China. By contrast, GTZ, a German aid agency, 
contracted by the German Federal Government, might have had a more direct influence, as it 
                                                 
 
147
 See generally Kent William Yamanaka Anderson, ‘Comparative Approaches to Continuing Legislative 
Reform: Considering Insolvency Law Reform in Japan and Several Common Law Countries’ (Law in Asia and 
the Near Future Conference, Australian National University College of Law, November 2001) 3.  
148
 Carruthers and Halliday (n 10) 562.  
149
 Ibid 564.  
150
 Terence C Halliday and Bruce G Carruthers, ‘Foiling the Financial Hegemons: Limits to the 
Globalization of Corporate Insolvency Regimes in Indonesia, Korea and China’ in Christoph Antons and 
Volkmar Gessner (eds) Globalisation and Resistance: Law Reform in Asia since the Crisis (Hart 2007) 282-3.  
151
 ‘5th Forum for Asian Insolvency Reform (FAIR), Beijing, China, 27-28 April 2006’ OECD 




established a partnership with China’s People’s Congress Financial and Economic Committee 
that was responsible for drafting the new bankruptcy law.
152
  
B. German GTZ 
Unlike other international institutions, GTZ had a long history of involvement in China, 
obtaining much insight into China’s political system and the subtle cultural differences that 
could not be learned by others in the short term.
153
  
In order to push forward China’s bankruptcy law reform, GTZ hosted several ad hoc 
conferences in China before 2006 wherein many internationally-recognized insolvency 
scholars were invited and exchanged their expertise and understanding with their Chinese 
counterparts.
154
 More importantly, many of the members of China bankruptcy law drafting 
team were invited to these conferences and were even funded by GTZ to have study tours to 
Germany and other developed countries where they were shown how the corporate 
insolvency system operated abroad.
155
  
To make the most of these conferences, GTZ collected and edited some useful proposals 
made by international experts, which might be of practical value and politically appropriate to 
China’s bankruptcy law reform, and submitted them directly to China’s People’s Congress 
Financial and Economic Committee which was responsible for drafting the bankruptcy law 
bill. The responses from China’s side were said to be very positive.156 Not surprisingly, as a 
result, there was clear evidence of German bankruptcy law principles transplanted into the 
EBL 2006; for example, the administrator-supervised debtor-in-possession in the EBL 2006 
was simply duplicated from German bankruptcy law without any modification.
157
 
Apart from the OECD, the ADB and GTZ, other international organizations were also 
involved in the making of the EBL 2006.  
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C. The World Bank 
As early as 2000, the World Bank conducted a national study of SOE bankruptcy in 
China; this was done to advise China on bankruptcy law reform issues and was published as 
‘Bankruptcy of State Enterprises in China: A Case and Agenda for Reforming the Insolvency 
System’.158 In this report, the World Bank urged China to, inter alia, amend its bankruptcy 
laws, nurture a profession of insolvency practitioners and train judges with bankruptcy 
knowledge. 
159
 This report, however, was quietly buried by China and never came to the 
notice of China’s mainstream bankruptcy scholars, let alone the bankruptcy law draftsmen.160  
Although the Bank was later active in offering prompt feedback concerning a draft of 
China’s bankruptcy law161 and participating in the FAIR Beijing meeting,162 it did not have a 
strong influence on the text of the EBL 2006.
163
  
In addition, the contribution from the representatives of the United Nations Commission 
on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)
164
 and the American Bar Foundation
165
 should not 
be forgotten, as all of them suggested many global insolvency norms for the EBL 2006. 
Overall, many global bankruptcy principles were adopted in the EBL 2006
166
 mainly because 
of advice from the above international institutions in China.  
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4.4. Key Features of the Rescue-Oriented EBL 2006 
The EBL 2006 has twelve chapters comprising 136 articles. Unlike the EBL 1986, the 
new law applies to all types of enterprises.
167
 It has three main corporate bankruptcy 
procedures: Chapter 8 deals with bankruptcy reorganization, Chapter 9 covers bankruptcy 
compromise and Chapter 10 governs bankruptcy liquidation.
168
 This sequence might also 
rather reflect the lawmakers’ intention to promote or encourage corporate reorganization.169  
A. Broad Entry 
The most striking characteristic of the EBL 2006 would be that it is rescue-oriented. To 
make the rescue procedure widely accessible, the EBL 2006 provides a broad entrance route 
for companies seeking rescue relief.  
First, a corporate rescue candidate is broadly defined. Article 2 of the EBL 2006 
stipulates that a company may be liquidated if it is bankrupt; however, it can also be 
reorganized. This suggests that the EBL 2006 does not set up any preconditions for a 
company to seek reorganization. Perhaps the rescue procedure is intended to be open to all 
bankrupt companies.  
In June 2004, reporting to China’s People’s Congress Standing Committee, the deputy 
director of the People’s Congress Financial and Economic Committee, Mr Jia Zhijie, stated 
that the reorganization procedure in the bankruptcy bill was designed for distressed 
companies that have a reasonable prospect of survival.
170
 But his explanation was still 
somewhat subjective and elusive, because there were not specific benchmarks that could be 
used to make a judgement regarding suitable candidates for corporate reorganization. 
Perhaps, China’s People’s Congress intentionally left the notion of corporate 
reorganization candidacy open so as to reduce the threshold and to widen the point of rescue 
entry.  
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Second, to make the corporate rescue regime more accessible, the EBL 2006 encourages 
a wide range of parties to file for reorganization. Unlike under the EBL 1986, whereby the 
formal reorganization process could only be requested by the government, the reorganization 
procedure under the EBL 2006 could be directly filed by both debtor and creditor.
171
 
Furthermore, to promote the use of rescue, where there is a corporate liquidation procedure 
already filed by creditors, the EBL 2006 stipulates that the debtor can request the court to 
convert the liquidation into reorganization procedure, and shareholders holding more than ten 
per cent of the company’s equity are also entitled to make such an application. 172  A 
reorganization procedure, thus, could be initiated by a wide range of interested parties.  
Third, bankruptcy tests can be relaxed if a company voluntarily files for reorganization. 
The EBL 2006 stipulates that a company that is bankrupt or is likely to be bankrupt could file 
for reorganization;
173
 this suggests that the company does not need to be bankrupt when it 
files for reorganization.
174
 The exemption from bankruptcy might be one of the most striking 
elements of the EBL 2006, because it may considerably boost the attractiveness of the 
corporate rescue regime. 
As for the first research question in this thesis concerning whether the rescue procedure 
will be frequently used, this seems to be promising, because the EBL 2006 sends a clear 
message that the law seeks to promote more corporate rescues.  
B. Two Choices of Control 
Under the EBL 2006, whether a reorganization, compromise or liquidation is chosen, a 
debtor will be immediately replaced by a court-appointed administrator at the time when the 
bankruptcy procedure is entered, and the company will be managed by the administrator 
thereafter.
175
 Therefore, in general, the default control model in China’s formal corporate 
rescue procedure can be described as an ‘administrator-in-possession’ system.  
Bearing in mind that the corporate reorganization procedure aims to rescue companies, 
an alternative control model is exclusively made available for corporate reorganization. 
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Under Article 73 of the EBL 2006, the debtor (the management) can regain control from the 
administrator if the court agrees with the debtor to such a request. In the event that the debtor 
retakes the company with the leave of the court, the administrator will withdraw as a monitor 
overseeing the debtor-in-possession afterwards.  
So, for China’s corporate reorganization regime, there are two types of control: an 
administrator-in-possession system as the default control model and a debtor-in-possession 
system under an administrator’s supervision. It should be noted that the latter is premised on 
two conditions: first, there should be an ad hoc application made by the debtor intending to 
recoup control, and, second, the application must be approved by the court. If there is no 
application made by the debtor, or if the application is rejected by the court, the administrator 
will continue to remain in charge. 
Concerns are also raised as to whether a debtor-in-possession can be easily accessed by 
debtors in practice, because the EBL 2006 does not specify the criteria that courts can apply 
to assess whether control could be returned. This means that debtors will face uncertainty 
about whether a debtor-in-possession would be really accessible. Moreover, in the case of a 
debtor-in-possession, the EBL 2006 does not clarify supervision roles played by 
administrators; without clear statutory boundaries between the debtor and the administrator, it 
may cause friction that hampers rescues. 
So, as to the second research question of this thesis regarding the control in China’s 
corporate rescue regime, in theory, both the administrator-in-possession and the debtor-in-
possession models are available. What this thesis is to explore is the extent to which these 
two models are used in practice.  
C. Professionalism 
Before the enactment of the EBL 2006, where there was a corporate bankruptcy, there 
was always a local government organized liquidation committee that was appointed by the 
court as the administrator to take over the company’s assets and to manage business 
affairs;
176
 it was very rare for professionals, such as lawyers and accountants, to be included 
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in these liquidation committees.
177
 So, in general, there was no real profession of insolvency 
practitioners in China before 2006.  
The EBL 2006, however, attempts to change the bankruptcy landscape by establishing 
China’s insolvency practitioner profession.178 A whole chapter of the EBL 2006 is dedicated 
to qualifying and regulating insolvency practitioners.
179
  
But the problem here is that the EBL 2006 still preserves the option of appointing a local 
government organized liquidation committee as the administrator in a corporate bankruptcy 
procedure.
180
 In other words, courts may not choose qualified insolvency practitioners as 
administrators, if they want a local government organized liquidation committees to be 
involved. This may cast a shadow over the future development of insolvency practitioners in 
China. 
Parry and Zhang have argued that appointing a local government organized liquidation 
committee as the administrator might only be used in the bankruptcy of SOEs, because the 
bankruptcy of these companies would be more politically complex, and that, ideally, these 
issues should be left to the government to resolve.
181
 
Nevertheless, the EBL 2006 still marks a turning point for China’s bankruptcy law and 
indicates that China intends to establish a market-driven corporate insolvency system 
whereby insolvency practitioners will play a significant role in improving the efficiency and 
fairness of corporate bankruptcy.
182
  
D. Flexibility in Value Distribution  
As is well known, there are two fundamental value distribution rules in corporate 
bankruptcy: the pari passu and the absolute priority principles. These two principles are, 
under Article 113 of the EBL 2006, clearly laid down in China’s corporate liquidation 
procedure.  
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In corporate reorganization procedures, however, the EBL 2006 gives parties a great deal 
of latitude as to whether to apply or deviate from these two principles. Under Articles 81 and 
87, these two principles are treated as default rules rather than as mandatory principles, i.e., 
deviation from these two principles is allowed, provided that it occurs with the consent of 
disadvantaged parties.
183
 In particular, deviating from absolute priority may pave the way for 
inviting debtors to join rescues, and as a result this might make rescues more achievable.
184
   
As for the third research question of this thesis concerning value distribution, 
consideration will be given to the extent to which these two basic distribution rules are 
applied in China’s new corporate rescues.  
E. Court Confirmation  
Similar to court confirmation in the US Chapter 11, a reorganization plan that has been 
voted on under the EBL 2006 should also be sent to the court for confirmation. A 
reorganization plan takes effect only after being confirmed. In general, there are two different 
court confirmation procedures; these are the normal and cram-down confirmation procedures.  
The normal procedure is used to confirm a reorganization plan that has been accepted by 
all classes of impaired parties. Under Article 86 of the EBL 2006, if the plan has been 
accepted by all classes of voters, the proponent of the plan can submit it to the court for 
confirmation within ten days of voting; the court may then confirm the plan if it believes that 
the plan comports with the EBL 2006.
185
 But, the main problem here is that Article 86 of the 
EBL 2006 is vaguely worded, because it does not specify what requirements a plan must 
meet to obtain confirmation. In other words, again, courts will find no specific requirements 
to apply when assessing whether to approve a plan. This may bring uncertainties to both the 
proponents of the plan as well as the court.  
The cram-down confirmation procedure is designed for courts to confirm a 
reorganization plan that fails to be accepted by one, or more than one, class of voters. Given 
that cram-downs reflect strong state intervention, a set of clear requirements and tests are 
enunciated in the EBL 2006 to ensure that they can be used correctly.  
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First, a renegotiation with objecting parties is required before a cram-down can be 
requested. The EBL 2006 stipulates that, in the event that a reorganization plan fails to be 
accepted by some classes of impaired parties, the proponent of the plan must open a new 
round of negotiations with the objecting parties. This means that a failed plan cannot be 
submitted for a cram-down consideration immediately.
186
 If the plan is still voted down by 
even one of the classes of voters in the second round, or the objecting parties refuse to 
renegotiate and to vote again, then the plan can be sent to the court to consider imposing a 
cram-down. 
Second, under Article 87 of the EBL 2006, the reorganization plan seeking a cram-down 
must pass the creditor-best-interest test, according to which creditors must be paid no less 
than they would be paid in a liquidation. But, the EBL 2006 seems to be more permissive, 
Article 87 adds an exception; this test can be satisfied if creditors agree to be paid less than 
they would be paid in a liquidation. Put simply, the creditor-best-interest test is used as a 
default rather than as a compulsory rule in China’s new corporate reorganization regime. It 
appears to be excessively liberal.  
Third, under Article 87 of the EBL 2006, the reorganization plan must pass the fair and 
equitable test. It can be argued that this test means that the pari passu and the absolute 
priority principles should be applied, unless disadvantaged parties agree with a departure 
from these principles.  
Fourth, the reorganization plan must pass the feasibility test. This test requires that a 
reorganization plan seeking a cram-down should be feasible, i.e., that there is a real prospect 
for the company to survive if the plan is confirmed.  
The reorganization plan will be confirmed under a cram-down if the court believes that 
all these requirements and tests are met; otherwise, the reorganization plan may be rejected, 
and the reorganization procedure will be converted into a liquidation procedure – the 
company will be liquidated. If confirmed, the reorganization plan will then be executed by 
the debtor and the administrator is liable to monitor its implementation.
187
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Regarding how Chinese courts will confirm reorganization plans, this is what the fourth 
research question of this thesis aims to investigate.  
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Although the trajectory of China’s bankruptcy law can be traced back to as early as 1906, 
China’s early bankruptcy statutes were not quite consistent mainly because of China’s radical 
social and political changes in the recent centuries.  
China’s first bankruptcy law of 1906 remained in force for less than two years. The 1935 
law was enacted and enforced at a time when China was deeply mired in civil war. The 1986 
law was only made for SOEs, and more importantly it was exclusively used by the 
government to liquidate loss-making SOEs; in other words, as noted, this law was not 
intended to be a debt collection tool for creditors. 
Before 2006, it seemed that the enforcement of China’s successive bankruptcy laws 
remained very weak. It is even no exaggeration to say that, prior to the enactment of the EBL 
2006, China did not have a well-functioning corporate bankruptcy system and its relevant 
bankruptcy institutions were accordingly underdeveloped. Investors, especially creditors, had 
little confidence in using the bankruptcy law. China, however, attempted to reform its 
corporate bankruptcy system, and the EBL 2006 was something of a milestone for China 
towards building a modern corporate bankruptcy regime to strengthen its market economy.  
The EBL 2006 is China’s first modern bankruptcy law that is applicable to all enterprises, 
but its main drawback would be that it does not regulate personal bankruptcy.
188
 This law 
also benefited from China’s effective interaction with international institutions; as a result, 
many internationally-recognized ‘best practice’ bankruptcy principles were absorbed into the 
EBL 2006. The EBL 2006 was also China’s first rescue-oriented bankruptcy law into which 
many pro-rescue mechanisms abroad were assimilated and in particular it drew upon many 
pro-rescue mechanisms from Chapter 11 in the US. 
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 With regard to this thesis’s first research question concerning the use of the new 
corporate rescue procedure under the EBL 2006, a glance at the text of the EBL 2006 
suggests that that there would be an increase in corporate reorganizations, because the EBL 
2006 sets out many pro-rescue provisions to promote the use of the corporate reorganization 
procedure as analysed above. In view of the weak enforcement of bankruptcy law in China 
before 2006, however, it should be realistic because a fine formal corporate reorganization 
regime should be based on an effective bankruptcy liquidation system. It will take time for 
China to use the EBL 2006 to build a well-functioning liquidation system. So, it would be 
overly optimistic to predict a proliferation of corporate reorganizations in China after 2006. 
For the second research question concerning control in corporate reorganization, what 
remains uncertain is the extent to which an administrator-in-possession or a debtor-in-
possession model will be used. Ideally, if a debtor-in-possession approach is more frequently 
used, it may enhance the new rescue regime in China, because it will encourage debtors to 
file an early rescue and will improve the feasibility of rescues.  
With respect to the third question over value distribution in reorganization, in principle, 
the EBL 2006 provides considerable flexibility to parties involved, as both the pari passu and 
the absolute priority principles could be relaxed. In order to protect creditors, however, the 
EBL 2006 sets up safeguarding limits: deviating from these two principles must be carried 
out only with the agreement of disadvantaged parties. Moreover, much creditor protection is 
embodied in reorganization plan confirmation procedures. 
As to the last research question - court confirmation of reorganization plans, the normal 
confirmation procedure of the EBL 2006 gives courts a great deal of leeway in confirming 
reorganization plans that have been accepted by all classes of impaired parties; this is because 
there are no specific requirements for courts to be bound when assessing these plans. In 
contrast, in a cram-down confirmation procedure, a series of tests are made by the EBL 2006, 
requiring courts to ensure that all these tests are passed before a cram-down is imposed.  
In sum, the EBL 2006 has paved the way for a new corporate rescue regime to develop 
in China. Given that this thesis aims to examine how the new corporate rescue law operates 
in practice, the thesis will examine a body of data to evaluate its implementation. To better 
understand the data collected, the next chapter will describe the methodology used in data 






In the previous chapter, the contextual background of China’s corporate bankruptcy 
reorganization law has been investigated. The history suggests that there were many 
inconsistencies in China’s bankruptcy law in the past. Before 2006, although there were three 
bankruptcy statutes – the 1906, 1935 and 1986 bankruptcy laws, they were generally not well 
enforced for various reasons. More importantly, the 1986 bankruptcy law - the EBL 1986, 
was only occasionally used by the government to close down inefficient, bankrupt SOEs. 
Nevertheless, before 2006, China did not have a well-functioning corporate bankruptcy 
system, and this may have a negative effect on the implementation of the new corporate 
bankruptcy rescue regime that is embedded in the EBL 2006.  
The most striking piece of China’s bankruptcy law, however, would be its newly-enacted 
EBL 2006 which embodies the contemporary corporate rescue culture, and, in particular, 
includes many well-known international ‘best practices’ of the corporate rescue regime, such 
as a debtor-in-possession system, the flexibility of absolute priority, inter alia. The EBL 2006 
is rescue-oriented and creates a new legal framework for troubled companies to seek 
rehabilitation in formal bankruptcy proceedings.  
This thesis aims to investigate how China’s new corporate rescue law is enforced. In 
order to answer this thesis’s four research questions, the relevant data were collected with a 
view to painting a comprehensive picture of China’s corporate rescue law in action. This 
chapter describes the methods used to collect these data. Describing these methods can also 
help demonstrate the strengths and limitation of the data.  
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In collecting the data, this thesis used both quantitative and qualitative methods.
1
 For 
example, to answer whether China’s new corporate rescue procedure is regularly used, the 
quantitative method was adequate, as mathematically collecting the number of rescue cases is 
sufficient to answer this question. Equally, to investigate why debtors are hesitant to file for 
reorganization, a qualitative method (face-to-face interviews) were used so as to investigate 
debtors’ concerns towards rescue procedures. To be sure, some research questions should be 
answered by using a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods.  
Collecting China’s corporate bankruptcy data was considerably difficult because of 
China’s less developed statistical infrastructure. In the US and the UK, for example, some 
basic national bankruptcy statistics are publicly available on relevant authorities’ websites;2 
however, in China, there are few such official statistics. Perhaps, bankruptcy information is 
still regarded as a negative phenomenon in the socialist economy, and therefore China’s 
Communist Authorities have been unwilling to make it publicly known.
3
 
For academic researchers, at present the only limited source of China’s national 
bankruptcy statistics is the Siyuan Thinktank,
4
 a Beijing-based private consulting firm 
specialising in bankruptcy, which is led by an eminent bankruptcy expert, Cao Siyuan, who is 
the architect of China’s EBL 1986.5 But the Siyuan Thinktank can only provide the national 
numbers on how many corporate bankruptcy cases are accepted in China each year; there are 
no further detailed statistics, such as the annual national number of corporate reorganizations.  
The data in this thesis regarding national corporate reorganizations was able to be 
collected partly because there were relatively few corporate rescue cases in China that arose 
after the EBL 2006; otherwise, it would be impracticable for this thesis to collect this data. 
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The national number of corporate rescue cases would be closest to the real figure, because the 
Zhejiang number of rescue cases surveyed in the national data collection in 2010 was later 
verified as accurate by the Zhejiang case study that was undertaken for this research in 2012. 
The data collection for this thesis took place at two stages: first, it surveyed the national 
data on corporate rescues in China in late 2010, and, second, the data were collected in a 
province, Zhejiang, in early 2012. The remainder of this chapter is, accordingly, arranged into 
two parts: (i) Part 2 describes how the national corporate rescue data were collected, and (ii) 
Part 3 explains the Zhejiang fieldwork which involved interviewing people who took part in 
corporate reorganizations. 
2. THE NATIONAL SURVEY
6
 
Advised by my supervisor, Prof. Roman Tomasic,
7
 the national corporate rescue data 
collection began in early December 2010 and was completed by the end of January 2011 at 
Durham University, England. It took nearly two months to search and identify Chinese 
corporate rescue cases. The data contained all corporate reorganization cases accepted by 
Chinese courts between 1 June 2007 and 30 November 2010, or over a total of three-and-a-
half years.  
It should be noted that this data only included reorganization cases accepted by courts 
during the selected period. This meant that two other categories of cases were excluded: the 
first was the cases that were filed but were rejected by courts, and the second were those that 
were filed before 30 November 2010 but were still not accepted by courts by 30 November 
2010, which was the deadline for this thesis’s national data collection. Article 10 of the EBL 
2006 gives courts fifteen days to decide whether to accept or reject a corporate reorganization 
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 The format of the following two parts is cited from Robert Brewer, Your PhD Thesis: How to Plan, Draft, 
Revise and Edit Your Thesis (Studymates 2007) 143.  
7
 The data were used to present a paper examining the implementation of China’s corporate rescue regime 
in INSOL 2011 Singapore Annual Conference. Later some of the data were published in Roman Tomasic and 
Zinian Zhang, ‘From Global Convergence in China’s Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 2006 to Divergence in 
Implementation’ (2012) 12 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 295.  
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filing, so there is a gap between reorganization filing and acceptance.
8
 All cases included in 
this national data collection were filed and accepted during the aforementioned period. 
In this part, the first section describes the content of the data. The second section outlines 
the sources of the data. The third section explains the methods used to access the data. The 
fourth presents the methods used in analysing the data.  
2.1. The Content of the Data  
The focus of the data collection was undertaken by reference to the four research 
questions raised in the first chapter. 
A. Corporate Rescue Entry 
This section responds to the first research question regarding how frequently the 
corporate rescue procedure is used in China. In order to build a fairly comprehensive picture 
of corporate rescue in China, the following nine sub-aspects of the date were surveyed.  
First, it was the annual national number of corporate reorganization cases. This number 
was calculated by including all cases accepted by courts between 1 June 2007 and 30 
November 2010. Specifically, the data contained the name of each individual company 
entering into the formal corporate rescue procedure under the EBL 2006 as well as of the 
name of each court that handled the rescue case. 
To provide a better understanding of whether China’s new corporate rescue law was 
widely used, apart from collecting the annual corporate reorganizations, the data also 
expanded to cover three related figures: the annual numbers of companies that were on the 
government company registration record, the annual dissolutions and  corporate bankruptcy 
cases. This was aimed to reach three comparison ratios: the company dissolution rate that was 
a measure on how many companies were dissolved out of the all companies registered at the 
beginning of each year, the company bankruptcy rate that was to identify the extent to which 
dissolved companies used the corporate bankruptcy procedures to exit the market, and the 
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 William J Woodward, Jr, ‘”Control’” in Reorganization Law and Practice in China and the United States: 
an Essay on the Study of Contrast’ (2008) 22 Temple International & Comparative Law Journal 141, 144 
(arguing Chinese court acceptance procedure may cause delay and inefficiency in corporate reorganization).  
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company reorganization rate that was to measure how many companies in the bankruptcy 
procedure chose the corporate reorganization procedure to seek rehabilitation. These rates 
were expressed as percentages.  
More importantly, to assess the use of corporate bankruptcy and reorganization 
procedures in China, these three corresponding rates from the US, and England and Wales 
were also searched and calculated so as to allow an international comparison to be made. 
Such international comparisons would identify the potential gaps of China’s enforcement of 
both bankruptcy and reorganization laws.  
Second, given that the corporate rescue regime was of novelty in China, it would take 
time for courts and businesses to become familiar with it, so the data examined whether there 
was a pattern indicating that the new rescue procedure was increasingly being used over each 
consecutive half year. For this purpose, all rescues cases were rearranged according to the 
date at which they were formally accepted by courts. As the surveyed period was three-and-a-
half years, it was divided into seven half years for analytical convenience. 
Third, given that China is a vast country with thirty-one provinces (including cities and 
autonomous districts at provincial level, not counting Hong Kong and Macau), this thesis 
surveyed the number of corporate rescue cases taking place in each province in order to 
identify how well the corporate rescue law was used in different regions. Of course, the 
regional gaps in economic development should be adequately borne in mind.  
Fourth, the data shed light on the different levels of courts handling corporate 
reorganization. Specifically, all rescue cases were categorized into three groups: cases 
handled by courts at lower, intermediate and provincial supreme court levels. This was to 
investigate the level of courts at which corporate reorganizations were more likely to be 
accepted. China has a four-level court system: at the top is China’s Supreme People’s Court, 
and three levels of local courts at province, prefecture and county levels respectively. China’s 
Supreme People’s Court does not directly hear corporate bankruptcy cases, so all bankruptcy 
cases are handled by courts at the three local levels.  
Under Article 3 of the EBL 2006, corporate bankruptcy should be filed in the court 
where the debtor company operates or is registered, but it is silent as to the level of the court 
to which a bankruptcy petition can be lodged. In a 2002 judicial notice, China’s Supreme 
People’s Court required that lower people’s courts at country level deal with the bankruptcy 
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of companies that are registered by company registration authorities at county level, and 
intermediate people’s courts at prefecture level handle those registered at higher levels and 
provincial supreme people’s courts can choose to accept any corporate bankruptcy filings at 
their own discretion. But in this judicial notice, China’s Supreme People’s Court also 
indicated that jurisdiction regarding any individual case could be subject to the discretion of 
local courts. This means that local courts have wide latitude in deciding which level of the 
court to try an individual bankruptcy case.
9
   
When the EBL 2006 was drafted, some foreign experts suggested that corporate 
bankruptcy be dealt with by courts at intermediate level so as to avoid local protectionism 
and to take advantage of the higher quality of judicial personnel available at this level, but 
China’s law makers have not accepted such suggestion.10 Hence, it is necessary to examine 
that in practice which level of courts were more likely to hear corporate reorganization.  
Fifth, the data were collected regarding which parties filed for corporate reorganization. 
This was to understand the extent to which the new rescue regime was preferred by, or more 
accessible to, a certain group of interested parties, i.e., creditors or debtors. Under Article 70 
of the EBL 2006, apart from debtors and creditors, shareholders holding more than ten per 
cent of the company’s equity could also request the court to change a creditor-filed 
liquidation procedure into a corporate reorganization one. So, a corporate rescue procedure 
could be filed by three types of parties: debtors, creditors and shareholders.  
Sixth, the data looked at the governmental connections of companies that entered the 
rescue procedure. This was to investigate whether a well-connected company had more 
chance to use the formal rescue procedure for rehabilitation. Similarly, the data also 
examined whether a company in rescue was a listed company publicly traded on either the 
Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchanges; this was to find the potential favouritism, because 
listed companies in China are often either state-owned or state-controlled.  
Seventh, the data recorded frequently quoted reasons used by courts in rejecting 
corporate rescue filings. But it should be noted that not many rejected filings were collected 
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 China’s Supreme People’s Court, ‘Several Issues of Enterprise Bankruptcies’ (Beijing China, 18 July 
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 Terence C Halliday, ‘Police Brief: The Making of China’s Corporate Bankruptcy Law’ (2007) Oxford 
Series in Law, Justice and Society 1.  
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by this thesis. Unlike accepting a corporate reorganization filing, the court is not liable to 
advertise its decision if it rejects a filing. So, most of rejected filings were likely to be hidden 
without being known by the public, especially given that this thesis accessed such 
information mainly from the media reports. The data collection in this regard appeared to be 
more difficult, because many courts refused to register the corporate reorganization filing in 
the first place; therefore, it made the official rejection in the second place impossible. 
Although several rejected filings collected by this thesis were limited in number, they still 
could paint a picture as to what the court would react before a corporate reorganization filing 
in the real world. Knowing these reasons could develop an understanding regarding the 
difficulties faced by companies that sought to use the formal corporate rescue procedure.  
Eighth, the data contained the success rate of corporate rescues in China.  Admittedly, 
the concept of ‘success’ is elusive. But, here it is specifically defined by looking at whether a 
reorganization plan was confirmed by the court and was fully executed thereafter. The data 
on this subject were incomplete, because at the time of data collection, some reorganization 
cases were still in the process of preparing reorganization plans, and in some other rescues 
the reorganization plans were in the process of execution. So, the data on this subject only 
covered the cases whose reorganization plans had been executed and whose reorganization 
attempts had been officially terminated.  
Ninth, the data were collected on how many corporate reorganizations were filed too late. 
This thesis defined a filing as being late if the company had ceased trading when the formal 
rescue petition was lodged. Ceasing trading appeared in different forms, depending on 
different industries. In the manufacturing industry, for example, the company ceased trading 
because its assemble line was switched off and most of workers had to leave the company. 
For the real estate industry, the company ceased trading if its construction project was 
suspended because the company was unable to pay construction contractors. This thesis 
identified ceasing trade by examining whether the media had reported so.   
In sum, with regard to entries into the corporate rescue procedure in China, this thesis 
collected the above data to demonstrate how well the rescue filing was handled by courts. 
B. The Control during the Rescue 
As for control in the rescue procedure, theoretically, it would be too complicated to 
define ‘control’, because control is a multifaceted concept. For the sake of simplification, this 
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thesis chose the following issues, which are in line with the academic concept of control, to 
describe control in Chinese corporate rescues.  
First, the data contained the administrator appointment in corporate rescues. As noted, 
where a corporate rescue filing is accepted, the court will simultaneously appoint an 
administrator to take control of the company’s properties and business affairs. It is 
noteworthy that an administrator in China’s corporate bankruptcy law is not an individual, 
but is an entity. More precisely, an administrator would be either a local government-
organized interim liquidation committee, a qualified law firm, a qualified accounting firm, or 
a professional liquidating firm.
11
 Here, the data calculated the extent to which each of these 
four kinds of candidates was appointed as the administrator in corporate rescues. These data 
were summarised as percentages.   
The administrator-appointment related data were also included. Under Article 22 of the 
EBL 2006, a meeting of creditors is allowed to challenge the court’s appointment of the 
administrator. Article 22 stipulates that a meeting of creditors can request the court to replace 
an existing administrator if creditors can prove that the administrator could not discharge its 
duties competently or even-handedly. Challenging court administrator appointments could be 
a powerful lever for creditors to influence control in rescues, so the data collection was 
expanded to investigate whether and how the administrator appointment was challenged by 
creditors.  
Second, under Article 73 of the EBL 2006, in a company reorganization procedure, the 
debtor could regain control from the administrator if the court approves the debtor’s request. 
This suggests that a debtor-in-possession is also available in China’s corporate rescue regime, 
although it should be subject to the administrator’s supervision. In the case where such a 
request is allowed by the court, in theory, the landscape of control will be radically changed. 
So, this thesis collected the data on how many reorganization cases used the debtor-in-
possession. These data were also calculated as percentages.    
Third, at the centre of control would be the right to propose the reorganization plan for 
vote. So, the data were identifying who proposed the reorganization plan in these rescue cases. 
Under Article 80 of the EBL 2006, it is the administrator who has the exclusive right to 
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propose a reorganization plan to a vote; however, in the case where control is returned to the 
debtor, this right is accordingly transferred to the debtor. But, as is well known, the law as 
written down does not always reflect the law in action. To examine the real nature of control 
in rescues, this thesis’ data collection went a step further to look at whether there was 
deviation from Article 80 in practice.  
Finally, given that allocating control to a certain party also partly aims to improve the 
efficiency of the rescue, the related data were also addressed. For the sake of simplification, 
the efficiency of the reorganization procedure was judged by calculating the average time 
spend on the rescue cases. The time spent on an individual reorganization case was counted 
from the date when the court accepts the rescue filing to the date on which the court confirms 
the reorganization plan. And the time on executing the reorganization plan was excluded.  
C. Value Distribution  
The data on value distribution specifically cast light on the following three aspects.   
First, corporate reorganization is intended to preserve going concern value of a 
financially-troubled company by avoiding a destructive liquidation. So, in the first place, the 
relevant data were needed to check whether or to what extent the company’s going concern 
value had been preserved. However, quantifying how much going concern value was 
preserved was a very difficult task, because it was technically impossible to draw a clear line 
between an individual company’s going concern and liquidation value.  
In practice, an asset evaluator would be hired to appraise both going concern and 
liquidation value of a company in the rescue process in China, but, the valuation was often 
inaccurate. Especially when there was an auction, a huge difference would emerge between 
the evaluated going concern value and the final bidding price. So, it would be considerably 
superficial to use these two sets of figures generated from the valuator report to measure how 
much going concern value has been preserved.  
Instead, this thesis calculated the average creditor recovery rate in rescues, and then 
compared it with its counterpart in liquidations. From the potential difference of creditor 
recovery rates between reorganization and liquidation, it could be known whether the 
corporate reorganization procedure had preserved going concern value of troubled companies.  
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It is worth noting that, in nearly all existing corporate rescue cases in China, it was the 
norm rather than the exception for secured and preferential creditors to be fully paid. So the 
creditor recovery rate was only drawn from the recovery rate for unsecured creditors. When 
making comparison, this thesis, accordingly, used the average recovery rate for unsecured 
creditors in liquidations.  
Second, the data sought to examine the application of the pari passu principle. In 
particular, the data shed light on whether and to what extent the pari passu principles was 
applied in distributing value of companies in reorganization. Under Article 87 of the EBL 
2006, the pari passu principle is a default rather than mandatory rule. This means that 
whether to apply this rule could be subject to negotiations of affected parties. Of course, in 
the case where there is no agreement reached, this rule should automatically apply. Moreover, 
the data also included for what purposes the deviation from the pari passu principle was 
made in the rescue case.   
Third, the data collection moved to examine the application of the absolute priority 
principle in rescues. This principle is also a default rule under Article 87 of the EBL 2006. 
This thesis investigated the extent to which this principle was applied and relaxed in 
distributing value of companies in reorganization. But, more attention was paid to the data on 
deviations from the absolute priority principle. Furthermore, as has investigated deviations 
from the pari passu principle, the data went further and looked into what goals were pursued 
in the case that deviations from the absolute priority principle took place.  
D. Reorganization Plan Confirmation  
A corporate reorganization procedure may reach its final stage when the reorganization 
plan is submitted to the court for confirmation. The data contained how many reorganization 
plans were confirmed by courts, and equally importantly, how many of them were dismissed. 
Meanwhile, the efficiency of courts in confirming reorganization plans was also investigated.  
Given that a cram-down may be used to confirm a reorganization plan under Article 87 
of the EBL 2006, the data identified how many reorganization cases used the cram-down to 
forcibly confirm the plans. As a corollary, the odds of each class of interest parties to be 
forced by the cram-down was also examined and computed.  
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In addition, under the EBL 2006, a cram-down cannot be imposed unless and until the 
relevant statutory requirements and tests are met or passed. So, the data checked whether and 
how these requirements and tests were met or passed when cram-downs were used.  
2.2. Data Sources 
Primarily, for this national survey, the bulk of the data were derived from newspaper 
reports, and the rest of them were from other institutions which made their relevant 
information publicly available. The major data sources are listed as follows.  
A. Newspapers 
Many corporate reorganizations in China were widely reported by Chinese newspapers. 
These events draw media attention mainly for the following reasons. First, nearly all existing 
rescue cases were to rehabilitate large companies. Given the social and economic impact of 
rescuing a large company, it was not surprising that newspapers were interested in reporting 
such an event. Second, more notably, large company rescues were often regarded as political 
events, because many government agencies would, in most instances, be involved. Also, it 
was not unusual for local senior politicians to directly participate in an individual corporate 
rescue procedure. So, the state-controlled propaganda machine (mainly newspapers) was 
deployed to publicize government efforts and achievements in managing the economy.
12
 
Third, the corporate rescue regime was a new legal procedure in China; many news agencies 
and even the general public were very curious about how this legal mechanism operated; and 
this might also attract newspapers to report such cases. Perhaps for these three reasons, most 
China’s corporate rescues received a considerable amount of press coverage. This made this 
thesis’ data collection possible.  
In general, reorganization of listed and non-listed companies seemed to attract press 
attention somewhat differently. For listed company reorganization, given its impact upon 
general public shareholders nationwide, it was mainly national newspapers investigating and 
reporting these events. Most of these newspapers are Beijing-based and focus on reporting 
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 Generally see Benjamin L Liebman, ‘Watchdog or Demagogue? The Media in the Chinese Legal 
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commercial and judicial news. They included: Legal Daily（fa zhi ri bao）,13 China Stock 
News（zhong guo zhen quan bao）, The People’s Court Daily（ren ming fa yuan bao）, 
Stock Daily（zhen quan shi bao）, Shanghai Securities Daily（shanghai zhen quan bao）, 
21
st
 Century Economy News（21 shi ji jing ji bao dao）, Daily Economy News（mei ri jing ji 
xin wen）, Stock Market Weekly（zhen quan shi chang zhou kan）, Caijing（cai jing）and 
The First Economy Daily（di yi cai jing ri bao）. 
By contrast, regarding reorganization of non-listed companies, because of their regional 
economic importance, these cases were largely reported by local newspapers at city or 
provincial level. For example, the reorganization of Jiangxi Xingzhen Pharmaceutical Co. 
Ltd. was only reported by the local newspaper, Pingxiang Daily.
14
 Compared with national 
newspapers, local newspapers appeared to be less critical, and these news reports were also 
less comprehensive. In particular, many key figures, which were likely to be treated by the 
local government as politically embarrassing, were missing in the local newspaper reports. 
For example, in the reorganization of Zhonghen Steel Co. Ltd. Sichuan, key figures in the 
reorganization plan, including the recovery rate for unsecured creditors and whether there 
was a cram-down, were not available in local newspaper reports.
15
 This exerted more 
challenges to collecting the data. 
All these newspapers had their online editions, which made the data collection possible 
and more convenient. Among all newspapers, the People’s Court Daily deserves more 
attention, because it was the main source of corporate reorganization information at national 
level.  
B. The People’s Court Daily 
The People’s Court Daily is a newspaper in Chinese that was founded and is managed 
by China’s Supreme People’s Court. It publishes seven days a week. According to a decree of 
China’s Supreme People’s Court released in 2005, public notices of all Chinese courts must 
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be advertised on the People’s Court Daily.16 Considering that the EBL 2006 requires the 
court to give a public notice when accepting a corporate bankruptcy filing,
17
 therefore, the 
acceptance of all corporate reorganization filings in China can be found in the People’s Court 
Daily.  
By and large, information on corporate reorganization from the People’s Court Daily 
was highly reliable and accurate. However, two main weaknesses here should be noted. The 
first was that these public notices advertised on the People’s Court Daily only provided some 
basic, procedural issues about rescues. Specifically, a public notice included: (1) the name of 
the company and who files for reorganization; (2) the date when the filing is accepted; (3) 
which entity is appointed as the administrator; and other information.
18
 But, as for substantive 
information including, among other things, the size of debts involved and the creditor 
recovery rate, these public notices revealed little. The second weakness was that some 
historic public notices from the Daily had been deleted from its website when this thesis’s 
data collection project started. The archives of these public notices could not be publicly 
accessed. So, this made the data incomplete. In fact, many public notices originally published 
on the Daily were from other secondary sources.  
Apart from the newspapers, much information on listed company reorganization was 
obtained from two officially designated websites.  
C. Listed Company Information Disclosure 
Many Chinese corporate rescue cases were reorganising listed companies which were 
publicly traded on either the Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. As one of the 
regulating requirements, listed companies are liable to disclose their important business 
information to the public.
19
 Given the importance of entering corporate reorganization 
procedures, listed companies had to disclose their information on corporate rescues. In China, 
there are two official websites designated for listed companies to feed transparency to some 
extent: the website of the Shanghai Stock Exchange at www.sse.com.cn and the Shenzhen 
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Stock Exchange at www.szse.cn. Therefore, a great deal of listed company reorganization 
information was derived from these two websites.  
It is also noteworthy that another website, www.cninfo.com.cn, established by one of the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange’s son companies, the Shenzhen Securities Information Co. Ltd., 
also offered comprehensive information on Shenzhen listed company reorganizations, 
because much historical information that have been deleted on the website of www.szse.cn 
could be found there. These two websites were complementary in providing the rescue 
information on Shenzhen listed companies.  
D. Professional Firms 
Some data were obtained from professional firms’ websites. In most cases, these firms, 
which were mainly accounting or law firms, were appointed as administrators to manage 
rescue processes. In some instances, it was even the case that the professional firm as the 
administrator officially used its website as a formal channel to disclose rescue-related 
information probably because of its independence and technical capability. For instance, in 
the reorganization of Jiangsu Hongjie Electronics Co. Ltd. in 2009, the administrator, 
Jiangsu Xingrui Accounting Firm, used its website as the main window to feed the case’s 
transparency: nearly all the critical rescue documents, including the reorganization plan and 
the sheet of creditors’ claims, were made publicly available on its website.20   
In other instances, the relevant information appeared in the professional firms’ news 
bulletins. These firms had the incentive to advertise their experience to appeal to prospective 
clients. For example, without the news bulletin publicized on the website of Zhejiang 
Xingyun Law Firm, it was impossible to know about the reorganization of Zhejiang 
Xing’an’jiang Steel Co. Ltd. which was handled in Zhejiang in 2010.21  
These websites, however, were not the primary data sources, as less than five cases were 
found in this way. But, undoubtedly, they considerably enriched and enhanced this thesis’s 
data collection.  
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E. China’s Insolvency Practitioners Association  
Strictly speaking, China’s Insolvency Practitioners Association is still not a legally-
recognized entity in China as it has not officially registered in the government,
22
 but has set 
up its website, http://www.qshyxh.com, gathering a great deal of court public notices on 
corporate bankruptcy, including corporate reorganization. In fact, many public notices that 
were originally advertised on the People’s Court Daily were derived from this Association’s 
website, because they had been deleted from the People’s Court Daily website.  
F. Individual Practitioners 
Inevitably, the data collected through the internet were incomplete in both depth and 
width, so some insolvency practitioners were then contacted for details. But in most cases 
they declined to provide information by explaining that it was concerned about commercial 
confidentiality, although only publicly available information circulated to creditors in 
creditors’ meetings was requested. Fortunately, there were still several public-spirited 
lawyers who replied quickly and provided the materials requested.  
2.3. Ways of Collecting Data  
The vast majority of the data were collected via the internet, and the rest was obtained by 
using the telephone and email.  
A. Using the Internet 
The data collection for this thesis was made possible mainly because nearly all sources 
had their online websites; hence, it was not very difficult to access relevant information. To 
trawl the internet, the web search engine ‘Google’ was primarily used.23 At the same time, 
given that most information appeared in Chinese, the web search engine in China ‘Baidu’ 
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was also used, and even, anecdotally, Baidu would be more effective than Google in 
searching online materials in Chinese.
24
  
In order to gather as much information as possible, the keywords that were used to 
search varied quite widely. These keywords included but were not limited to: corporate 
bankruptcy (gong si po chan), corporate reorganization (gong si chong zhen), corporate 
rescue (gong si zhen jiu), bankruptcy reorganization (po chan chong zhen), judicial 
reorganization (si fa chong zhen), enterprise reorganization (qi ye chong zhen), and 
reorganization (chong zhen), etc. 
It should be noted that the above keywords were in Chinese not in English, as nearly all 
information in this respect appeared in Chinese. Interestingly, many corporate reorganization 
cases handled in Taiwan were also obtained, because Chinese is spoken and used in both 
countries.
25
 Given that this thesis exclusively focused on the mainland China, namely, the 
People’s Republic of China, the rescue cases in Taiwan were used for reference purposes 
rather than were included in the data collection.  
There were two steps taken for each search. The first step was using the aforementioned 
key words to identify individual companies entering the rescue procedure. The second step of 
each search was to change the key words to the company’s name, including its official, 
abbreviated and its acronym names if applicable. This led to more detailed company-specific 
information.  
All relevant webpages were recorded and stored in this thesis’s electronic portfolio. 
B. Telephone 
To a large extent, collecting the data by phone was a failure, as nearly all respondents 
declined to provide information in this way. It was normal, given that there was no trust 
established before. It is worth noting that some courts in China still could not be contacted by 
phone, as in some areas phone numbers of law courts (and other governmental institutions) 
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were still treated as a kind of state secret, and the general public had no publicly available 
access to these numbers.   
C. Email 
There were three cases collected by using email. A lawyer, Mr. Shen Tianfen, from 
Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province, responded to an email request quickly, and days after all legal 
documents of the three reorganization cases handled by him were obtained.  
2.4. Data Reliability  
It can be ensured that the data collected in this thesis were reliable. As noted, the vast 
majority of the data were obtained from newspaper reports. Given that China’s newspapers 
are state-owned and rigorously regulated, it is highly unlikely for the newspapers to fabricate 
facts. Furthermore, the news of corporate reorganization was largely commercial in nature; 
namely, it was not politically sensitive; therefore, it seemed unnecessary for the government 
to manipulate such information.
26
 Moreover, it should be noted that most of the facts were 
also double-checked through different newspaper sources for the sake of credibility.  
Apart from newspaper reports, the majority of the data for listed company 
reorganizations were obtained from two official information-disclosure websites. They were 
trustworthy, because these information would have been verified several times by different 
regulating authorities before being made public.  
As for the data from the professional firms’ websites and individual practitioners, most 
of the data appeared in photocopied original files; this produced great confidence.  
In sum, there was little doubt about the reliability of the data. The main problem of the 
data was its incompleteness. For example, perhaps due to local government pressures, in 
some instances, the key information on the unsecured creditor recovery rate, especially when 
it was very low, and on whether a cram-down was issued seemed to be intentionally 
concealed in newspaper reports, since such information might be negative from a local 
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government point of view. This caused some problems for the data collection, and the 
comprehensiveness of the data was adversely affected. To address the incompleteness of the 
data, in later chapters, the limits of the data in each particular aspect will be clarified. 
2.5. Data Analysis 
The statistical analysis was mainly used in order to generate a summary of corporate 
rescue law implementation in China. In particular, two types of figures were extracted: 
probabilities and trends. The probability figures aimed to ascertain the likelihood of certain 
practices. For example, this thesis calculated the average unsecured creditor recovery rate in 
rescues through averaging the unsecured creditor recovery rate in all individual rescue cases; 
the average figure was useful to understand the extent to which unsecured creditors would 
recover their debts in corporate rescues.  
As for the trend, this was mostly used in counting the number of rescues during certain 
periods; this was to examine the use of the rescue procedure over time. In addition, it was 
also used to identify geographic differences in using the rescue procedure rehabilitate local 
troubled companies.  
It is worth noting that the average unsecured creditor recovery rate in Chinese corporate 
rescues calculated by this thesis was slightly lower than the genuine one because of an 
artificially simplified method of calculation. More specifically, in some rescue cases in China, 
unsecured creditors were paid pro rata, i.e., the pari passu principle was applied; however, in 
other, although not too many, cases, unsecured creditors were paid at different rates, i.e., the 
pari passu principle was relaxed. 
For example, in the reorganization of Guangming Furniture Co. Ltd. in 2009, under its 
confirmed reorganization plan, the first ¥30,000 debt of each unsecured creditor was paid one 
hundred per cent; over ¥30,000, eighteen per cent was paid.
27
 Evidently, the deviation from 
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 The Administrator of Guangming Furniture Co. Ltd., ‘The Reorganization Plan of Guangming 
Furniture Co. Ltd.’ (Yichun City, Heilongjiang Province, China, 19 April 2010, in Chinese) 
<http://stock.quote.stockstar.com/1_000587_000000000000036lux.shtml> accessed 9 June 2012. 
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the pari passu principle was made to attract votes from small creditors.
28
 However, in real 
terms, the amount of unsecured creditor payment at higher rates seemed to be very small in 
quantity. In the Guangming case, the amount of debts which had a one hundred per cent 
payment was only ¥68,271, and it appeared to be negligible if compared with the 
¥381,631,802 unsecured debts paid at the eighteen per cent rate.  
Thus, for the sake of simplicity, this thesis chose the unsecured creditor recovery rate 
that applied for the majority of unsecured debts as the representative recovery rate. By this 
standard, for example, in the Guangming case, the recovery rate of eighteen per cent was 
selected as the recovery rate for all unsecured creditors. Obviously, the average unsecured 
creditor recovery rate reported in this thesis would be slightly, but negligibly, lower than the 
genuine one.  
Using this simplified method was also realistic. In theory, a comprehensive recovery rate 
for unsecured creditors in a rescue case could be precisely calculated by dividing the whole 
amount of unsecured debt by the actual amount paid to all unsecured creditors, although they 
were paid at different rates. But, in practice, the problem was that such an ideal approach 
could not be realised, because usually the different recovery rates were available, whereas the 
exact amounts of debts paid at different rates were not accessible; hence, this optimal method 
lacked sufficient data support, and had to be placed aside.  
Overall, this national data collection mainly used the quantitative method to paint the 
picture as to how the new corporate rescue law was enforced in China. At the second stage of 
the data collection, namely, the Zhejiang case study, the qualitative research method was 
mainly employed.  
3. METHODS FOR THE ZHEJIANG STUDY 
Zhejiang is an economically well-developed province located in eastern China, adjacent 
to Shanghai. Zhejiang province was selected for a case study mainly because this province 
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 The practice of differentiating unsecured creditors repayment rates was also found in Germany where 
small unsecured creditors could be paid at a higher rate in exchange for their consent to the rescue plan. See 
Julian R Franks, Kjell G Nyborg and Walter N Torous, ‘A Comparison of US, UK and German Insolvency 
Codes’ (1996) 25 Financial Management 86, 94.  
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handled nearly a quarter of China’s corporate reorganization cases between June 2007 and 
November 2010. Therefore, its relatively large number of corporate reorganizations would be 
helpful in identifying some common problems and patterns. 
Moreover, the decision to do the Zhejiang study arose also because of an official 
corporate rescue report released by Zhejiang’s Supreme People’s Court in late 2011.29 In this 
report, the Court reviewed corporate rescue practice in the province and provided much 
insight. This report was likely to be the first judicial report on corporate rescue made by a 
provincial supreme court in China. 
During January 2012, twenty people were interviewed; among of them were eight 
lawyers, two accountants, three judges, five creditors (or their representatives), one debtor 
and one government senior official.  
3.1. Zhejiang Study Preparation  
Unlike the preceding national survey which focused on collecting objective figures, the 
Zhejiang study aimed to investigate the behaviour and incentives of interested parties in the 
rescue procedures; this meant that subjective opinions and observations were collected.  
In late November and December 2011, the interview questions were designed at Durham 
University, England, under the auspices of Prof. Roman Tomasic. Under Durham 
University’s academic regulations, research proposals involving interviews should be subject 
to the University’s ethics approval. Therefore, after the interview questions were finally 
drafted, a ‘Durham Law School Ethics and Data Protection Monitoring Form’ for the 
Zhejiang study was submitted to the University on 2 December 2011, which outlined the 
research interview questions, prospective interviewees, the anonymity principle, among other 
things. On 13 December 2012, Durham University Law School approved the proposal. In the 
process of the fieldwork, the guidelines demonstrated in the approval form were strictly 
complied with.  
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 The Zhejiang Supreme People’s Court, ‘Report of Corporate Reorganization in Zhejiang (2007.6 – 
2011.11)’ (Hangzhou Zhejiang China, 22 November 2011, in Chinese). 
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In early January 2012, the candidate travelled to Zhejiang, China to undertake field-work 
for one month, visiting seven cities: Fuyang, Hangzhou, Jinghua, Quzhou, Shaoxing, Yiwu 
and Zhoushan for the interviews. The data collected were then processed in February 2012 at 
Durham University.  
It was worth noting that the number of the Zhejiang corporate rescue cases collected in 
the preceding national 2010 survey was verified as accurate by this Zhejiang fieldwork. All 
corporate rescue cases taking place in Zhejiang during the chosen period were included in 
this Zhejiang study.  
3.2. Data Content 
Covering a longer period than that in the national survey, the Zhejiang study examined 
rescue cases accepted by courts in Zhejiang between 1 June 2007 and 31 December 2011. 
The previous national survey counted the cases accepted between 1 June 2007 and 30 
November 2010. In total, thirty-five companies entered corporate reorganization procedures 
in Zhejiang in the aforesaid period. The data focused on the following issues, which in turn 
responded to the four research questions of this thesis.  
A. Entry Difficulties: The Problem of Access 
Before asking why it was so difficult for a formal corporate rescue procedure to be 
entered, the Zhejiang study collected the data on the number of companies on the register, 
company dissolutions, bankruptcies and reorganizations in Zhejiang during this period in 
order to paint a full picture regarding bankruptcy law enforcement as a whole.  
As for interview questions, the first was to ask why courts were hesitant to accept 
corporate rescue filings. The second was asking why government support was essential for a 
court to accept a rescue filing. The third question focused on why many rescue filings were 
commenced too late.  
All replies and comments were summarized into three categories according to the party 
they were directed to. Specifically, the first category was about courts as to their concerns 
towards corporate rescue filings. The second was dedicated to debtors, describing why 
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debtors were rescue-averse in practice. The third category looked at creditors, examining 
their attitudes and perceptions towards filing for reorganization.  
B. The Control in Zhejiang Rescues 
Given that the administrator-in-possession was used in most Zhejiang corporate rescues, 
first, the interviewees were asked why debtors could not be allowed, or be trusted, to run 
formal rescue processes. This question was to investigate why the expected debtor-in-
possession was not widely used or preferred. This question also aimed to find the attitudes of 
interested parties towards the debtor-in-possession approach.   
The second interview question asked what specific roles were played by the 
administrators in rescues. In particular, interviewees were asked how the administrator 
prepared the reorganization plan, because in most rescues the reorganization plan was 
proposed in the name of the administrator. Meanwhile, an explanation was sought for why it 
was still the administrator who proposed the reorganization plan in the case that there was a 
debtor-in-possession according to which it was the right of the debtor, not the administrator, 
to do so.  
Finally, interviewees were asked how creditors influenced control in rescues. Although 
creditors have a powerful lever - voting on a reorganization plan, such a right would be 
considerably undermined if creditors could not get sufficient information of the company. So, 
the interviewees were asked whether creditors were allowed to access the company’s books 
in order to make an informed decision prior to voting on the reorganization plan. In practice, 
an auditor’s report would be made in each reorganization case, so the interviewees were 
asked whether auditor reports could satisfy creditors’ information demands and enhance 
transparency of the procedure.  
C. Value Distribution 
Similar to the national survey, the Zhejiang study calculated the average unsecured 
creditor recovery rate in order to test the strength of the corporate rescue regime in preserving 
going concern value. Regarding the priority principle in value distribution, given that in most 
Zhejiang corporate rescues this principle was rigidly adhered to, interviewees were asked 
whether deviating from absolute priority had been, or could be, considered in order to 
improve the viability of rescues by inviting old equity-managers to contribute their 
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information and experience to new companies. The application of the pari passu principle 
was also examined.  
D. Reorganization Plan Confirmation   
The first interview question was to ask what criteria the courts used to confirm 
reorganization plans in the normal confirmation procedure, because the EBL 2006 does not 
give clear instructions in this regard. Moreover, the judge interviewees were asked how they 
assessed the feasibility of reorganization plans. Second, judge interviewees were asked 
whether and how cram-downs were used by Zhejiang courts. In particular, judges’ attitudes 
towards cram-downs in Zhejiang were sought.  
3.3. Data Sources 
The vast majority of the data on Zhejiang corporate rescues were generously provided by 
insolvency practitioners, including lawyers and accountants who were appointed as 
administrators. Almost all reorganization plans, as either a hardcopy or electronic one, were 
also directly given by them in person.  
There were only two reorganization cases in which the materials were not directly from 
the practitioners. The first was the rescue of Zhejiang Jingxing Trust Co. Ltd. wherein the 
administrator was a local-government-organized liquidation committee; all the members of 
the committee
30
 were local government officials in Jinghua, Zhejiang; unfortunately, they 
declined to be interviewed or to give any case materials. In the Zhejiang Provincial Company 
Registration Office, however, the photocopied reorganization plan and other key documents 
of Jingxing case were unexpectedly found.
31
  
The second case was the reorganization of Huachen Real Estate Co. Ltd. in Ningbo, 
Zhejiang. Nearly all the crucial documents of this case had been made publicly available 
online at the official website of Beilun’s Lower People’s Court, Ningbo which handled the 
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rescue. Hence, it was unnecessary to physically travel to Ningbo to get access to the case 
materials.  
This study was originally planned to interview more judges in Zhejiang, but most of 
them were not easy to approach. The same difficulty was encountered regarding attempts to 
interview government officials. As to debtor interviewees, it appeared understandable for 
them to decline to be interviewed as they were, in most cases, actually expelled during or 
after rescues, and the re-telling of their stories might exacerbate their misery; therefore, after 
listening to the grievances of several debtors when they were approached by telephone, the 
plan to interview more debtors was dropped.  
It is worth noting that the Zhejiang study interviewed ten insolvency practitioners who 
were in charge of seventeen out of twenty reorganizations
32
 in Zhejiang. So, the mainstream 
views of administrators on corporate rescues in Zhejiang would have been adequately 
investigated by this thesis.  
3.4. Ways of Collecting Data  
Prior to travelling to Zhejiang in January 2012, the author gathered, by using the internet, 
publicly available data on Zhejiang corporate rescues as comprehensively as possible. At that 
stage, both the data on rescues themselves and the contact details of prospective interviewees 
were searched and collected. Collecting the data from the media seemed to be necessary, 
because, compared to the source of interviewees who had vested interest in these cases, the 
media information appeared to be more neutral and objective.   
The author met all interviewees in person. Most interviews took place in the 
interviewee’s office. Before each interview, the interviewee was informed of the purposes of 
this study and the principle of anonymity. In order to avoid interruption and for the sake of 
confidentiality, the interviews were conducted without third parties present. Most interviews 
took between one and two hours. No electronic recording apparatus was used, because 
recording was inappropriate in the local custom context. The notes of responses and 
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 As will be demonstrated later, the Zhejiang case study distinguishes a reorganization case from a 
reorganized company, because, in some instances, a group company reorganization case may deal with several 
companies within the same group.  
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comments of the interviewees were taken by the author in Chinese on the scene and then 
translated into English in England later.  
Most of the reorganization plans were electronically transferred to the author’s memory 
stick from interviewees’ computers. There were two cases where the hard copies of 
reorganization plans were provided. There was only one case, Zhejiang Jingxing Trust Co. 
Ltd. reorganization, whose reorganization plan was photocopied from The Zhejiang Province 
Company Registration House. 
3.5. Data Analysis  
Statistical analysis was applied to the Zhejiang data as it had been to the national survey. 
But this method was only used to briefly examine some objective figures, such as the 
unsecured creditors’ recovery rate. Given that the main goal of the Zhejiang study was to 
investigate subjective issues of interested parties in rescues, the main analytical method here 
was observation. Observation as an analytical method was critical in the Zhejiang study, 
because some interviewees’ responses could only be properly interpreted and understood in 
their contest.  
3.6. Focusing Attention on the Zhejiang Data  
There are two extra issues in the Zhejiang data that should be specially mentioned. The 
first is the difference between the number of rescue cases calculated in this thesis and that 
presented by Zhejiang’s Supreme People’s Court in its 2011 corporate reorganization report.  
The report stated that there were thirty-four companies entering the corporate 
reorganization procedure in Zhejiang between June 2007 and September 2011, but the Court 
has not disclosed the list of these companies for public inspection.
33
 This thesis, however, 
found that there were only thirty companies in the formal rescue procedures during this 
period. 
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After carefully reading of the report, a potential double-counting problem was found: 
some going concern sale liquidations were also included by Zhejiang’s Supreme People’s 
Court as corporate reorganizations. For example, the liquidation of Ningbo Bailian Industry 
Technology Co. Ltd., which ended up in a going-concern sale, was counted by the Court as a 
corporate rescue case in its report.  
Presumably, the Court’s 2011 report included two categories of cases: the first was the 
cases that were initially accepted by courts as corporate reorganization irrespective of their 
final destinations, and the second was liquidations which were eventually operated as going-
concern sales. Therefore, the number of rescues was artificially inflated in this official report.  
But this thesis recognized and calculated a corporate reorganization case only if it had 
been accepted by the court as a corporate reorganization procedure. A corporate 
reorganization case might end up in a piecemeal liquidation, as did happen in Zhejiang, but it 
was still included as a rescue case for this thesis. By contrast, this thesis did not regard a 
going concern sale liquidation as a reorganization, because such a method would 
considerably complicate the statistics. 
The second issue is about the social attitudes towards business failures as found by this 
thesis. The social attitudes towards company failure surveyed in this study were actually 
established from only interviewing a small group of people. Their views to some degree 
reflected those of the general public, but strictly speaking, they could not comprehensively 
represent the latter. It was beyond the scope of this thesis to conduct a comprehensive survey 
as to the general social attitudes towards business failure. This limit should be borne in mind.  
Furthermore, social attitudes observed in this thesis were limited to the companies that 
entered the formal rescue procedure rather than to a broad range of companies that failed in 
the market. So, the limit in this respect should also be kept in mind, as causes of business 
failure in the wider market as a whole would be far broader than those seen in the companies 
in reorganization.  
4. CONCLUSIONS 
Generally, this thesis used the collected data to describe and understand the 
implementation of the new corporate rescue law in China. As to the national survey, most of 
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this data was from the online sources on the internet; by contrast, the Zhejiang case study was 
predominantly based on fieldwork interviews.  
In the national survey, to a large extent, a quantitative method of statistical analysis was 
applied with the aim of forming a comprehensive view of corporate reorganization practice 
nationwide in China. In the Zhejiang case study, a qualitative method of observational 
analysis was used to examine the behaviour and incentives of interested parties in rescues. 
In the next chapter, the research findings from the national survey will be reported, 
followed by a chapter reporting the Zhejiang study findings. These two chapters will give a 









In the previous chapter, the research methods of this thesis were described; in particular, 
the methods used to collect empirical data at the national level as well as in Zhejiang 
province were explained. This chapter reports the research findings of the implementation of 
the company reorganization regime in China as a whole; the regional Zhejiang research 
findings will be presented in the next chapter.  
In this chapter, given that the data are mainly quantitative in nature, a set of figures will 
be used to demonstrate China’s new rescue law in action. The next chapter, by contrast, will 
largely consist of the qualitative data drawn from the interviews which explore the 
behaviours and incentives of interested parties in the rescue procedure.  
China’s Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 2006 (the EBL 2006) was passed in 2006, but it 
needed the relevant institutions, especially a body of the insolvency practitioners (IPs), to 
support its full operation. As noted before in chapter 2, one of the most striking 
characteristics of the EBL 2006 was to establish the profession of insolvency practitioners in 
China; in particular, under the EBL 2006, qualified insolvency practitioners could be 
appointed by courts as administrators to manage companies in corporate bankruptcy 
procedure. Given that, before the EBL 2006, there was no profession of insolvency 
practitioners, it was essential to establish a group of qualified insolvency practitioners to meet 
the legal requirements.  
Pursuant to Article 22 of the EBL 2006, in April 2007, China’s Supreme People’s Court 
released two judicial notices regulating the qualification and remuneration of insolvency 
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 Authorised by these two notices, local provincial supreme courts started to 
make their regional lists of insolvency practitioners after April 2007. Considering that it was 
June 2007 when the EBL 2006 took effect, however, receiving the authorisation in April 
2007 meant that most provincial supreme courts were unable to prepare the list of insolvency 
practitioners by the time when the EBL 2006 came into force; two months was too short a 
time for these complicated qualification project to be concluded.  
In fact, when the EBL 2006 took effect on 1 June 2007, in most provinces, the list of 
qualified insolvency practitioners was still pending. For example, in Beijing, it was not until 
September 2007 when its first insolvency practitioner list was made available.
3
 This meant 
that, during the period between June and September 2007, there were no qualified insolvency 
practitioners available for administrator appointments in Beijing. Nevertheless, after the EBL 
2006 took effect, lists of insolvency practitioners were gradually made and released province 
by province.  
Strictly speaking, the availability of the insolvency practitioner list in each province 
marked the starting point of the full enforcement of the EBL 2006. But the belated lists of 
insolvency practitioners did not postpone the enforcement of the EBL 2006; this was because 
under its Article 24 a local government organized liquidation committee could also be 
appointed as an administrator, which meant that courts did not have to appoint qualified 
insolvency practitioners to do the job.  
Before reporting the national implementation of China’s new corporate rescue regime, 
the four research questions in this thesis are worth repeating here, because the findings 
reported in this chapter will focus on them. First, is the new corporate rescue regime 
frequently used in China? And if not, what are the main obstacles to its commencement? 
Second, who is actually in control of the existing corporate reorganizations in China? Third, 
how is value preserved in rescues distributed between interested parties? Finally, is the court 
reorganization plan confirmation adequate to fulfil the policy goals of the new corporate 
rescue regime? 
                                                 
 
2
 They are the Administrator Appointment Regulation and the Administrator Remuneration Regulation 
issued by China’s Supreme People’s Court on 4 and 12 April 2007 respectively. 
3
 The Beijing Supreme People’s Court, ‘The Public Notice of the First Bankruptcy Administrator List of 
Beijing’ (Beijing China, 25 September 2007, in Chinese) 
<http://bjgy.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=56875> accessed 20 September 2012.  
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In response to these four questions, the reminder of this chapter is arranged into four 
Parts: (i) Part 2 reports the number of corporate reorganizations in China and the entry-related 
issues; (ii) Part 3 outlines control in rescues; (iii) Part 4 sheds light on value distribution in 
rescues, and (iv) Part 5 describes the courts’ confirmation of reorganization plans. In the 
conclusion, some of the key points of the findings will be summarized.  
2. COMMENCEMENT OF CORPORATE RESCUE IN CHINA 
As discussed in chapter 3, before the EBL 2006, the corporate bankruptcy system in 
China was not well developed. Although there was optimism about its enforcement when the 
EBL 2006 was passed,
4
 questions still remained regarding the use of the new corporate 
rescue regime, because its development largely depended on a rigorous corporate liquidation 
regime, which in turn needed a well-developed judicial infrastructure, including experienced 
judges, skilled insolvency practitioners and business confidence to use bankruptcy law, inter 
alia. 
2.1. A Small Number of Corporate Reorganizations after 2007 
Given the huge size of the Chinese economy,
5
 there were a relatively small number of 
corporate reorganizations after the EBL 2006 took effect. Between 1 June 2007 and 30 
November 2010, a period of three and a half years, there were, reportedly, only 111 
companies that entered the formal corporate reorganization procedure in China as a whole.
6
  
Within these 111 companies, there were some companies in a company group that were 
jointly reorganized; or, in the language of corporate bankruptcy research, they were 
consolidated. In the consolidated reorganization procedure, all companies in one group were 
treated as one legal entity, and accordingly the legal personality of the individual company 
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 For instance, in the consolidated reorganization of Zonghen Group Co. Ltd. 
Zhejiang in 2008, the legal personality of six companies in the group was annulled; the six 
companies were consolidated as one legal entity in the reorganization procedure. In this thesis, 
these are treated as one corporate reorganization case, but in calculating how many 
companies are reorganized, the thesis will state that there were six companies in the rescue 
i.e., the numbers of reorganizations and companies in reorganization are differentiated in this 
thesis.  
Sometimes a company group containing several companies entered the corporate rescue 
procedure, but the companies within the group were not substantively consolidated, i.e., the 
individual company’ legal personality was retained, and putting them together was just for 
procedural convenience. In such circumstances, they were treated as several independent 
reorganizations or reorganization cases. For example, in the reorganization of Yijiaxiang 
Food Co. Ltd. Zhejiang 2010, three of its affiliated companies entered the rescue procedure 
concurrently in the same court, but they were not consolidated; therefore, they were 
calculated as four corporate reorganizations dealing with four companies.  
By such standards, this thesis tends to state that there were eighty-seven corporate 
reorganizations dealing with 111 companies in China between 1 June 2007 and 30 November 
2007. On average, there were twenty-five corporate reorganizations handled each year.  
Moreover, in order to better understand rescue law implementation in China, this thesis 
calculated a series of rates, namely the company reorganization, bankruptcy and dissolution 
rates, each of which will be defined below, and then an international comparison with the US 
and the UK will be made. As discussed in chapter 4 on methodology, an international 
analogy would be an optimal way to identify the potential gaps of enforcing the EBL 2006 in 
China.  
First, it is the company reorganization rate, which is calculated from counting the 
number of corporate reorganization cases out of the number of all corporate bankruptcy cases, 
including reorganization, liquidation and compromise procedures. From 2007 to 2010 (as 
Figure 1 shows), Chinese courts as a whole handled 3,207 corporate bankruptcy cases in 
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 See generally Charles M Tatelbaum, ‘The Multi-Tiered Corporate Bankruptcy and Substantive 
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2007, 2,955 in 2008, 2,434 in 2009 and 1,973 in 2010. On average, there were 2,642 
corporate bankruptcy cases annually. Therefore, twenty-five corporate reorganizations out of 
2,642 corporate bankruptcies per year meant that the corporate reorganization rate was 0.95 
per cent (twenty-five out of 2,642); put differently, there were 0.95 per cent of corporate 
bankruptcy procedures that were used to reorganize bankrupt companies. 
 
Second, it is the corporate bankruptcy rate, which was the number of corporate 
bankruptcies out of that of corporate dissolutions in the given period. The average number of 
corporate bankruptcies between 2007 and 2010 at 2,646 was already made known above; 
here, correspondingly, the average number of company dissolutions is needed.  
However, accessing China’s company dissolution statistics was very difficult, partly 
because such statistics might still be deemed to be a state secret that the government is 
unwilling to disclose.
8
 So, this thesis had to rely upon other secondary sources to fill the gap.  
One recent study conducted by Li and Wang indicates that China’s national company 
dissolutions were 814,600 in 2007, 871,400 in 2008 and 774,700 in 2009; the data for 2010 
and onwards were not available; these figures were, according to Li and Wang, obtained from 
China’s Supreme People’s Court.9 On average, there were 820,233 companies that were 
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 For example, in its Annual Report on Enterprise Registration of 2011, the China National Company 
Registration Ministry just gave the number of companies opened in 2011 but kept silent as to the number of 
companies dissolved in the year. See the China National Company Registration Ministry, ‘Annual Report on 
Enterprise Registration of 2011’ (Beijing China, in Chinese) 
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Figure 1: The Numbers of Corporate Bankruptcy Cases Handled by Courts in
China Per Year. Information Source: Si Yuan Think Tank, Beijing 2011
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dissolved annually in China.
10
 This figure is consistent with a Beijing-based newspaper’ 




Thus, given the average number of company dissolutions as 820,233, the company 
bankruptcy rate would stand at 0.32 per cent (2,642 company bankruptcies out of 820,233 
company dissolutions); put simply, there were 0.32 per cent of dissolved companies in China 
that entered into the bankruptcy procedures to solve outstanding debt and to exit the market. 
Third, it is the company dissolution rate - the number of companies dissolved out of the 
number of those on the register at the beginning of each year. As shown in Figure 2, in China, 
the number of companies
12
 registered was 9,639,700 in 2007, 9,714,600 in 2008, 9,717,700 
in 2009 and 11,365,100 in 2010 respectively. On average, there were 10,109,275 companies 
on the register annually in this period. Given the annual figure of company dissolutions at 
820,233, China’s company dissolution rate was 8.11 per cent (820,233 company dissolutions 
out of 10,109,275 companies on the register); namely, during the given years, there were 
annually 8.11 per cent of companies that were closed down and exited the market for various 
reasons.  
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Finally, and more significantly, if a comparison is made of the above figures for China 
with their counterparts in England and Wales and the US, some striking contrasts will come 
into light, although it should be noted that such a comparison is useful but superficial, 




As has been calculated elsewhere,
14
 in England and Wales, from 2007 to 2010, the 
annual company dissolution rate was 13.20 per cent, the annual company bankruptcy rate 
stood at 8.55 per cent, and the annual corporate reorganization rate was 15.70 per cent. It 
should be noted that, in England and Wales, the corporate reorganization procedure includes 
administration and the company voluntary arrangement (CVA) procedures. 
In the US, due to the national census interval, the company dissolutions and bankruptcies 
in 2009 and 2010 had not been announced at the time of writing, so it has been necessary to 
turn back to the corresponding statistics from two years earlier (i.e., from 2005 to 2008). 
Over this period, the annual company dissolution rate of the US was 10.85 per cent, its 
annual company bankruptcy rate was 6.04 per cent, and the annual corporate reorganization 
rate stood at 19.98 per cent.
15
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All figures of these three jurisdictions are shown in Figure 3. Evidently, there is an 
apparent similarity of the company dissolution rate between the US, England and Wales and 
China, which stood at 10.85 per cent, 13.2 per cent and 8.11 per cent respectively. Such a 
similarity suggests that the market forces in culling inefficient companies in these three 
countries functioned at similar levels regardless of the differences of judicial infrastructure. 
China’s slightly lower company dissolution rate might be attributed to its relatively higher 
economic growth rate during that period.
16
   
As for the company bankruptcy and reorganization rates, however, a real similarity only 
exists between the US and England and Wales, while China lagged far behind. In both the US 
and England and Wales, there were annually six to nine per cent of dissolved companies that 
used the bankruptcy procedures to solve issues of remaining debts; while in China less than 
one per cent of dissolved companies chose, or were allowed, to do so.  
With regard to the company reorganization rates, in the US and England and Wales, 
between fifteen and twenty per cent of companies in the bankruptcy procedures chose the 
reorganization procedure to seek rehabilitation; whilst in China, again, less than one per cent 
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Figure 3: Comparison of Company Dissolution,Bankruptcy and 
Reorganization Rates in US, England and Wales and China 
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of these companies used the corporate rescue procedure with intention of seeking a rescue 
outcome. 
If the US’s figures could be used as the benchmarks, it means that there were 94.7 per 
cent of dissolved companies in China that should have used the formal bankruptcy 
procedures to settle defaulted debts but actually did not. By the same token, moreover, there 
would be up to 95.2 per cent of Chinese companies in bankruptcies that should have filed for 
reorganization to seek survival but again have not or could not.  
 If the comparison is made with England and Wales, the similar striking contrasts could 
be also concluded.  
As noted, granted, these comparisons are somewhat superficial, as China’s economy and 
social justice are still at the very lower levels of development.
17
 But such contrasting figures 
do give a pointer to potential improvements that can be made in China. One conclusion is 
clear: China’s corporate bankruptcy law and its bankruptcy reorganization regime were not 
adequately used as expected.  
2.2. Few Signs of Momentum  
Given that the corporate rescue law was a new thing in China, it would have taken some 
time for businesses and practitioners to become familiar with it. An examination was made to 
identify whether this new law was growingly used after 2007. For this purpose, all companies 
in rescue were separated into seven consecutive half years according to the date when they 
were formally accepted by court. The results are shown in Figure 4 below.  
Most of the half years saw between ten and twenty companies in reorganization. The 
number of cases culminated at twenty-five in the half year between June and November of 
2009, which might be associated to the then global financial crisis that also hit China hard.
18
 
After that, however, the number dropped again to eleven during the last half year between 
June and November of 2010.  
                                                 
 
17
 See generally Zhiwu Chen, ‘Capital Markets and Legal Development: The China Case’ (2003) 14 China 
Economic Review 451.  
18
 See generally William H Overholt, ‘China in the Global Financial Crisis: Rising Influence, Rising 
Challenges’ (2010) 33 The Washington Quarterly 21.  
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So, apparently, there is not a noticeable trend showing that the rescue regime in China 
has been increasingly used since it was made available from 2007.  
 
2.3. Regional Differences  
Apart from the small number of corporate reorganizations in China as a whole, there was 
a significant asymmetry between different provinces regarding the use of the corporate rescue 
procedure. 
In Figure 5, all companies in rescue between 2007 and 2010 are grouped according to 
the province where they entered the rescue procedure. It is clear that the majority of China’s 
corporate reorganization cases took place in three provinces: Zhejiang, Guangdong and 
Jiangsu. In particular, these three provinces handled 61.26 per cent of these cases (sixty-eight 
out of 111). In the lead, Zhejiang province dealt with the rescue of 27 companies, almost a 
quarter of the national number.  
Meanwhile, in contrast, there was no reported corporate reorganization case in seven 
Chinese provinces, although the rescue law had been in force for nearly four years. It is 
equally striking that although there were reported reorganizations in the remaining twenty 
four provinces, ten of them had only one company in rescue during the three-and-a-half years 





















Figure 4: The Number of Companies Entering Corporate 
Reorganization Each Half Year in China  
 (June 2007 to November 2010)  
Information Source: Zinian Zhang's Data Collection, the following figures 




Lastly, there were a very small number of companies in rescue in Shanghai and Beijing, 
though these two cities (at provincial level in both senses of economy and political status);
19
 
during this period, Shanghai had five companies in rescue, Beijing had only four.  
 
2.4. Court Jurisdictions 
With regard to court jurisdictions, it was found that intermediate people’s courts dealt 
with 65.09 per cent of companies in rescue (sixty-nine out of 111), lower people’s courts 
managed 33.96 per cent of them (thirty-six out of 111), and provincial people’s supreme 
courts handled 0.9 per cent (there was, in fact, only one rescue case accepted by Qinghai’s 
Supreme People’s Court). 
According to a judicial notice issued by China’s Supreme People’s Court in 2002,20 as 
noted before, in principle, a corporate bankruptcy petition should be filed to a lower people’s 
court if the debtor company is registered in a government company registration office at 
county level; if registered at above county level, the company’s bankruptcy should be filed to 
an intermediate people’s court. But a great deal of leeway was also given to local 
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Figure 5: The Number of Companies Entering the 
Corporate Reorganization Procedure by Province  




intermediate people’s courts, as this notice stipulates that an intermediate court has the final 
say as to the acceptance of an individual bankruptcy case.
21
 Therefore, at the end, it is the 
local intermediate court that has the discretion regarding whether a reorganization case 
should be handled by itself or handed down to a lower people’s court.  
Perhaps because of the mandate from this judicial notice, in some areas the local 
intermediate court requires that all corporate bankruptcy procedures should be dealt with by 
itself, i.e., local lower people’s courts are deprived of the power to hear corporate 
bankruptcies. For example, in Guangdong province, Shenzhen’s Intermediate People’s Court 
decreed that all bankruptcy procedures in the region must be heard by the intermediate 
people’s court in order to improve efficiency and professionalism.22 This means that lower 
people’s courts in the Shenzhen prefecture are not allowed to hear corporate bankruptcy, 
including corporate reorganization.  
Exclusively making intermediate people’s courts to handle corporate bankruptcies would 
be desirable: one the one hand, intermediate people’s courts often have high-quality 
personnel; on the other hand, it may rather overcome the problems of local protectionism as 
well as a lack of judicial independence, both of which have been long undermining the 
judicial authority in China.
23
     
2.5. Applicants  
A corporate reorganization procedure could be filed by a debtor, a creditor, or a 
shareholder; more importantly, the debtor and its shareholders could request the court to 
change a creditor-filed liquidation into reorganization procedure.  
As for the applicants of existing corporate reorganizations, there were eighty-two 
companies in rescue where such information was publicly available. As shown in Figure 6, 
fifty out of these eighty-two companies (60.98%) were brought into reorganization by 
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22
 See Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court, ‘The White Paper of Corporate Bankruptcy Hearings in 
Shenzhen Intermediate Court’ (Shenzhen Guangdong China, 20 December 2011, in Chinese) 
<http://www.szcourt.gov.cn/shenwu/view.aspx?id=4207 > accessed 22 September 2012. 
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creditors, twenty-eight of them (34.15%) entered reorganization at the application of 
themselves, and four of them (4.88%) started the formal reorganization procedure at the 
request of shareholders. So, the majority of the rescues were filed by the creditors in China.  
  
2.6. Favouritism  
Given that there was a strong government presence in existing corporate reorganizations 
in China, it is necessary to examine whether companies that had state connection had more 
chances to enter into the formal rescue procedure.  
To this end, all debtor companies were classified into three categories: state-connected, 
private and foreign invested companies. The concepts of the last two categories are easy to 
understand. The concept ‘state-connected’ needs to be clarified here.  
The state-connected companies included these companies that were state-owned, state-
controlled, state-participated, and privatized, each of which will be explained as follows.  
First, the concept ‘state-owned’ is common, since it is widely used and recognized as a 
company with all its equity owned by the state. Second, a state-controlled company is defined 
as a company that is jointly owned by the state and by private parties, but the state is the 
major shareholder and controls the company. Third, a state-participated company is a 
company that is jointly owned, but the state is not the major shareholder, instead it is private 
parties controlling the company. Lastly, a privatized company is the company which was 




Figure 6: Applicants of Corporate Reorganizations in 
China  
(June 2007 to November 2010) 
Applied by Creditor (50)
Applied by Debtor (28)
Applied by Shareholder (4)
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a strong political connection with the state because of their complex previous relationships, 
although they are legally separated from the state.
24
  
 By these standards, as shown in Figure 7 below, forty-eight of these 111 companies 
(43.24 per cent) were state-connected; forty-one of them (39.64 per cent) were private, and 
the remaining seventeen companies (17.12 per cent) were foreign invested. 
 
To test whether there was an element of favouritism involved, a set of related figures in 
2008 released by China’s Company Register Ministry were used to detect the potential bias. 
According to the Ministry’s statistics, in 2008, twenty-six per cent of China’s companies 
(270,540,000 out of a total 971,460,000) were state-connected, sixty-eight per cent 
(675,420,000 out of a total 971,460,000) were private, and four per cent (43,490,000 out of a 
total 971,460,000) were foreign invested.
25
    
In view of these two sets of figures, it can be found that twenty-six per cent state-
connected companies had a forty-eight per cent chance of using the formal rescue procedure, 
whereas sixty-eight per cent private companies were only given a thirty-nine per cent chance. 
Apparently, state-connected companies had far more chances to access the formal corporate 
rescue procedure. 
Interestingly, although there were only four per cent of companies in China that were 
foreign invested, they secured seventeen per cent of the formal bankruptcy rescue 
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Figure 7: Different Types of Debtor Companies Entering 
Corporate Reorganization in China 
 
 (June 2007 to November 2010) 
State-Connected Company (48)
Private Company (44)
Foreign Invested Company (19)
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opportunities. A closer examination found that all these foreign companies were Taiwanese 
invested; these investors were probably more aware of the corporate rescue regime under 
China’s new company bankruptcy law and managed to use this regime for rehabilitation.  
Furthermore, apart from the favouritism towards state-connected companies, China’s 
publicly-traded companies seemed to have been given a handsome share of the corporate 
rescue opportunities. These companies were listed on either the Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock 
Exchanges. Figure 8 below shows that twenty-nine out of a total 111 companies in rescue 
were publicly-traded, i.e., 26.13 per cent of the existing rescues were used to reorganize 
troubled listed companies in China.  
As shown in Figure 5 before, many provinces had only one or two companies in rescue 
during the give period, and it was quite likely for these companies to be the listed ones. For 
instance, in Hubei Province, there were only two companies brought into reorganization: 
Tianfa Oil Co. Ltd. and Tianyi Tech. Co. Ltd., both of them were listed on the Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange. 
 
To find out whether listed companies in China had been disproportionally favoured 
regarding the reorganization opportunity, the comparing statistics were searched and derived. 
In 2008, according to World Bank,
26
 China had 1,604 listed companies (excluding companies 
listed overseas). Given that, in 2008, as noted before, there were 971,460,000 registered 
companies in China as a whole, which means that less than 1 per cent listed companies (1,604 
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74% 
Figure 8: Listed and Non-listed Companies in 
Reorganization in China 
  





out of 971,460,000) were given twenty-six per cent of the corporate reorganization 
opportunities. Thus, compared with state-connected companies, listed companies in China 
had far more chances to use the formal rescue procedure. And it should be noted that many 
listed companies were also state-connected.  
But it should be noted that the above two comparison outcomes are still somewhat 
superficial, because both state-owned and listed companies were of far more economic 
significance than the rest of companies, and were large in size regarding annual turnover and 
employment, etc. In other words, the sheer numbers of them could not tell the whole story. 
However, at the very least, these contrasting figures suggest that companies which were not 
well-connected were rather disadvantaged before the opportunities in using the formal 
corporate reorganization procedure in China. 
2.7. Rejections  
Given the huge number of dissolved and bankrupt companies in China each year, as 
shown before, some troubled companies would have desperately sought a breathing space 
under the new corporate rescue law, but most courts might have turned their backs on these 
filings. To understand the entry of the new corporate rescue procedure in China, it would be 
desirable to know how many, or what proportion of, rescue filings were rejected by courts. 
This, however, was largely impractical, as, on the one hand, there were no relevant official 
statistics on rejections, and, on the other hand, unlike required to give a public notice when 
accepting a corporate reorganization filing, courts are not obliged to advertise a rejection; this 
meant that most objections probably quietly vanished without being publicly noticed. 
Four high-profile rejected filings were collected (see Table 1 below), however. Although 
they do not represent all rejected rescue filings, some understandings in reflection of the 







Table 1: Corporate Reorganization Petitions Rejected in China 
(1 June 2007 to 30 November 2010) 
 Company Filing Court Rejection Grounds 
1 China Bicycle 
(深圳中华) 
 
14 Jan 2010 Shenzhen 
Intermediate 
Court 
28 Dec 2010 A Lack of the Consent of the 
Revenue Authorities 
2 China Kejian 
(科健股份) 
15 Jan 2010 Shenzhen 
Intermediate 
Court 











06 Nov 2010 No Explanation 
4 East Star 
Airlines 
(东星航空) 
08 Apr 2009 Wuhan 
Intermediate 
Court 
12 Jun 2009 No Explicit Local 
Government Support and 
others 
 
The first rejected filing was the attempt to reorganize the company, China Bicycle Co. 
Ltd., which was located in Shenzhen, Guangdong province. The reorganization petition was 
filed by a creditor that was also the company’s largest shareholder to the Shenzhen 
Intermediate People’s Court on 14 January 2010. Under the EBL 2006, 27  the court was 
required to either accept or reject the filing within fifteen days of receiving the filing. It, 
however, took almost one year for the court to formally respond to the application; the filing 
was rejected on 28 December 2010. More surprisingly, to reject the filing, the court explained 
that it was because that the applicant had not obtained the agreement of the local revenue 
authorities regarding how to solve the company’s outstanding taxes.28 Such a requirement 
seemed to have gone beyond either the spirit or the letter of Article 8 of the EBL 2006.  
The second rejected filing was to reorganize China Kejian Co. Ltd. The company was 
filed for reorganization by a creditor to the same Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court on 15 
January 2010. This time, the court took about eight months to assess the application. On 20 
September 2010, the applicant was informed that its filing had been deemed to be withdrawn 
because of a lack of supporting materials. The court, however, did not specify what these 
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 More contentiously, since the reorganization filing was deemed to be 
withdrawn, it meant that the applicant was also deprived of the opportunity to appeal.  
  The third rejection happened in Shanghai. On 4 February 2010, Shanghai Hongshen 
Technology Co. Ltd. was filed for reorganization by its creditor to the Shanghai First 
Intermediate People’s Court. Over nine months later, on 6 November 2010, the applicant was 
told that the filing had been rejected, but no explanations were given.
30
 At that time, it was 
rumoured that the court rejected the rescue filing because the major shareholders of the 
company could not enter into an agreement on some key restructuring issues.
31
 One year later, 
however, on 27 October 2011, Hongshen entered into the formal corporate rescue procedure 
before Xi’an Intermediate People’s Court, Shaanxi Province, after it had relocated its 
registered office from Shanghai to Shaanxi;
32
 perhaps it was the first forum shopping case in 
China’s corporate bankruptcy law history.  
The fourth case took place in Wuhan, the capital city of Hubei Province in 2009. East-
Star Airlines Co. Ltd. Hubei, a private airlines company, was filed for reorganization by its 
creditor before the Wuhan Intermediate People’s Court on 8 April 2009. Over two months 
later, on 12 June 2009, the court rejected the filing
33
 on the grounds that the reorganization 
proposal prepared by the applicant was not feasible and that the applicant had not shown 
evidence that the local Wuhan Municipal Government would back the company’s 
reorganization.
34
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These four rejected rescue filings were collected by this thesis mainly because they 
gained heavy press coverage. The first three companies were publicly-traded and the last one 
was an airlines company. In other words, these companies’ rescue filings mattered public 
interest, so they attracted much press attention. Conversely, the rejected reorganization filings 
of other low-profile companies might be just conveniently neglected.  
Although these four reorganization attempts were rejected for various reasons, they 
shared one common feature: all these courts did not meet the statutory deadline to respond to 
the rescue filings, namely, there was a breach of Article 10 of the EBL 2006 that requires that 
the court must make the decision within fifteen days of receiving the filing. This lack of 
timekeeping by the courts also reflects a serious problem on the accountability of the 
judiciary in China. 
Apart from the above individual rejected filings, in fact, some courts have formalized the 
entry restrictions of the reorganization procedure. For example, in 2011, the Shenzhen 
Intermediate People’s Court, one of the Chinese experimental courts in handling corporate 
bankruptcy, released a report which stated that ‘a filing of corporate bankruptcy (including 
corporate reorganization) must be assessed considerably carefully and cannot be accepted 
unless the court believes that both procedural and substantive requirements enshrined in the 
EBL 2006 have been thoroughly fulfilled’.35 Its tone of this report was clear: acceptance of 
corporate reorganization filings must be restricted.  
Similarly, in the Hangzhou Intermediate People’s Court, Zhejiang Province, another 
pioneer court in China, one of its reports on bankruptcy (2010) stated that when there is 
corporate reorganization filing, the applicant will be persuaded by the court not to formally 
file for reorganization; instead, at the time, the interested parties including major creditors, 
the debtor, and, more essentially, the potential company buyer, will be summoned by the 
court to assess the feasibility of the reorganization proposal. If the proposal can be, in 
principle, agreed by the main parties, the court will allow the formal reorganization procedure 
to start so as to facilitate the agreed rescue package; otherwise, the court will persuade the 
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applicant to drop the filing.
36
 In some ways, this is like a pre-packaged reorganization,
37
 
although the court involves in the pre-filing negotiations.  
In sum, the acceptance of corporate reorganization filings were restrictively interpreted 
by courts in China, thus, making the court accept a corporate rescue filing is considerably 
difficult. 
2.8. A High Success Rate 
Perhaps because of excessive entry restrictions of the corporate rescue procedure, the 
rescue success rate was very high in the existing corporate reorganizations. Here the success 
of a corporate reorganization case is defined as whether its reorganization plan is confirmed 
and executed as expected. It was found that there were 103 out of all 111 companies in rescue 
(92.79%) that survived the rescue processes.
38
 Accordingly, there were only eight of these 
companies (7.21%) which were converted into liquidation. More precisely, within these eight 
companies, four had no reorganization plan proposed or had the plan voted down by creditors, 
and the remaining four companies ended in liquidation because their confirmed 
reorganization plans failed in execution.  
2.9. Late Rescue 
Generally, most of the reorganizations seemed to have been filed too late. Out of eighty-
seven companies in rescue where their information was publicly available, fifty-seven of 
them (65.52%) ceased trading prior to entering the corporate reorganization procedure.
39
 For 
example, when Xiamen Xinxin Artefacts Co. Ltd. Fujian entered the corporate reorganization 
procedure on 27 February 2009, its business operation had stopped months before on 25 
October 2008, and its major shareholder, who was also the chief executive officer, Huang 
                                                 
 
36
 The Hangzhou Intermediate People’s Court, ‘The Self-Assessment of Dealing with Corporate 
Reorganization Cases’ (Hangzhou Zhejiang China, 5 January 2010, in Chinese) <www.hzcourt.cn> accessed 26 
September 2011.  
37
 See generally at Lijie Qi, ‘The Rise of Pre-packaged Corporate Rescue on both Sides of the Atlantic’ 
(2007) 20 Insolvency Intelligence 129.  
38
 See Appendix 1.  
39
 See Appendix 4.  
 119 
 
Zhongguo, had long been missing. It was the local government that stepped in and handled 




In short, between June 2007 and November 2010, there were not too many corporate 
reorganizations handled by Chinese courts, and more notably, many of the existing corporate 
reorganization procedures were used to rehabilitate state-connected and listed companies in 
China. If a rescue filing was accepted by the court, however, it was high likely for the 
reorganization plan to be confirmed. And it is noteworthy that most of the existing corporate 
rescues were filed very late, therefore, much could be done to incentivize relevant parties to 
take early rescue actions.  
3. CONTROL IN RESCUE 
Despite the difficulties encountered by troubled companies to enter the corporate 
reorganization procedure, some companies were still offered a breathing space under the new 
corporate rescue law. This Part moves to reporting the findings on control in the existing 
corporate rescues in China.  
Under Article 13 of the EBL 2006, whatever the corporate reorganization or liquidation 
procedure, the court will appoint an administrator to take control of the company at the time 
when the bankruptcy filing is accepted. But, given that the corporate reorganization 
procedure aims to continue a company’s business, the debtor is allowed to apply to regain 
control from the administrator. So, this Part reports, first, the findings on administrator 
appointments and, second, those on the use of the debtor-in-possession model in rescues.  
3.1. Administrator Appointments 
All administrators in the existing rescues were directly appointed by the courts. As noted 
before, the power of appointing the administrator is exclusively vested in the hands of courts. 
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But under Article 22 of the EBL 2006, a meeting of creditors is allowed to challenge the 
appointment and to request a replacement. In practice, however, such replacement has not 
been found. But, there are three relevant cases worth mentioning.  
The first case was the reorganization of Xiamen Xinxin Artefacts Co. Ltd. Fujian in 2009. 
The previously appointed administrator, a local law firm, was replaced by another law firm; 
however the replacement was made by the court on its own motion rather than at the request 
of the meeting of creditors. There was no publicly available information regarding why the 
court made the replacement.
41
   
The second case was the reorganization of Taizinai Milk Co. Ltd. Hunan in 2010. One of 
the company’s shareholders nominated a Beijing-based law firm as the administrator,42 but 
this nomination was simply ignored, probably because the court thought that it had no duty to 
consider the shareholders’ nomination.43 
The third case was the reorganization of Haiji Chemical Co. Ltd. Inner Mongolia in 
2009. When the creditors’ meeting was held, some angry creditors asked the court to sack the 
administrator, accusing that the administrator had not discharge its duties adequately in 
investigating the company’s assets, but the creditors’ intent was not considered by the court.44 
The failure of this challenge was likely to be caused by two factors. First, the EBL 2006
45
 
states that the administrator’s appointment can only be formally challenged by a meeting of 
creditors rather than by individual creditors; put differently, there should be a special 
resolution passed by the creditors’ meeting. But the central concern here is that the EBL 2006 
is silent on the specific routes whereby individual creditors could use to raise a motion in the 
creditors’ meeting. Without clarification, creditors’ voices cannot be adequately heard and 
counted. Second, in the Haiji case, the creditors only met once; the first meeting of creditors 
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was also the last. It seemed too late for creditors to challenge the administrator’s appointment. 
Frustrated by reaction of both the court and the administrator, most of the creditors in the 
Haiji case voted against the administrator’s proposed reorganization plan, but days later the 
court imposed a cram-down confirming the plan.
46
  
Except these three cases, there were no other publicly reported cases wherein the 
administrator’s appointment was affected or challenged. Therefore, it is safe to say that the 
administrators’ appointments in China’s corporate rescues were completely in the hands of 
the courts. 
It should be noted that, unlike administrators in the UK corporate administration 
procedures who are exclusively selected from qualified insolvency practitioners (IPs), 
bankruptcy administrators in China include qualified insolvency practitioners and local 
government organized liquidation committees. These committees are interim working panels 
formed by local government agencies. Usually, most of them are local revenue, labour and 
pension, police, land, company registration and bank regulating authorities. Most of these 
committees are chaired by local senior politicians, for example a deputy mayor.
47
 
Moreover, China’s bankruptcy administrators are not individuals but entities, such as 
law firms, accounting firms, or the aforementioned committees. This would be second key 
difference from the UK administrators.  
As for administrator appointments from these different groups, eighty-three companies 
in rescue where their information was publicly available were examined. As shown in Figure 
9, local government organized liquidation committees were appointed in thirty-nine out of 
these eighty-three reorganizations (46.99%); law firms were appointed in twenty-six of them 
(31.33%); accounting firms in thirteen (15.66%) and professional liquidating firms in two 
cases (2.41%); the remaining three reorganizations (3.61%) had law and accounting firms 
jointly appointed.  
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 As shown in Figure 9, almost half of the corporate reorganizations used local 
government organized liquidation committees as administrators to manage the companies in 
rescue.
48
   
On closer examination, it was found that the administrator appointments from local 
government organized liquidation committees were mainly used in listed company 
reorganizations. In particular, such an appointment took place in twenty-six out of a total of 
twenty-nine listed company rescues (89.66%). 
49
  
Interestingly, if leaving the listed company reorganizations aside, a largely different 
pattern of administrator appointments emerged. As shown in Figure 10 below, in fifty-four 
non-listed company reorganizations, local-government-organized liquidation committees 
were appointed in thirteen reorganizations (24.07%), law firms were appointed in twenty-four 
reorganizations (44.44%), accounting firms in thirteen (24.07%), professional liquidating 
firms in one (1.85%), and law and accounting firms were jointly appointed in three cases 
(5.56%). Law firms took a big share in these appointments.  
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Figure 9: Corporate Reorganization Administrators' 
Appointments in China 
 (1 June 2007 to 30 November 2010) 
Liquidation Committee (39) 
Law Firm (26)  
Accounting Firm (13) 
Law Firm and Accounting Firm Jointly (3)  




Although many Chinese corporate reorganizations had administrators appointed from the 
local government organized liquidation committees, the composition of these committees has 
rather evolved. Before the EBL 2006, old local government organized liquidation committees 
were entirely comprised of government officials without the involvement of professionals, 
such as lawyers;
50
 however, the new liquidation committees under the EBL 2006 were to a 
certain extent different.  
Clearly, professionals were more involved in these liquidation committees after the EBL 
2006. As noted, there were thirty-nine reorganizations that used the liquidation committee as 
the administrator; in at least twenty-five of these cases (64.10%), it was found that 
professionals, especially lawyers, were included in the committee as individual members. In 
the remaining fourteen cases, notwithstanding that there was no concrete evidence that 
professionals were officially admitted as committee members, it was often noticed that 
professionals were hired by these committees as advisors. For instance, in the reorganization 
of Jingxing Trust Co. Ltd. in Zhejiang in 2010, a Beijing-based law firm was contracted by 
the liquidation committee to advise the process although the lawyers were not officially 
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Figure 10: Administator Appointments in Non-Listed 
Company Reorganizations in China 
 (June 2007 to November 2010)  
Law Firm Appointment (24)
Accounting Firm Appointment (13)
Law Firm and Accounting Firm Joint
Appointment (3)
Professional Liquidating Firm Appointment (1)
Liquidation Committee Appointment (13)
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included as the committee members.
51
 Thus, there was more professionals’ involvement in 
local-government-organized liquidation committees.  
Overall, with regard to administrator appointments, this power was completely in the 
hands of the courts in China, and it has never been effectively challenged by creditors. In the 
meantime, in listed company reorganizations, China’s courts tended to appoint local-
government-organized liquidation committees as administrators, whilst in the reorganization 
of non-listed companies, lawyers had a better chance of appointment.  
After an administrator was appointed, as noted, with the leave of the court, the control of 
the company might be returned to the debtor; in such circumstances, the administrator would 
retreat and act as a monitor overseeing the debtor-in-possession.  
3.2. The Debtor-in-Possession Model 
As for the debtor-in-possession, fifty reorganizations were examined, because their 
information on this was publicly available. It was found that
52
 that debtors regained control in 
thirteen reorganizations (26%), and administrators accordingly continued to control in the 
remaining thirty-seven reorganizations (74%). Therefore, in most of the rescues, it was the 
administrator-in-possession rather than the debtor-in-possession model which was used.
53
  
Whoever the administrator or the debtor was in control, at the heart of control would be 
the right to propose a reorganization plan for a vote. This will be reported in the following 
section.  
3.3. Plan Drafters 
Under Article 80 of the EBL 2006, a reorganization plan can be proposed by an 
administrator; but this right will be transferred to the debtor in the event of the debtor-in-
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possession; other parties, including creditors and shareholders, are not expressly given the 
right to do so under the EBL 2006.
54
  
As to which parties proposed reorganization plans, there were seventy reorganizations 
studied.
55
 It was found that the reorganization plan was proposed by the administrator in fifty 
cases (74.29%),
 
which was consistent with the dominance of the administrator-in-possession 
as noted before; the reorganization plan was proposed by the debtor in twelve reorganizations 
(17.14%); the administrator and the debtor jointly proposed the reorganization plan in five 
cases (7.14%), and there was one reorganization case (1.43%) where the reorganization plan 
was actually proposed by the creditors’ committee and the company buyer. 
Apparently, administrators played a greater role in proposing reorganization plans. In all 
cases of the administrator-in-possession, undoubtedly, it was the administrator who prepared 
the reorganization plan.  
In thirteen cases of the debtor-in-possession, however, pursuant to Article 80 of the EBL 
2006, the reorganization plan should have been proposed by the debtor. But, within these 
thirteen cases were two cases where the plan was instead prepared by the administrator, and 
in another two cases, the reorganization plan was jointly proposed by the administrator and 
the debtor.
56
 It seemed to be deviation from what the debtor-in-possession was intended to do 
under the EBL 2006. 
A reorganization plan might be proposed in the name of an administrator, a debtor, or 
jointly. The main terms of a reorganization plan, however, would be the results of intense 
negotiations between the company buyer and other interested parties, because the current 
corporate reorganization regime in China relied too heavily on the outside buyers to turn 
troubled companies around.  
As to whether a company buyer was successfully solicited in the existing corporate 
reorganizations, seventy-three reorganizations were examined: sixty-one reorganizations 
(83.56%) were concluded as going concern sales.  
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3.4. Efficiency  
To examine efficiency of the existing corporate rescues in China, seventy-eight 
reorganizations whose relevant information was publicly available were studied.
57
 On 
average, it took 198.77 days, i.e., about six-and-a-half months, to complete a corporate 
reorganization procedure in China.  
It is worth noting that the time of a rescue procedure was calculated from the date when 
the rescue filing was accepted by court to the date on which the reorganization plan was 
confirmed; the time taken by the court to assess the rescue application prior to accepting the 
filing and by the debtor to execute the confirmed reorganization plan were excluded.  
Furthermore, it was found that the reorganization procedure of listed companies seemed 
to be conducted more efficiently than that of non-listed companies did. Specifically, if there 
two groups of companies were separated, it was found that it  on average took 120.76 days to 
complete a listed company reorganization case; whilst, on average, 244.94 days were taken to 
complete a non-listed company reorganization case. Listed companies spent less than half 
time non-listed companies did.  
The shortest corporate reorganization procedure was found in Sichuan Province where 
an automotive supplier, Zhonghen Special Steel Co. Ltd., spent only 31 days to go through 
the rescue process.
58
 The longest one occurred in Zhejiang, where it took 536 days for the 
reorganization of Huatai Oil Co. Ltd. to be concluded by the court.  
The next Part moves to reporting the findings of value creation and distribution in 
China’s corporate rescues. 
                                                 
 
57
 See Appendix 8.  
58
 Youbing Lan and Yuansong Chen, ‘The Success of the First Corporate Reorganization in the Province’ 
Mianyang Evening News (Mianyang Sichuan China, 11 January 2010, in Chinese) A2.  
 127 
 
4. VALUE DISTRIBUTION  
The corporate reorganization regime would be built on sand if it could not preserve 
going-concern value. Preserving going-concern value is mainly tested by examining whether 
rescue procedures have increased creditor recovery rates. So, this Part starts with reporting 
the value preservation of the corporate rescue regime in China, and then it turns to reporting 
on value distribution in rescues.  
4.1. Preservation of Going-Concern Value 
As described in chapter 4, this thesis examined whether corporate reorganization 
preserved going-concern value by looking at whether creditor recovery rates were increased. 
Under Article 82 of the EBL 2006, creditors are divided into three classes: secured, 
preferential (tax and wage) and unsecured creditors. As to recoveries to secured
59
 and 
preferential creditors, it was found that in all existing corporate reorganizations these two 
classes were paid in full. In other words, the securities were fully honoured, and employees 
and revenue authorities were well protected, mainly because they ranked above unsecured 
creditors in the payment hierarchy. So, examining creditor recovery rates only focused on 
unsecured creditors.  
As far as the average unsecured creditor recovery rate is concerned, sixty-nine 
reorganizations were investigated as their relevant information was publicly available. It was 
calculated that the average recovery rate for unsecured creditors amounted to 33.67 per cent 
of their original claims.  
The full payment to unsecured creditors was found in several cases, although it was 
often made in instalments. The lowest payment took place in the reorganization of Dixian 
Textile Co. Ltd. Hebei in which the unsecured creditors were paid at two cents of the dollar. 
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Zero per cent payment to unsecured creditors did not happen in China’s corporate 
reorganizations.  
The 33.67 per cent average unsecured creditor recovery rate in China’s corporate 
reorganizations would be better understood if compared with its counterpart in corporate 
liquidations.  
Until now, there have not been empirical studies calculating the average recovery rate to 
unsecured creditors in China’s corporate liquidations under the EBL 2006. An alternative 
figure had to be used to fill the gap. One early study indicates that it was not unusual for 
unsecured creditors to recover nothing in China’s corporate liquidation procedures before the 
EBL 2006, and the average recovery rate for them was always below ten per cent.
60
 
Therefore, tentatively, if unsecured creditors as a whole could only recover less than ten per 
cent of their claims in liquidations, China’s new corporate reorganization did show its 
strength in preserving going-concern value, since the recovery rate to unsecured creditors has 
been increased to 33.67 per cent in reorganizations. It would be a significant achievement.  
The above comparisons may only offer a glimpse of the strength of the new corporate 
rescue regime in preserving going-concern value. But, such comparisons are far from 
perfection, since a comprehensive, scientific comparison should take into account a wide 
range of variables of these companies in both liquidation and reorganization procedures, such 
as the debt/equity ratios, the industry differences etc. Obviously, this is beyond what this 
thesis could reach.  
4.2. The Pari Passu Principle 
In theory, the pari passu principle is not compulsory in China’s corporate reorganization 
procedures. But, given that this principle reflects fundamental equity in distributing value in 
bankruptcy, it is still regarded as a basic rule to follow in practice.  
As noted, in nearly all recues, secured and preferential creditors were paid in full; 
therefore, the pari passu principle only mattered to unsecured creditors.  
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Regarding application of the pari passu principle, sixty-nine corporate reorganization 
cases where the relevant information was publicly available were examined. It was found
61
 
that this principle was applied in fifty-one reorganizations (73.91%); accordingly, its 
departure was found in eighteen cases (26.09%).  
Deviating from the pari passu principle took place more frequently in reorganization of 
listed companies. In particular, it happened in twelve out of all twenty-eight listed company 
reorganizations (42.86%); by contrast, it was only seen in out of all forty-one non-listed 
company reorganization cases (14.62%). Thus, it was far more likely for this principle to be 
relaxed in listed company reorganization cases than in non-listed company ones.  
The deviation from the pari passu principle was used mainly in two forms. The first was 
to pay small unsecured creditors at a higher recovery rate in exchange for their votes to pass 
the reorganization plan, because the number of creditors mattered to the plan’s passage. As 
reviewed in chapter 3, a reorganization plan should be accepted by over half in number and 
over two-thirds in claims of each class of impaired parties. To solicit votes of small creditors, 
it was common in these cases to design a complex unsecured creditors’ repayment scheme 
whereby smaller creditors were paid at a higher rate or sometimes paid in full.  
For example, in the reorganization of Jiufa Food Co. Ltd. Shandong, according to its 
reorganization plan, each unsecured creditor was fully paid on the amount below ¥100,000, 
and was paid at 20.48 per cent on the amount above ¥100,000.
62
 Clearly, a small unsecured 
creditor would be paid at 100 per cent if his claim was less than ¥100,000; however, to a 
large unsecured creditor, say, with a debt of ¥ 100,000,000, the full payment on the amount 
below ¥100,000 was indeed negligible. Thus, the small creditors were the main beneficiaries 
under such a payment scheme; in turn, they might have no reason to reject the reorganization 
plan.
63
    
The second form of deviation was to pay unsecured creditors who were natural persons 
at a higher recovery rate in order to maintain social stability in China. Unlike large, corporate 
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creditors, creditors who were natural persons tended to collectively petition before the 
government if they felt unfairly treated, and this gave rise to concerns of social stability. In 
response, these individuals were more likely to be paid at a far higher recovery rate so as to 
avoid mass petitions.  
For example, in the reorganization of Qingtai Trust Co. Ltd. Qinghai in 2008, all 
unsecured creditors who were natural persons were paid in full, while other unsecured 
creditors were paid at ten per cent.
64
 In the reorganization of Zhonggu Sugar Co. Ltd. 
Guangdong, the sugar cane farmer creditors were paid at 100 per cent and other creditors 
were paid at 28.3 per cent only.
65
   
In fact, the first form was used more frequently that the second.  
The pari passu principle deals with payment within the same class of creditors, while the 
absolute priority principle governs value distribution between creditor and shareholder. As to 
value distribution in corporate rescues, it is the absolute priority principle rather than the pari 
passu principle that is a source of contention for decades. The following section reports the 
application of the absolute priority principle in Chinese corporate rescues. 
4.3. The Absolute Priority Principle 
As to the absolute priority principle, there were sixty-two corporate reorganizations with 
their relevant information publicly available. It was found
66
 that the deviation from this 
principle occurred in thirty-three out of these sixty-two reorganizations (53.23%). 
Most of these deviations took place in listed company reorganizations; in particular, 
twenty-seven out of all thirty-three deviations happened in the reorganization of listed 
companies. In fact, the departure from absolute priority in the norm rather than the exception 
in listed company reorganization. This was because China’s Supreme People’s Court required 
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that shareholders of listed companies should be protected in reorganization regardless of 
whether the company is insolvent.
67
  This is quite contentious.  
Compared with listed company rescues, the deviation happened far less frequently in 
non-listed company reorganizations. In all these sixty-two studied company reorganizations, 
there were thirty-four non-listed company reorganizations, and the deviation was only found 
in five of these company reorganizations, i.e., the deviation was used only in 14.71 per cent 
of non-listed company reorganizations. So, a striking contrast as to applying the absolute 
priority principle could be found between listed and non-listed company reorganization cases 
in China.  
In most these deviations, it appeared to be a transfer of value from unsecured creditors to 
shareholders. Secured and preferential creditors were generally not adversely affected, 
because, as noted before, they were always paid in full. 
In listed company reorganizations, the deviation was undertaken mainly in two ways. 
The first was that all old equity remained intact; accordingly, the reorganization was 
conducted entirely at the expense of unsecured creditors. For instance, in the reorganization 
of Haina Tech Co. Ltd. Zhejiang in 2007, the unsecured creditors were paid 25.35 per cent of 
their pre-bankruptcy claims, whereas all equity of the shareholders remained unaffected 
according to the reorganization plan.
68
  
The second, perhaps the most common, was that shareholders joined unsecured creditors 
to bear the costs of reorganization. In such situation, shareholders were required to give up 
part of their equity, and the administrator would sell the equity so as to increase recoveries 
for unsecured creditors. For instance, in the reorganization of Changling Group Co. Ltd. 
Shaanxi in 2008, the general public shareholders were asked to contribute ten per cent of their 
shares to the administrator who sold them in order to increase the payment rate to unsecured 
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creditors. As a result, the unsecured creditors’ recovery rate was increased to eighteen per 
cent; otherwise, they would have recouped nothing.
69
  
It seemed to be quite anomalous that the shares of a listed company in the bankruptcy 
procedure were still valuable in China. This was mainly because the company’s license to be 
listed at China’s stock exchanges, which is strictly controlled by the central government, is 
high in value. A listed company may be bankrupt, but its license to be quoted in the stock 
exchange would be worth of between RMB 0.1 to 1 billion, but the key problem is that the 
license is inalienable and does not belong to the company itself; creditors could not benefit 
from the license.  
In contrast to listed company reorganizations, the deviation from absolute priority in 
non-listed company rescues, as noted above, was the exception rather than the norm. It 
happened in only five out of thirty-four non-listed company reorganizations. But, 
interestingly, the deviation in all these five cases actually went to the extreme: all previous 
equity remained untouched, i.e., it was entirely the unsecured creditors footing the bill of 
rescues.  
The deviation in these five cases seemed to be attributed to full control by the debtor 
during the rescue process. For example, in the reorganization of Dadi Paper Co. Ltd. 
Zhejiang in 2010, the debtor regained control from the administrator, and the reorganization 
plan was also prepared by itself. Therefore, it is not surprising that the debtor used the control 
to steer the rescue in its own best interests.
70
  
At the same time, in these cases, sometimes the circumvention of absolute priority might 
also be a realistic option for creditors. And by doing so, both unsecured creditors and equity-
managers benefited from the circumvention; otherwise, the consequence might be destructive 
for both sides. For example, in the reorganization of Xiamen Xinxin Artefacts Co. Ltd., as has 
been mentioned before, the company’s controlling shareholder and CEO, Mr Huang 
Guozhong, absconded to the US shortly before the company collapsed, but was later invited 
by creditors to come back to turn the company around. In this case, the creditors had to make 
                                                 
 
69
 Changling Group Co. Ltd, ‘The Annual Report of Changling 2008’ (Shaanxi China, 2009, in Chinese).  
70
 Jingding Group Co. Ltd, ‘The Public Notice: Outcomes of Reorganization of Dadi’ Stock Daily (Beijing 
China, 9 December 2010, in Chinese) D4.  
 133 
 
a choice between two options: first, if Mr Huang did not return, the company would be 
liquidated, since there was no company buyer coming forward, and this could, as estimated, 
lead to zero repayment for unsecured creditors; second, with Mr Huang’s ownership of the 
company unchanged, the unsecured creditors were promised a ten per cent payment. Without 
hesitation, creditors decided to choose the second option.
71
  
Therefore, the deviation from the absolute priority principle in listed company 
reorganization was used mainly because of political concerns over maintaining social 
stability; by contrast, in non-listed company reorganization, it was largely used because of 
market forces.  
In sum, the corporate reorganization regime has been proved to be effective in 
preserving going concern value of troubled companies in China, as the average recovery rate 
for unsecured creditors has been increased from less than ten per cent in pre-EBL 2006 
corporate liquidations to 33.67 per cent in post-EBL 2006 reorganizations. The current main 
challenge is how to deal with two fundamental value distribution rules: the pari passu and 
absolute priority principles in reorganizations, because there were widespread deviations 
from them in the existing corporate reorganizations in China.  
In particular, in listed company reorganizations in China, the absolute priority principle 
was virtually ignored, and the pari passu principle was relaxed in nearly half of these cases. 
By contrast, in non-listed company reorganizations in China, these two principles were 
largely complied with, and specifically, the deviations from the pari passu and absolute 
priority principles were only seen in 14.62 and 14.71 per cents of these reorganizations 
respectively.  
Strictly speaking, deviations from these two principles are allowed by the EBL 2006, but 
under Article 87, such deviations must be carried out only if certain statutory conditions are 
met. To these ends, it is courts which are required to safeguard that the deviation from these 
two principles are lawfully exercised when confirming reorganization plans. Have courts 
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discharged their duties in making sure that these norms were complied with? These issues 
will be reported in the next Part.  
5. PLAN CONFIRMATION  
Under Article 86 of the EBL 2006, a reorganization plan must be submitted to the court 
for confirmation after it has been voted by all classes of impaired parties. The law allows the 
court to make a final decision within thirty days of receiving the plan.
72
  
5.1. Quick Confirmation  
Not surprisingly, all submitted reorganization plans were confirmed by the courts; in 
other words, there was no one case where the reorganization plan was rejected by the court in 
China.  
In most cases, it appeared to be a formality for the court to confirm a submitted 
reorganization plan, since it was not unusual for the court to approve a plan on the same day 
when the plan was submitted,
73
 or within two to three days thereof.
74
   
In very rare cases, it would take longer. For example, in the reorganization of Jingwoniu 
Food Equipment Co. Ltd. Guangdong, it took over five months for the court to eventually 
confirm the reorganization plan, though this seemed to be a breach of Article 86 of the EBL 
2006. This was an exceptional case, as the quick confirmation was seen in the vast majority 
of corporate reorganizations in China.  
Confirming a reorganization plan that has been voted for by all classes of impaired 
parties would be easier, perhaps because courts tended to defer to the collective agreement of 
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interested parties; however, if a reorganization plan had been voted against by any class of 
these parties, the court might face a challenge, since the proponent of the plan would request 
a cram-down. 
5.2. Cram-downs  
As far as the cram-down is concerned, some seventy-one corporate reorganizations were 
examined as their relevant information was publicly available; the cram-down was imposed 
in twenty-nine of these seventy-one reorganizations (40.85%). 
A wide range of interest parties was forced to accept reorganization plans by cram-
downs.  
First, shareholders bore the brunt of these cram-downs. In particular, seventeen out of 
these twenty-nine cram-downs were issued to override the objection of shareholders. Under 
Article 85 of the EBL 2006, a reorganization plan that affects old equity must be voted and 
accepted by shareholders regardless of the company’s insolvency. In practice, however, 
shareholders often refused to attend the meeting to vote on the reorganization plan, because 
many reorganization plans left nothing to them under the absolute priority principle. For 
example, in the reorganization of Jiande Special Steel Co. Ltd. Zhejiang in 2011, the 
administrator had to request a cram-down, because the shareholders refused, in anticipation 
of the application of the absolute priority principle in the plan, the invitation for the meeting 
that was held to vote on the plan.
75
  
In the meantime, a cram-down against shareholders could also be issued at a very late 
stage. In such situations, usually, the shareholders had voted for a reorganization plan 
whereby their shares were cancelled due to the company’s insolvency. However, later, they 
declined to cooperate in transferring the company’s ownership to the company buyer at the 
government company registration office, although the transfer was substantially to fulfil 
formalities. Therefore, to smooth the process, a cram-down had to be requested by either the 
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debtor or the administrator. This was the case in the reorganization of Zonghen Textile Group 
Co. Ltd. Zhejiang in 2009.
76
   
Second, it was unsecured creditors that were forced by cram-downs to accept 
reorganization plans. It was found that twelve out of these twenty-nine cram-downs were 
issued to overrule their objections. Probably, a low recovery rate and a lack of transparency 
were two main reasons that led unsecured creditors to vote against the plan.  
For instance, in the reorganization of Dixian Textile Group Co. Ltd. Hebei in 2008, 
angry of the recovery rate at two cents on the dollar, the unsecured creditors voted against the 
reorganization plan, but a cram-down was followed to put their objections aside.
77
 In 2009, 
there was another high-profile corporate reorganization case dealing with Haiji Chemical Co. 
Ltd. Inner Mongolia. In Haiji case, the unsecured creditors were paid at thirty-six per cent of 
their claims, but rejected the reorganization plan on the grounds that there were too many 
questions unanswered, such as how the payment rate was reached and why the administrator 
did not sue one of the former shareholders who was alleged of unlawfully withdrawing a 
huge amount of capital before the company’s insolvency.78 Namely, the unsecured creditors 
used the votes to express their dissatisfaction over the lack of transparency and accountability 
of the administrator. But their objections were invalidated by a cram-down ruling shortly 
after the meeting of creditors.  
Third, secured creditors were also sometimes forced to accept reorganization plans by 
cram-downs. In nine out of these twenty-nine cram-downs, it was found that the secured 
creditors were silenced by cram-downs. For secured creditors, the main dispute arose 
regarding the level of compensation for the postponed foreclosure of securities. For example, 
in the reorganization of Zhonghen Special Steel Co. Ltd, the secured creditor, a bank, voted 
against the plan, because it insisted that the interest rate for the extended maturity date should 
be calculated according to the original loan contract, which was quite high, however, the 
reorganization plan reduced the punitive interest rate down to the official one-year-loan level. 
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In addition, sometimes, revenue authorities were also cram-downed, but this happened 
only in two of these twenty-nine cases. The first case was the reorganization of Sanqing 
Cement Co. Ltd. Shanxi where the fines claimed by the local tax authority were refused in the 
reorganization plan, and such a refusal was later supported by the court’s cram-down 
decision.
80
 The second case was the reorganization of Jingwoniu Manufacture Co. Ltd. 
Guangdong in which the tax authority voted against the plan, and a cram-down was used, but 




It should be noted that in many cases a cram-down was imposed to force more than one 
class of impaired parties, namely the above figures rather overlapped. For example, in the 
case of Guangxia Industry Co. Ltd. Yinchuan, the reorganization plan was voted against by 
both the unsecured creditor and shareholder classes; the cram-down overrode the 
disagreement of both classes.
82
 These overlaps should be noted and kept in mind here.   
5.3. The Cram-down Tests  
As noted, before a cram-down is issued, a series of tests should be carried out and passed 
by the court; otherwise, the reorganization plan may be rejected, with reorganization 
converted into liquidation afterwards.   
As noted before, apart from the substantive tests, there is a procedural requirement for a 
cram-down to meet: the objecting class or classes should be given a second chance to vote on 
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the plan before it is submitted to the court for the cram-down consideration, and during this 
period, the proponent of the plan is liable to renegotiate the terms of the plan with the 
objecting parties. However, in practice, it seemed that this procedural requirement was not 
adequately complied with. 
It was found that in many cram-downs the objecting parties were in fact not contacted 
for a second round of voting, let alone for a renegotiation. For example, in the case of 
Baoshuo Chemical Co. Ltd. Hebei in 2008, the reorganization plan was voted against by the 
class of unsecured creditors; two days later, the administrator straightforwardly submitted the 
plan to the court without renegotiating and organizing a second round of voting; days later, 
the cram-down was announced by the court.
83
 This was also noticed in the reorganization of 
Haiji Lvjian Chemicals Co. Ltd. Inner Mongolia in 2009.
84
  
But the more critical safeguards against the improper use of cram-downs are the three 
statutory tests.  
As to the first creditor-best-interest test, it was found that this test appeared to have been 
conducted very well, since, at first glance, by simply reading the texts of these reorganization 
plans, creditors, especially unsecured creditors, were paid not less than they were in 
liquidation. These seemingly happy ends were likely to be ascribed to the routine use of 
assets evaluations in most reorganization cases in practice. In nearly all corporate rescue 
procedures, there was a regular asset evaluation according to which the company’s 
liquidation as well as going concern value would be appraised. It was clear that in all cases 
creditors were, as stated in the reorganization plans, paid more than the evaluated liquidation 
value.  
For example, in the reorganization of Dixian Textile Co. Ltd. Hebei in 2008, according to 
the assets’ evaluation, unsecured creditors would be paid 1.028 per cent of their claims if the 
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company was liquidated; to pass the creditor-best-interest test, the reorganization plan 
increased the unsecured creditor recovery rate to two per cent.
85
  
Thus, passing this test was largely dependent upon the results of asset evaluations. The 
worry here is also firmly associated with such asset evaluations. If company assets were 
undervalued, it would be quite easy to pass this test. Conversely, in the case of inflated 
valuation outcomes, passing the creditor-best-interest test would not be easy. Although there 
was no hard evidence that assets of these companies were usually under-valued, it seemed 
that there was a tendency of undervaluation especially from the view point of administrators 
and courts both of which stayed in charge and decided which asset evaluators were hired.  
In theory, at least, an under-valued result would be favoured or preferred by the 
administrator and the court. In the case of an under-valued outcome, first, it would be, as said 
before, easy to pass the creditor-best-interest test through even slightly increasing the 
unsecured creditor recovery rate above the liquidation value, and, second, a low asset 
evaluation would be more attractive to potential company bidders since most corporate 
reorganization cases in China resorted to the business sales. A low asking price which was 
based on the asset valuations would be far more appealing in inviting more company buyers 
to bid.  
In reality, suspicions over asset undervaluation did cause many disputes. For example, in 
the reorganization of Wugu Food Co. Ltd. Beijing in 2009, many creditors during the 
creditors’ meeting questioned why the company’s trademark, a national household name in 
China, was only appraised at about RMB 1 million, but months ago, a buyer was willing to 
pay RMB 10 million for it.
86
  
Thus, on the face of it, this test was superficially passed in each reorganization case, but 
the worry was that this test would be essentially destroyed if there was an asset 
undervaluation. Much should be done to improve the accuracy of asset evaluations.  
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The second is the fair and equitable test. This test requires that the pari passu and 
absolute priority principles must apply if the proponent of the reorganization plan seeks a 
cram-down. But it was found that this test was not well taken by many courts in China.  
As noted above, the deviation from the absolute priority principle took place in all listed 
company reorganizations; therefore, in principle, to pass the fair and equitable test, the courts 
could not impose the cram-down in listed company reorganizations unless the disadvantaged 
parties had voted for the reorganization plans. But, in fact, it was found that, in listed 
company reorganizations, many cram-downs were still issued by the courts in spite of the 
creditors’ objections. For example, in the reorganization of Guangming Furniture Co. Ltd. 
Heilongjiang, a listed company, in 2010, because of the objections of both secured and 
unsecured creditors, a cram-down was sought and obtained, although evidently there was the 
deviation from the absolute priority principle in the reorganization plan, because the 
shareholders retained the majority of their equity in the new company, whilst the unsecured 
creditors were not paid in full.  
In non-listed company reorganizations, the courts’ failure to take this test was also 
visible. For example, in the reorganization of Fenghua Group Co. Ltd. Guangdong, a non-
listed company, in 2008, the Zhaoqing Intermediate People’s Court, Guangdong imposed a 
cram-down, although the absolute priority principle was relaxed in the reorganization plan.  
With regard to the pari passu principle, it was treated similarly, i.e., many courts also 
failed to ensure that this principle was applied when carrying out the fair and equitable test. 
For example, in the reorganization of Baoshuo Chemical Co. Ltd. Hebei in 2008, as noted 
before, a cram-down was imposed, in spite of the fact that the deviation from the pari passu 
principle appeared in the plan.
87
  
The third test is that of feasibility, which means that the court must be convinced that the 
plan is more likely to be put into effect if confirmed. Given that there is no specific criteria or 
guidance in the EBL 2006 as to how to assess the feasibility of a reorganization plan, not 
surprisingly, it was found that there were no clear expression quoted by courts in assessing 
the feasibility of reorganization plans. In most of the courts’ cram-downs, a routine statement 
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was identified: ‘the reorganization plan is believed to be feasible, so the court approves it’. 
However, no further explanations were given to ascertain how the court reached such a 
conclusion.  
Considering that most of the China’s corporate reorganizations were business sale sales, 
perhaps the buyer’s decision to purchase the business might have made the court believe that 
the plan was feasible, because the reorganization plan was essentially a contract to sell the 
company. 
Overall, concerning these three tests, the first creditor-best-interest test seemed to have 
been superficially taken well. As for the fair and equitable test, some courts failed to 
discharge their duties in ensuring the full application of the pari passu and absolute priority 
principles when issuing cram-downs. The third feasibility test was perhaps beyond what 
courts were technically able to do, and it was largely a formality for courts to state that this 
test had been passed; in fact, most courts did little to conduct this test.  
6. CONCLUSIONS  
In general, between June 2007 and November 2010, there were not many corporate 
reorganization cases in China, but the existing corporate rescue cases may still have profound 
implications for the future development of the corporate rescue regime, especially given that 
the intense media coverage over some high-profile corporate reorganization cases had 
considerably raised the awareness of the new corporate reorganization regime in China 
nationwide.   
As for some key findings in this national data collection, first, compared with the US and 
the UK, China had a quite low corporate bankruptcy rate as well as a low corporate 
reorganization rate; this further merits the investigation in the next chapter to examine why 
China’s new corporate rescue law was not used more often.  
Second, in nearly half of the existing corporate rescues in China, it was the local-
government-organized liquidation committee that was appointed as the administrator. More 
notably, in the majority of the rescue processes, the expected debtor-in-possession model was 
not used. Thus, China’s corporate rescue procedures were largely controlled by the 
administrators; this in effect was the administrator-in-possession model. As to whether 
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China’s administrator-in-possession approach may deter debtors from seeking a formal 
rescue, among other things, the next chapter will shed light on its potential impacts.  
Third, as to value distribution, it was found that the deviation from the absolute priority 
principle was routine in listed company reorganizations in China; meanwhile, the pari passu 
principle was relaxed in about forty per cent of listed company rescues. By contrast, in non-
listed company reorganizations, these two fundamental distributional principles were largely 
followed. The next chapter will go a step further to examine concerns of interest parties 
towards applying or deviating from these two principles in rescues.  
Fourth, China’s courts seemed to have been quite lenient to submitted reorganization 
plans, since all these plans were confirmed by courts; however, serious concerns arose as to 
the courts’ independence especially in conducting the tests for cram-downs, because it was 
found many cram-downs were issued by courts through bypassing the statutory tests which 
are mandated by the EBL 2006.   
In short, this chapter has painted a comprehensive picture of the new corporate 
reorganization regime’s implementation in China. Behind these statistical figures presented 
so far, however, there are still many issues that remain unanswered, especially regarding the 
incentives or intentions of key parties in corporate reorganizations in China. These gaps will 





A CASE STUDY OF ZHEJIANG 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter, a review of the implementation of China’s corporate rescue law 
has been made, but there are still many issues in need of further investigations.  
As to the first research question, in the last chapter, it was possible to identify a small 
number of corporate rescues that arose after the EBL 2006 took effect; however, it remains 
unknown as to what the main factors that hampered the use of the new corporate rescue law 
were in practice. Concerning the second research question, it has been found that, in the 
majority of China’s existing corporate reorganizations, the administrator-in-possession 
approach was used, but it remains unknown why the administrator-in-possession approach 
rather than the expected debtor-in-possession approach was preferred, and equally 
importantly, questions have also been raised as to what effects the dominant administrator-in-
possession approach has had on debtors regarding their willingness to voluntarily enter a 
formal rescue procedure.  
With regard to the third research question on value distribution, in the last chapter, it has 
been reported that the departures from both the absolute priority and pari passu principles 
were widespread in reorganizations of listed companies in China; in contrast, these were far 
less likely to happen in non-listed company reorganizations. These raise questions as to what 
were the main concerns of the parties in charge when deciding to apply or deviate from these 
two principles.  
As for the fourth research question on the court confirmation of reorganization plans, in 
the last chapter, it has been demonstrated that all reorganization plans were confirmed by the 
courts; meanwhile it was found that the cram-down was also widely imposed. But it remained 
largely unknown how courts assessed reorganization plans before confirming them, whether 
it was a cram-down or a normal confirmation.  
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The aforesaid questions are what this chapter, the Zhejiang study, attempts to address. In 
particular, this chapter will use the interview data collected from Zhejiang to review what had 
happened behind the statistical figures presented in the previous chapter. To be sure, this 
chapter is intended to reinforce the last chapter, seeking to give a fuller account of China’s 
corporate rescue law implementation.  
As mentioned earlier, nearly a quarter of Chinese corporate reorganizations during the 
studied period took place in Zhejiang province alone, in spite of the fact that Zhejiang is only 
one of the Chinese thirty-one provinces.
1
  
It is worth repeating that the time covered by the Zhejiang study was longer than that of 
the national study. The Zhejiang study contained corporate reorganization cases accepted by 
the courts from 1 June 2007 to 31 December 2011; while the national study in the previous 
chapter surveyed cases accepted by the courts between 1 June 2007 and 31 November 2010. 
Such a difference should be kept in mind.  
Like other provinces, after China’s Supreme People’s Court released the judicial notice 
regulating bankruptcy administrator appointments,
2
 Zhejiang’s Supreme People’s Court 
announced its corporate insolvency practitioner list on 5 September 2007, which selected and 
listed thirty-four local law firms and fourteen accounting firms as insolvency practitioners.
3
 
There was an absence of qualified insolvency practitioners in Zhejiang, as the EBL 2006 
came into force on 1 June 2007, whilst the first insolvency practitioner list was made 
available three months later, on 5 September 2007. So, Zhejiang courts were unable to 
appoint insolvency practitioners as administrators before 5 September 2007. But, as noted 
above, under Article 24 of the EBL 2006, the court could still appoint a local-government-
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organized liquidation committee as the administrator in a reorganisation. The delayed release 
of the insolvency practitioner lists also happened in other provinces.
4
  
At the time of writing, Zhejiang’s Supreme People’s Court has updated its corporate 
insolvency practitioner list since 10 September 2012, and now there are 222 law and 
accounting firms officially included in this list, over five times the size of the first one.
5
 The 
sharp increase of insolvency practitioners may have significant implications for the future 
development of corporate bankruptcy law in Zhejiang.  
From 1 June 2007 when the EBL 2006 came into effect to 31 December 2011, there 
were thirty-five companies that entered the corporate reorganization procedure in Zhejiang. 
In view of some consolidated rescues, as defined before, there were twenty corporate 
reorganization cases.  
In these twenty reorganizations in Zhejiang, there were two reorganizations that have 
been converted into liquidations and another two cases were still pending; the remaining 
sixteen cases had been successfully concluded by December 2011 when the data collection in 
Zhejiang ended. In these sixteen reorganizations, all secured and preferential creditors were 
paid in full; unsecured creditors recouped on average thirty-six per cent of their pre-
bankruptcy claims. Business sale rescues occurred in twelve reorganizations (75%), i.e., it 
was largely company buyers who turned these troubled companies around.  
To report the Zhejiang findings, the remainder of this chapter is arranged into four parts: 
(i) Part 2 presents the difficulties of relevant parties when a corporate reorganization filing 
was attempted, (ii) Part 3 describes the factors resulting in the present control models in 
Zhejiang corporate rescues, (iii) Part 4 explores the justifications of value distribution in 
rescues, and (iv) Part 5 looks into what courts mainly considered in confirming 
reorganization plans. The key findings will be summarized in the conclusion.  
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2. ENTRY DIFFICULTIES 
Under the EBL 2006, in theory, the corporate rescue procedure is open to a broad range 
of troubled businesses and could be filed by many different parties;
6
 in reality, there were, 
however, too many obstacles impeding entry into the corporate reorganization process. 
2.1. Reorganizations in Zhejiang    
As noted before, compared with other provinces, Zhejiang did accept more corporate 
reorganization petitions. In contrast to the number of companies dissolved every year in 
Zhejiang, however, there were a small proportion of them that used the corporate 
reorganization procedure in order to survive crises. As shown in Table 1, there were over 
50,000 companies that were dissolved in Zhejiang every year between 2006 and 2011; 
however, less than ten corporate reorganizations per year were handled by all Zhejiang’s 
courts.  
Table 1: Company Dissolutions, Bankruptcies and Reorganizations 
in Zhejiang Province, China
7
 











2006 571,340 63,145 33 0 
2007 608,871 58,222 35 1 
2008 666,624 62,841 42 2 
2009 711,701 57,372 41 7 
2010 782,639 52,378 36 7 
2011 862,395 53,993 N/A 3 
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Why were there so small a number of corporate rescues in Zhejiang? especially given that 
Zhejiang had an export-based economy, it might have been hit hard by the 2008-9 global 
financial crisis; presumably, there would have been far more financially distressed businesses 
that sought a breathing space under the protection of the new corporate rescue law. 
Difficulties of courts are examined at first.  
2.2. Courts’ Hesitation 
First and foremost, it was the hesitation of courts in accepting corporate reorganization 
filings that led to the scarcity of formal rescues in Zhejiang. As is known, under Article 10 of 
the EBL 2006, a formal corporate rescue procedure cannot be commenced unless the court 
accepts the rescue filing. It was once argued by one leading Chinese bankruptcy scholar 
shortly before the EBL 2006 took effect that the new corporate rescue law would be stymied 
if courts turn their backs on bankruptcy filings.
8
 Indeed, it would be an exaggeration to say 
that the courts have totally closed the door; but, at the very least, accepting a corporate rescue 
filing was an exception rather than the norm for most courts in Zhejiang. The courts’ 
considerable hesitation was likely to be attributed to the following reasons. 
A. Manpower 
Asked why courts were so wary of accepting corporate reorganization filings, nearly half 
of the interviewees suggested that the courts had no sufficient judges to handle corporate 
reorganizations, if the rescue filings were accepted without restrictions.
9
 Here, it should be 
noted that the courts were not particularly hesitant in accepting corporate reorganization 
petitions, instead, all corporate bankruptcy affairs, including corporate reorganization and 
liquidation cases, were what the courts did not want to be embroiled with. For the courts, 
dealing with corporate bankruptcy reorganization cases was as difficult as dealing with 
corporate bankruptcy liquidation cases. So, in general, the courts tried to avoid accepting all 
corporate bankruptcy petitions as a whole.  
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The corporate bankruptcy businesses were time-consuming and demanded more judges 
to handle. Without enough judges, the courts could not afford to fully open the door to accept 
corporate reorganization filings. Understaffing was one of the main concerns of courts when 
a petition of corporate reorganization was raised before them.  
In Zhejiang, like other provinces, there were no specially-established bankruptcy 
courts.
10
 The corporate bankruptcy businesses including corporate reorganizations were 
handled by the second civil chamber of all law courts. In most second civil chambers at lower 
court level, there were usually only four or five judges in service; more notably, these judges 
were already saddled with too many cases, and it was not unusual for a judge to deal with 
over 200 litigation cases a year. By China’s standards in judicial circles, most judges were 
overworked. As a result, courts tried not to be bothered with time-consuming corporate 
bankruptcy cases; there were not enough judges to handle them. It is noteworthy that, after 
the EBL 2006 took effect, there was no increase of judges in Zhejiang’s courts so as to pave 
the way for the full implementation of the new law, especially at lower court level.  
Regarding the existing corporate reorganization cases in Zhejiang, because it was 
considerably time-consuming to handles them, most judges were reluctant to be designated to 
deal with them. To encourage judges to handle corporate bankruptcies, many courts in 
Zhejiang adjusted the judge performance assessment system in favour of these judges. For 
example, one interviewee said that, in the Fuyang Lower People’s Court, one corporate 
bankruptcy case was calculated as ten normal lawsuits; thus, the judge would be better 
assessed because one of the main measures to assess the judge performance is based on how 
many lawsuits he or she handles in a year. Another interviewee said that, in the Shaoxing 
Intermediate People’s Court, one corporate bankruptcy case was counted as at least twenty 
lawsuits. This was to reward and encourage judges who engaged in bankruptcy issues within 
the court systems.  
The stimulus of multiplying judges’ workload assessment, however, seemed not to be 
enough. One judge interviewee said that nearly one hundred meetings were assembled and 
chaired by him when he handled one corporate reorganization case, and he felt overwhelmed. 
                                                 
 
10
 It was advised by foreign experts in the 1990s that China establish a special bankruptcy court system to 
deal with corporate bankruptcy issues, but this proposal was rejected. See generally Terence C Halliday, ‘The 
Making of China’s Corporate Bankruptcy Law’ (2007) Oxford Series in Law, Justice and Society 2, 7.  
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Counting one corporate bankruptcy case as ten or twenty lawsuits still could not reflect the 
workload that he had contributed in the case. 
Another judge interviewee suggested that how many lawsuits a corporate bankruptcy 
case should be counted should consider how many creditors were involved in the case, and 
that fixing one corporate bankruptcy case as ten or twenty lawsuits still be somewhat 
mechanical. Furthermore, this judge commented that a corporate reorganization procedure 
involved almost all areas of law practice ranging from the criminal, civil, administrative, and 
corporate, and even the intellectual property laws, and that judges in the second civil chamber 
who focused on practicing business law were not competent to deal with the bankruptcy 
issues. The corporate bankruptcy affairs required the judges to have comprehensive expertise 
in many related legal areas.  
Thus, on the one hand, because there was no increase of judges, the courts could not 
afford to accept corporate bankruptcy cases that were time-consuming. On the other hand, 
inside the courts, individual judges were also unwilling to handle this kind of cases on the 
grounds that, first, their commitment would not be sufficiently recognised and rewarded, and 
that, second, they had not professionally prepared to supervise these cases. In other words, 
there was a shortage of both judges and expertise in the courts to deal with corporate 
reorganization affairs.  
The lack of judges was a real problem that deterred courts from fully accepting corporate 
bankruptcy filings. But, the lack of bankruptcy law training for judges should also be 
properly addressed, because they could not gain confidence unless they were educated and 
trained in the nuances of the bankruptcy law. But, the courts’ hesitation to accept corporate 
bankruptcy cases was more likely to be due to the pressure from outside.  
B. Government Support 
Most of the interviewees believed that the unwillingness of courts in accepting corporate 
reorganization filings was also because of the lack of support and cooperation of 
governmental institutions.  
Unlike handling day-to-day lawsuits, when dealing with a corporate reorganization 
procedure, courts needed administrative services or cooperation from many government 
institutions. For example, the revenue authorities needed to agree to provide the tax-approved 
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receipts to the company if its business operation continued during the rescue; the utility 
authorities could not cut off electricity and water supplies simply on the basis that there were 
outstanding unpaid bills, etc. In reality, however, the court itself was unable to persuade local 
government agencies to cooperate and to facilitate the corporate bankruptcy process. Law 
courts were weak institutions in China’s present power systems. 
One judge interviewee gave an example to demonstrate the difficulty of the court in 
dealing with corporate bankruptcy reorganizations.
11
 He said that, in the corporate rescue 
case supervised by him, the local police department played a key role in investigating the 
company’s assets, because the lawyer administrator was not allowed to access the company’s 
records of assets possessed by the banks and the government agencies. Without the 
involvement of the police, it was impossible to find out the whereabouts of the company’s 
key assets, let alone to restructure the company’s business. He, however, emphasized that, in 
that rescue case, the local police department was actively involved mainly because it was 
ordered by the local government to support the case; in particular, one of the deputy mayors 
of the city chaired an ad hoc team to direct and facilitate the rescue. If the local government 
had not intervened, it was highly unlikely for the police department to participate, which 
meant the rescue process would be far more difficult.  
But the key problem was, this judge interviewee continued, that the help, cooperation or 
coordination provided by the government agencies was the exception rather than the norm; 
these government agencies, including the police department, were not legally obliged to 
participate in the corporate bankruptcy process; if these government agencies did not want to 
give a hand, the court could not force them to do so. The judges felt helpless in proceeding 
with corporate reorganizations without extra support from local government.  
This was echoed by a lawyer interviewee, who said that, in the reorganization case that 
he was involved, the court asked for a guarantee in writing from the local government that 
promised to coordinate all government agencies to support if needed; without the guarantee 
of government, the court was not confident enough to accept the reorganization filing. 
Moreover, this lawyer interviewee addressed that there had been already several meetings 
held between the court and the local government before the formal procedure commenced to 
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discuss the rescue prospects of the troubled company, and that the formal rescue procedure 
would have not be allowed to begin until an agreement had been reached between the court 
and the government. In the agreement, the government consented to share certain 
responsibilities, and during the subsequent process, the court relied on the government to 
deploy other government institutions when the administrative services were needed. The need 
of government support might partly answer the question regarding why courts tended to use 
the local-government-organized liquidation committee as the administrator in corporate 
bankruptcy cases.   
In real terms, the lack of government support would rather be ascribed to the 
oversimplification of the EBL 2006 and the less developed rule of law in China.
12
 For 
example, as noted above, the company needed the tax-authority-approved receipts to keep on 
trading during the formal rescue process; but the revenue authority might refuse to provide 
these receipts on the basis that the company had unpaid tax generated before the bankruptcy 
procedure. The tax authority’s refusal was lawful. In practice, in the event of such a deadlock, 
usually it was the judge who had to visit the tax authorities in person and asked for an 
exemption; or, the judge would ask the government that agreed to support the corporate 
reorganization procedure to persuade the tax authorities to give leniency.  
Thus, at first glance, it was the revenue authority that did not cooperate with the court in 
facilitating the corporate reorganization case; however, in essence, it was the inconsistence 
between the tax law and the EBL 2006 causing the stagnation. The EBL 2006 was too simple 
to envisage and tackle conflicts with other statutes. It was not detailed enough to be 
conveniently applied in practice.  
As to the less developed rule of law in China, this could be epitomized by the difficulties 
of lawyers in accessing the company’s records of assets possessed by the government 
agencies, such as the company registration and land registration authorities. Under Article 35 
of China Lawyer Law 2007, Chinese lawyers did have the rights and privileges to access 
these records held by government agencies; but in real world, lawyers could not materialise 
these rights or privileges, because many government agencies tended to deny lawyers’ such 
requests without being held to account. It seemed to be paradoxical. Chinese law said that 
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lawyers are entitled to access these materials, but remained silent as to whether and how to 
punish government agencies and their staff if they breach the law by denying lawyers’ access 
to these materials. This seemed to be against the basic principles of the rule of law.  
And the things would be changed. If the local government was directly involved in the 
particular corporate reorganization case or the corporate liquidation case, such an 
investigation gap would be filled by the local police force.  
In reality, if the local government did not give support or was not involved, and if the 
lawyer administrator was denied the access to the company’s records in the government 
agencies, usually, the judge himself would have to investigate the company’s assets by using 
his own judicial power. But, this was what the judge could not afford the time to do. Thus, 
the fact that the courts needed the extra support from the government also demonstrated the 
fact that the rule of law in China was still to some extent weak. 
Besides the above concerns, potential mass petitions associated with the corporate 
bankruptcy affairs would deter courts from accepting corporate reorganization filings.   
C. Mass Petitions  
The lack of manpower and government support might only make the courts feel unable 
or reluctant to accept corporate reorganization cases, but the potential corporate bankruptcy 
related mass petitions would frighten courts away from dealing with corporate bankruptcy 
affairs.  
In recent decades in China, it was a political threat to local authorities, including law 
courts, if there was a street protest launched by people raising their grievances. The street 
protest was euphemised as the mass petition, because it was politically sensitive in China.
13
 
To address and prevent mass petitions, China has established the comprehensive social 
stability assessment systems, according to which local authorities, especially their senior 
officials, would be assessed over the number and the scale of mass petitions that occurred in 
their administrative areas; the officials in charge of a particular government department 
would be disciplined and even prosecuted if there was a mass petition or a street protest that 
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pointed to their department.
14
 Beijing central government was seriously concerned about 
social protests, worrying that this kind of individual event might spread across the whole 
country and put the ruling Communist Party in trouble.  
For law courts, in response to the social stability assessment system, the common 
strategy was to refuse accepting any lawsuits that involved many individuals, because the 
large number of individuals was a main cause of mass petitions. To be sure, corporate 
bankruptcy cases fell into such a business category that courts tried to avoid, since a 
corporate bankruptcy case always had a large number of either employees or creditors whose 
existence made courts nervous.  
Most interviewees believed
15
 that potential mass petitions were the top worry of a court 
when it decided on whether to accept a corporate reorganization filing. Indeed, the court 
would steer itself into trouble if it accepted a corporate reorganization petition. The courts’ 
worry seemed not to be superfluous.  
Corporate reorganization was really mass petition sensitive; it was found that the mass 
petition or protest occurred at least in eleven out of twenty reorganizations in Zhejiang (55%); 
all these mass petitions were made by unpaid employees. But thankfully these mass petitions 
took place before these formal rescue processes; otherwise, the judges in charge would have 
faced enormous pressures. Assembling in large number, these unpaid employees laid their 
grievances before the local government, as under Article 85 of China Employment Law 2005, 
the local government was liable to enforce the labour law and to ensure that employees were 
to be paid under their labour contracts. Namely, employees redirected their grievances to 
government, because they thought that the government had failed to discharge its legal duty 
in enforcing the employment laws.   
One administrator interviewee indicated that, before the court accepted the corporate 
bankruptcy filing that he was involved, the local government had agreed to tackle and bear 
the political responsibilities for any possible mass petitions flowing from the corporate 
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reorganization process. In other words, for fear of being negatively assessed or accused by 
the local Communist Party committee, the court needed an advance pardon from the 
government in case that there was a mass petition in the prospective corporate reorganization 
process; otherwise, the court was not confident to engage in these issues by accepting the 
filings.   
One phenomenon might reflect the deep anxiety of both courts and local government 
over the potential protests or social unrests. One lawyer interviewee disclosed that in the 
reorganization case he was involved in Zhejiang in 2009, to pre-empt the potential protest by 
creditors, about 800 riot police officers were deployed to monitor the meeting of creditors 
that was attended only by 600 creditors and their representatives. In another city, a second 
lawyer interviewee said that, during the meeting of creditors, the police officers seated side 
by side with creditors; each creditor was flanked with two police officers. In other cities of 
Zhejiang, other interviewees told that there was a similar heavy riot police presence at 
creditors’ meetings.  
This heavy riot police presence at creditor meetings could be interpreted in two ways. At 
first, the courts were on alert for potential protests; second, without the government support, 
which could deploy the police force to maintain the security of creditor meetings, the courts 
even might not be confident enough to hold meetings of creditors.  
Thus, from the courts’ perspective, it was risky to accept corporate rescue filings. One 
government official interviewee summarised the situation: courts neither dared to accept 
corporate reorganization petitions alone nor had any incentive to do so. Keeping their 
distance from corporate reorganization issues was the strategically correct course to take for 
courts to remain politically safe.  
The courts’ hesitation should be partly responsible for the rare use of the new corporate 
reorganization procedure in Zhejiang, but debtor companies in distress were also rescue 
averse because they had their own concerns.  
2.3. Unwillingness of Debtors  
Ideally, corporate reorganization objectives might be more achievable if reorganization 
proposals could be initiated by debtors themselves, because they have the exact knowledge 
 155 
 
and understandings of their own positions. Debtors’ experience and information are critical 
for the success of rescues. In Zhejiang, however, it was rare to see debtors which voluntarily 
filed for reorganization. 
Two practitioner interviewees explained that most debtor companies tried to avoid the 
corporate reorganization procedure for fear of losing control to third parties, because under 
Article 13 of the EBL 2006 the entry into the formal bankruptcy reorganization procedure 
would lead to the automatic resignation of debtors; it was unacceptable to most debtors. 
Although under Article 73 of the EBL 2006, the debtor might regain control under the court 
permission at a later stage, these two interviewees emphasized that regaining control was a 
possibility rather than a certainty; the debtors did not want to gamble; it was too dangerous.  
It was, moreover, manifested by some interviewees that at the heart of the debtor’ 
unwillingness to file for reorganization were its fears of exposing the company’s books and 
other financial record to a third party. This was because evading tax was, they said, 
widespread in business circles, and surrendering the books to a third party largely meant that 
the debtor disclosed criminal evidence of their own tax fraud. It would, therefore, be fatal for 
the debtor to file the reorganization petition to the court.  
The debtors’ worry of losing control was real. As reported in the previous chapter, in 
fact, it was highly unlikely for the debtor to regain control after the commencement of the 
rescue, as the debtor-in-possession model was only used in a small percentage of the existing 
corporate reorganization cases. Put differently, to a large extent, the control lost would be lost 
for ever.  
One critical point, however, was overlooked by these interviewees – the debtor also had 
no economic incentives to file for reorganization, because the application of the absolute 
priority principle, which will be described later, meant that nothing would be left for them in 
rescues.  
Overall, from the point of view of debtors, the formal corporate rescue procedure was 
not as debtor-friendly as expected.  
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2.4. Creditors’ Frustration  
China’s new corporate rescue regime might not be debtor-friendly. But even in the US 
where there is a pro-debtor corporate rescue regime as reflected in the debtor-in-possession 
approach, it was found that most voluntary rescue filings were, in effect, due to imminent 
liquidation pressures from creditors.
16
 So the use of the corporate bankruptcy rescue regime is 
also dependent on a rigorous debt enforcement system whereby creditors can easily choose 
either individual debt enforcement or liquidation to collect debts. In Zhejiang, however, in 
general, creditors had no lever to threaten a liquidation when debtors defaulted. It was even 
safe to say that a liquidation petition was not a means of collecting debts for creditors. As a 
result, defaulting debtors did not need to use a corporate reorganization procedure as a 
bombing haven to keep creditors at bay.  
One lawyer interviewee said that, in reality, where a debtor defaulted, creditors could 
only resort to individual debt enforcement by suing the debtor in court; as to threatening to 
liquidate the debtor under the EBL 2006, such a course of action would be unrealistic and 
naïve, because it was insurmountable for the creditor to open a formal bankruptcy procedure 
in court. In particular, this lawyer interviewee explained that in order to open a bankruptcy 
process, the creditor had to persuade the local government where the debtor was located to 
take actions. Without the local government’s help, it was a waste of time for the creditor to 
petition for a liquidation procedure, since such a petition would certainly be refused by the 
court.  
This lawyer interviewee further clarified that if the creditor was from outside the region 
where the debtor is located, such a possibility would be much simmer, because it was far 
more unlikely for the local government to support a liquidation petition against a local 
business in favour of the creditor from outside its administration. 
In the existing corporate rescues in Zhejiang, however, it was apparent that some of the 
rescues were indeed filed by creditors. So, has the assertion of creditors’ difficulty in using 
bankruptcy law been exaggerated? On closer examination, it was found that it has not. In 
such circumstances, in form, the rescue procedure was filed by creditors; in substance, 
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however, these creditors were actually invited or arranged to submit the application to fulfil 
the formalities. For example, in the reorganization of Nanwang Electronic Co. Ltd. Hangzhou 
in 2008, the creditor applicant, Sanhua Group Co. Ltd., was also one of the company’s 
shareholders, an inside party; after the agreement had been reached between the local 




Another lawyer interviewee said that it had been repeatedly tested and verified in 
practice that the corporate bankruptcy procedure, including corporate reorganization, was 
unavailable to both creditors and debtors unless the local government was involved.  
In short, courts had the power to accept a corporate rescue case but hesitated to do so; 
debtors had the information and knowledge but were unwilling to enter reorganization for 
fear of the negative consequences; creditors had the intent to recoup their debts through 
bankruptcy processes but were unable to jump over the hurdle to enter the courthouse. The 
combination of these factors largely explained why there were few corporate reorganizations 
in Zhejiang.  
3. ADMINISTRATION OF RESCUES IN ZHEJIANG   
Although there was a high threshold for companies to enter the formal rescue process, 
there were still some companies that were brought into the rescue procedure in court. This 
Part focuses on reporting findings on control in the existing corporate rescues in Zhejiang; in 
particular, it centres on different roles played by debtors, administrators, and creditors, 
respectively.  
3.1. The Role of Debtors 
In theory, as noted, a debtor could regain control from the administrator if the court 
approves its such a requires; however, in practice, regaining control was not common.  
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In Zhejiang, it was found that there were only four out of fourteen reorganizations (29%) 
where the company control was returned to the debtor. More essentially, the returned control 
appeared to be in name only, as in these four cases the key right to propose the reorganization 
plan still resided in the hands of the administrator. In particular, in two of these four cases, 
the reorganization plan was proposed by the administrator, not the debtor;
18
 in the third case, 
the plan was jointly proposed by the debtor and the administrator;
 19
 there was only the last 
case where the reorganization plan was really proposed by the debtor.
20
 Thus, in real terms, 
there was just one out of these fourteen cases (7%) where the debtor-in-possession was used.  
Why was, in most cases, the debtor excluded from most corporate reorganization cases 
in Zhejiang? With this question in mind, some explanations were given by the interviewees. 
By and large, the exclusion of the debtor in Zhejiang corporate rescues was occasioned by the 
factors as follows. 
A. Few Sympathies 
The attitudes of the stakeholders towards the business failures might be one of many 
reasons which led the debtor to be removed before or during the formal rescue process. 
In response to the interview question ‘what the main cause of the company’s failure was’, 
most of the interviewees considered
21
 that above all it was the debtor’s mismanagement that 
turned the company from trouble into crisis. In other words, the debtor, and especially its 
senior managers, was culpable for the company’s distress, which meant that most 
stakeholders had little confidence to allow the debtor to run the company any more in the 
formal bankruptcy rescue process. Debtors made stakeholders lose confidence.  
Apart from the management culpability, many of the interviewees believed that the 
business crisis was, in most of the rescues, also attributed to the company’s over expansion; 
these companies had borrowed too much to fund their expansion projects, and a sudden 
squeeze in liquidity brought down the whole company. 
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But, interestingly, the attitudes of the interviewees to the failures of these companies in 
reorganization seemed to be ambivalent. When the interview question ‘to what extent do you 
think the company’s failure was due to the management’s dishonesty or fraud’ was asked, all 
interviewees outright replied that they did not think that dishonesty or fraud was involved. 
They believed that these debtors had done their best to rehabilitate the companies before the 
formal rescue procedures, but failed to succeed, and that it would be unfair to say that these 
debtors had intended to defraud creditors, and that these failures were more likely to be 
mistakes. Put differently, there were still possibilities of conciliation.   
B. Disbandment  
The absence of the debtor, in most of the rescues, was also because the management had 
been disbanded prior to the formal rescue procedure. At least, in twelve out of seventeen 
rescue cases studied here, the company ceased trading prior to entering the formal rescue 
procedure; it meant, to a large extent, that the management had stopped working or had 
dissolved. More importantly, it was found that, as the key member of the managing team, the 
chief executive officer (CEO), absconded or was missing in at least ten out of these twenty 
reorganizations (50%). It seemed, as a result, to be impossible to rely on the former 
management, which had disappeared, to run the company during the rescue process. 
Partly because of the absence of the old management, one administrator interviewee said 
that it was even a huge challenge to restore the company’s business operation after he was 
appointed as the administrator, because nearly all key members of the former management 
had gone, and the chief executive manager was missing.  
To be fair, the disappearance of the former management would also be occasioned by the 
difficulty to enter the formal rescue process at an early stage. As mentioned before, most of 
the rescues were filed too late. In fact, before the formal rescue, all informal rescue efforts 
might have been made by the debtors but failed. For instance, on 15 July 2010, Yijiaxiang 
Food Co. Ltd. Hangzhou entered into the formal rescue process; however, its debt crisis 
erupted as early as in October 2008; during the following period of two years, the debtor 
made several restructuring attempts, but eventually failed to achieve the ends.
22
 The debtor 
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had rather exhausted all its rescue efforts before the formal rescue procedure started. Thus, 
the disappearance of the debtor might be in part because the debtor itself lost confidence in 
continuing the rescue efforts. 
C. Changed Ownership  
The overwhelming exclusion of the former management was also because of the 
widespread going concern sale rescues. In seventy-five per cent of the Zhejiang rescues, the 
rescue resorted to the going concern sale; it was the new owner who formed a new managing 
team to run the company; therefore the former management were deemed to be obsolete.  
It was even emphasized by one interviewee that the old management would be nuisance 
in the new company, as many bidders concerned that their future control of the company 
would be undermined if the former management was still in office, especially in the light of 
the previous personal connection between employees and these managers; as a result, 
removing the old managing team was, in practice, usually a precondition for attracting 
business bidders.  
Therefore, in most cases, the debtor was excluded from the process of rescue in Zhejiang; 
the main party in charge would be the court-appointed administrator.  
3.2. Administrators  
In thirteen out of seventeen reorganization cases studied, the administrator continued to 
manage the company during the reorganization procedure, and in the remaining four cases the 
debtor was authorized to regain control. So, in most cases, it was the administrator-in-
possession approach that was in use. 
A strong sign of control would be whether the administrator possessed or controlled the 
company’s books; in response to the interview question on whether the company’s books 
were available for the administrator to inspect, all administrator interviewees replied that the 
company’s books and other financial and administrative records were fully under their 
control; thus, undoubtedly, the administrator was really at the helm.  
To make the control complete, many administrator interviewees said that after the rescue 
filing was formally accepted by the court, the company’s general stamp would be 
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immediately suspended, and a new administrator stamp would be made and used as the 
company’s only official stamp to seal contracts and other legal documents from then on. One 
administrator interviewee indicated that, after his firm was appointed as the administrator, the 
company’s finance office was required to answer the administrator directly, and all the 
company’s spending had to be authorised by the administrator both in person and in writing. 
Furthermore, at the core of the administrator’s role in the corporate reorganization 
procedure might be the right to propose the reorganization plan. It was stated by most of the 
interviewees that the reorganization plan was mainly drafted by the administrator.
23
 Some 
interviewees added that the main terms of the reorganization plan were in effect shaped by 
the intense bargaining between the company’s buyer, the main creditors and the administrator.  
In many of the cases, the local government also had a strong voice in making the 
reorganization plan, because it could provide some benefits to induce the company’s 
purchaser to turn the company around. For example, to support the reorganization of 
Nanwang Group Co. Ltd. Hangzhou in 2008, the local government promised to buy back the 
debtor’s three pieces of industrial land at the premium prices to improve the company’s cash 
flow; in other words, the relevant parties, including the company buyer, might be more 
confident to enter into the deal to make the company afloat.
24
  
Furthermore, some of the interviewees indicated that, in some cases, it was the 
company’s buyer who determined the main terms of the reorganization plan, since the rescue 
task had been heavily reliant on the buyer.
25
  
As noted before, there were four cases where the company was returned to the debtor, 
but it was still the administrator who proposed the reorganization plan in three cases. As to 
this phenomenon, one judge interviewee explained that the debtor in general had exhausted 
their rescue proposals prior to the formal rescue procedure, so technically they were unable to 
provide any fresh rescue initiatives to gain the confidence of the creditors; more significantly, 
returning the company in reorganization to the debtor was largely to invite the debtor to 
maintain the company’s daily business operation rather than to allow them to restructure it; 
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therefore, this judge interviewee added, it had to be the administrator proposing the 
reorganization plan. 
Thus, on the face of it, the company was returned to the former management’s 
possession, but the key decision-making power was still in the hands of the administrator; the 
management was allowed to be back in their office because running the company’s business 
operation needed the old management’s experience and information.  
Nevertheless, the vast majority of the rescues were firmly controlled by the 
administrators in Zhejiang.  
3.3. Creditors 
As noted above, it was predominantly the administrator at the helm of the rescue 
procedure. Given that creditors did not have a say towards the administrator appointment, it 
was highly unlikely for them to influence the rescue outcome through the administrator. In 
practice, the creditors seemed to be considerably passive in the rescue processes.  
To assess the degree of creditors’ participation in the rescue procedure, the interviewees 
were asked whether creditors were allowed to access and inspect the company’s books in 
order to let them to make an informed decision when voting on the reorganization plan. 
Given that the administrator was in power in nearly all rescues, the administrator 
interviewees were specifically asked whether they would allow an individual creditor to 
access or inspect the company’s books. Most administrator interviewees replied that the 




To explain why the creditors were not allowed to inspect the company’s books, some of 
the administrator interviewees said that there had already been an audit report which 
disclosed and analysed the debtor’s financial affairs, so it seemed to be unnecessary for the 
creditors to re-examine the company’s books and to make a second judgement. Other 
administrator interviewees indicated that an individual creditor’s request to verify or confirm 
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his own transaction with the company might be satisfied, but the demand to generally inspect 
all the company’s books and other original financial documents would definitely be rejected, 
because it was a matter of commercial confidentiality.  
Ironically, most of the administrator interviewees said that they had not actually received 
any specific requests from the creditors who had their particular intentions to examine the 
company books. 
The company’s books were assumed to one of the main sources to diagnose the 
company’s past business conditions and to estimate whether it has a future; however, some 
interviewees, including one judge, suggested that it might be a waste of time for the creditors 
to check the company’s books, because most of them were fabricated.27 They believed that 
the company’s books were unlikely to reflect its real business position, so, a comprehensive 
understanding of the company’s situation could not be reached only by examining those 
books.  
In reality, creditors faced a dilemma on whether to investigate the company by 
inspecting the company’s books. On the one hand, the creditors were generally denied access 
to the company’s books; on the other hand, due to various considerations, they did not take 
actions to realise their intentions to inspect these books. Furthermore, they would be misled 
by the company’s books, because they were generally not reliable.  
So, the only source as well as the only form of information disclosure in the corporate 
reorganization processes in Zhejiang was the audit report. Several creditor interviewees, 
however, indicated that, by reading the audit report, they could not form a comprehensive 
understanding regarding why the company was bankrupt, or whether the company genuinely 
had a future beyond reorganization, since the audit report was usually excessively skeletal, 
and lacked details. They very much wanted to know more detailed information about the 
company, but in view of the potential costs, they could not afford to take actions individually.  
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Individual creditors were vulnerable and cost-aware; a creditors’ committee was 
expected to fill the gap and to tackle the collective action problem.
28
 It was found, however, 
that the creditors’ committee was established in only four out of a total twenty corporate 
reorganization cases in Zhejiang (20%), i.e., the creditors’ committee was rarely set up to 
represent creditors in the rescue process. Thus, creditors might be further under-represented 
in Zhejiang corporate reorganization cases.  
In addition to debtors, administrators and creditors, another key player in the rescue 
process was courts.  
3.4. Courts  
As to the courts’ role in the rescue procedure, different judges made different 
observations. One judge interviewee said that the corporate reorganization procedure should 
be, and had to be, controlled by the court, with other interested parties participating, and that 
the corporate bankruptcy procedure was like a litigation case where judges must control the 
whole process.
29
 The second judge interviewee considered that the rescue case he dealt with 
was actually controlled by the administrator; he acted just as an adjudicator sitting in the 
middle. The third judge interviewee gave a moderate answer, stating that the corporate 
reorganization process was actually operated as a collective forum in which each individual 
party played its own role under the law, so it was difficult to ascertain who dominated the 
show. 
But, given that the court had the exclusive power in appointing the administrator
30
 as 
well as in determining the administrator’s fees,31 the administrator might show considerable 
deference to the court in reality. Even one eminent corporate lawyer in Zhejiang once 
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publicly argued that the administrator should act as an assistant of the judge in corporate 
bankruptcies.
32
   
In a nutshell, the corporate reorganization processes in Zhejiang were mainly controlled 
by the administrators who in turn answered to the judges. 
4. VALUE DISTRIBUTION IN ZHEJIANG RESCUES 
In all sixteen successfully completed reorganizations in Zhejiang, secured and 
preferential creditors were paid in full, and unsecured creditors, as noted earlier, recovered 
thirty-six per cent of their original claims on average. In two cases, unsecured creditors were 
paid in full, though the payments were made in instalments. The lowest recovery rates for 
unsecured creditors happened in the reorganization of Jiande Special Steel Co. Ltd. in 2010 
where they were only paid at 4.625 per cent.  
By and large, the corporate reorganization regime preserved the companies’ going-
concern value, as it at least prevented these companies from being piecemeal liquidated; the 
continuity of the company business itself avoided the chain reaction which might put the 
company’s business partners at jeopardy.  
The strength of the corporate rescue regime, however, cannot be exaggerated. In the case 
of too low a recovery rate for unsecured creditors, a chain reaction was still followed. For 
example, in the reorganization of Jiande Special Steel Co. Ltd. as noted above, because of the 
very low recovery rate at only 4.625 per cent, one of the company’s suppliers, Quhua 
Logistics Co. Ltd. Zhejiang, was declared bankrupt shortly afterwards.
33
 In other words, the 
ripple effect still ensued, though a corporate reorganization effort was made.  
                                                 
 
32
 See Y Wang, ‘Mr Chen Gave a Speech in the Seminar Concerning the Role of Administrators in 
Shaoxing’ (Hangzhou Zhejiang China, 19 September 2011, in Chinese) 
<http://wqjhlawyer.zfwlxt.com/newlssite/BlogShow.aspx?itemTypeID=53176ddc-94f7-4943-884d-
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 Zhiling Wang, ‘Quhua Group’s Fiasco in the Reorganization of Jiande Special Steel’ 21st Century 
Business News (Beijing China, 4 August 2011, in Chinese) <http://www.21cbh.com/HTML/2011-8-
4/2MMDcyXzM1NTE2MQ.html> accessed 18 October 2012. 
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As a whole, the rescue regime in Zhejiang functioned well in preserving the going-
concern value of financially troubled companies. Preserving their value was just the first step; 
the next step was to distribute it to relevant parties in a fair and equitable way.  
4.1. The Absolute Priority Principle 
Although China’s lawmakers intended to give flexibility to the application of the 
absolute priority principle in corporate reorganizations,
34
 it seemed that there was a lack of 
understanding among many practitioners on this matter.  
In the sixteen completed corporate reorganizations in Zhejiang, it was found there were 
two cases in which the absolute priority principle was bypassed, and in the remaining 
fourteen cases this principle was stringently applied. They tended to go to extremes, and the 
flexibility of this principle embedded in the EBL 2006 appeared not to be fully understood 
and exploited.  
The application of this principle was polarized. In the two deviation cases, the 
shareholders’ equity remained intact, whereas unsecured creditors had to accept a sharp 
reduction of their debts (in the first case, unsecured debts were cut to 25.35 per cent, and in 
the second to 15 per cent).
35
 In the remaining fourteen cases, by contrast, the absolute priority 
principle was rigorously adhered to, as all previous shares were cancelled in the 
reorganization plans. It appeared that there was no middle way or flexibility in applying the 
absolute priority principle in Zhejiang.  
The first deviation case was Haina Technology Co. Ltd. Zhejiang, a listed company, in 
2007. As noted in the previous chapter, it was the special decree of China’s Supreme 
People’s Court to reserve equity for general public shareholders in listed companies’ 
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 Article 87 of the EBL 2006.   
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 The unsecured creditors recovered at 25.35 per cent in the reorganization of Haina Technology Co. Ltd., 





 therefore, it seemed there was no room left for unsecured creditors to raise 
objections to the deviation.  
The second deviation case took place in Fuyang, Zhejiang in 2009 where the debtor 
company, Dadi Paper Co. Ltd., was managed by the old shareholder-managers; this was the 
only real debtor-in-possession case, and the reorganization plan was also initiated by the 
shareholder-managers. The deviation from the absolute priority principle in this case might 
directly result from the debtor’s firm control. Interestingly, in this case, there was no reported 
objection raised by unsecured creditors to the deviation, although unsecured debts were 
reduced to fifteen per cent of their pre-bankruptcy claims.  
But, one fact should be addressed here. In the reorganization plan of these two deviation 
cases, although the old shareholders’ equity remained untouched, there was no description on 
how to deal with the company’s ownership. Put differently, creditors were not told that the 
reorganization of the company was made entirely at the expense of them, and that the 
shareholders survived the crisis without paying any costs. For the sake of transparency, it 
seemed that the reorganization plan should mention the ownership arrangement in the 
reorganization plan.  
In other cases, it appeared that the sanctity of the absolute priority principle was entirely 
honoured. Thus, generally speaking, the departure from the absolute priority rule seemed to 
be the exception rather than the norm in Zhejiang corporate reorganizations, which was 
different from the national picture presented in the previous chapter.  
When asked whether it was appropriate to somehow depart from the absolute priority 
rule by offering some equity to the shareholder-managers in exchange for the latter’s 
continued service in the new company, the interviewees
37
 gave mixed responses.  
Some of the administrator interviewees indicated that it seemed unnecessary to deviate 
from the absolute priority norm on the grounds that, in many of the cases, former equity-
managers had left the company prior to the commencement of the corporate reorganization 
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 Xiaoming Song, ‘The Court’s Role in the Proceedings of Enterprise Bankruptcy and Restructuring and 
the Problems That Need to be Solved’ (The Forum for Asian Insolvency Reform, April 2006 Beijing China) 
<http://www.oecd.org/china/38184314.pdf> accessed 02 October 2012.  
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proceeding; in other words, the possible beneficiaries of the deviation had walked away. This 
was true. It was widespread for the bosses of bankrupt companies to abscond not only in 
Zhejiang
38
 but also in China nationally
39
 before their businesses collapsed.
40
  
 In the meantime, as was told by other administrator interviewees, because of the 
prevalence of the going concern sale rescue in Zhejiang, it was highly unlikely for the new 
owner to retain their predecessors in office. Some interviewees commented that the new 
owner tended to remove all members of the previous boardroom so as to clear way for full 
control, let alone give some equity to the former owners.  
But, some interviewees suggested that the old equity-managers might be motivated to 
join the rescue process and to contribute their information and expertise if they could be 
given some equity in the new company by deviating from the absolute priority rule. One 
creditor interviewee addressed that it would be desirable to give the old equity-manager some 
employee shares under a kind of the share-incentive-scheme in the new company; otherwise, 
the old equity-manager did not have any economic incentive to continue to serve the new 
company. This interviewee added that deviating from absolute priority would be needed 
especially in the case where there were no business buyers, and under such circumstances, the 
involvement of the old equity-manager seemed to be crucial for the company’s continued 
existence.  
Inviting the former equity-managers to join the rescue process in some cases seemed to 
be quite necessary. One judge interviewee gave an example:
41
 in the rescue case he handled, 
the court and the administrator desperately needed the collaboration of the former chief 
manager of the company, who was also the controlling shareholder, because he was the only 
person who knew the company’s key business information; but that manager was detained by 
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police at that time, and the whole rescue process was made far more complicated due to his 
absence. But, one critical problem might be overlooked by this judge interviewee. If that 
manager had been really available before the court and the administrator, in anticipation of 
the application of the absolute priority principle, which meant that nothing would be left for 
him, would he have incentives to fully cooperate and disclose all information to them?   
In sum, it seemed that most interviewees were not fully aware of the usefulness of the 
flexibility of absolute priority in rescues. Obviously, the lack of training practitioners, 
including judges and insolvency practitioners, should be addressed in the foreseeable future.  
4.2. The Pari Passu Principle 
In all sixteen completed corporate reorganizations in Zhejiang, the pari passu principle 
was rigorously applied, which differed from the national practice that was presented in the 
previous chapter. At the national level, relaxing this principle predominantly occurred in 
listed company reorganizations; it happened far less frequently in non-listed company rescues.  
Given that there was only one listed company reorganization case in Zhejiang, the strict 
application of the pari passu principle seemed to be consistent with the national practice on 
non-listed company reorganizations.  
In a word, the absolute priority and pari passu principles were largely conformed to in 
Zhejiang corporate reorganizations, probably because of Zhejiang’s overwhelming market-
driven economy.  
5. REORGANIZATION PLAN CONFIRMATION IN ZHEJIANG 
As has been known, there are two different procedures used by the courts to confirm a 
reorganization plan: one is the normal confirmation procedure, and the second is the cram-
down procedure. This Part reports the findings on these two confirmation procedures.  
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5.1. Normal Confirmation  
In the majority of the corporate reorganizations in Zhejiang, the reorganization plan was 
accepted by all classes of impaired parties, so it was subject to the normal court confirmation 
procedure under Article 86 of the EBL 2006. But, the problem is that Article 86 is vague, 
without specifying what criteria could be used by the court to assess the reorganization plan.  
To investigate whether courts have created their own practical criteria in confirming 
reorganization plans, three judge interviewees were asked whether there were some specific 
principles that the courts used in confirming the reorganization plans. They gave a quite 
evasive answer – they only assessed the legality of the reorganization plan. But the concept of 
legality was still too general to grasp; they were asked to clarify it. It seemed to be 
embarrassing, as they could not provide the defining answers regarding to how to assess the 
reorganization plan.  
With the first question unsatisfied, the interview question moved to ask them whether the 
court assessed the feasibility of the reorganization plan.  
One judge interviewee gave a straightforward answer: the court was unable to evaluate 
whether the reorganization plan was feasible because it was a commercial judgement that was 
beyond judges’ capabilities. Other two judge interviewees responded that they did not need to 
assess the feasibility of the reorganization plan, because this issue had been considered by 
local government business development department. In particular, these two judge 
interviewees mentioned that when seeking the company’s buyers, the government had 
considered whether the buyer was financially and technically capable to turn the company 
around. So, the feasibility of the reorganization plan was already evaluated by the 
government when selecting the company’s buyer. Nevertheless, the courts did not assess the 
feasibility of the reorganization plans.   
Clearly, it could be safe to say that there were no substantial criteria used by the courts to 
assess the reorganization plans when the plans were confirmed. Confirming the 
reorganization plans was rather a formality in Zhejiang courts.  
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5.2. Cram-Down Confirmation  
On 15 December 2011, the Zhejiang Corporate Reorganization Report 2011 was 
released by Zhejiang’s Supreme People’s Court, which stated that the courts in Zhejiang had 
ever used the cram-down to force impaired parties to accept the corporate reorganization 
plans.
42
 But, a closer investigation found that this assertion was not entirely true.  
It was found that the cram-down had been issued by the court in at least
43
 six out of all 
sixteen corporate reorganizations (37.5%) that had been completed before the deadline of this 
thesis’ data collection in Zhejiang. And, it was shareholders rather than creditors who bore 
the brunt of the cram-downs in these six reorganizations.  
Given that the company in reorganization was already insolvent, arguably, it was 
equitable to cancel all old shares in the reorganization plan. In response to the cancellation of 
old shares, however, some shareholders, especially the shareholder-managers, either refused 
to attend the meeting to vote on the reorganization plan whereby their shares were entirely 
cancelled,
44
 or neglect to cooperate, at the last stage, to convey the company’s ownership to 
the company buyer.
45
 To tackle the refusal of the shareholders to corporate, the court had, 
usually on the request of the administrator, to issue a special ruling, forcibly transferring the 
company’s ownership to the buyer, thus a cram-down was generated.  
Zhejiang’s Supreme People’s Court was quite hesitant about recognising the cram-
downs, because it knew that it was not business friendly if the courts frequently used the 
cram-down to force impaired parties to accept reorganization plans. For some courts, they 
even tended not to invoke Article 87 of the EBL 2006, the cram-down provision, when there 
was a real cram-down sanctioned.  
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Email from Jiang Feng to the author (16 February 2012).  
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This was the case in the reorganization of Jinghua Trust Co. Ltd. Zhejiang. In Jinhua 
case, although the old shareholders were impaired by the reorganization plan wherein all 
shares were required to be sold to the company buyer at the local government-set price of 
RMB 1 per share, the old shareholders were not even given the right to vote on the 
reorganization plan.
46
 Strictly speaking, the court’s confirmation of the reorganization plan in 
this case was a cram-down, but the court used Article 86, the normal confirmation provision, 
rather than Article 87, the cram-down provision, of the EBL 2006 to confirm the 
reorganization plan; in other words, the genuine cram-down was disguised.  
In the reorganization of Jiande Special Steel Co. Ltd. where the court, however, 
specifically applied Article 87 of the EBL 2006, the cram-down provision, to force the 
shareholders to accept the reorganization plan, because the latter refused to attend the 
meeting to vote.
47
 Obviously, this cram-down was neglected by Zhejiang’s Supreme People’s 
Courts in its above report.  
Given that most of the de facto cram-downs occurred in the wake of the reorganization 
plan confirmation, it was rare for Zhejiang courts to directly use Article 87 of the EBL 2006, 
the cram-down provision, to confirm the reorganization plans. For example, in the 
aforementioned reorganization of Jinghua Trust Co. Ltd. where the court confirmed the plan 
by citing Article 86 of the EBL 2006, a normal approval procedure, in spite of the fact that it 
was essentially a cram-down.
48
    
 As for issuing a cram-down, in theory, a set of tests enshrined in the EBL 2006 must be 
each passed by the court; however, in reality, with a very brief statement that the plan was 
fair and equitable and feasible, a cram-down was issued by the court, without giving any 
details as to how and why the court reached this conclusion.  
In brief, in the normal reorganization plan confirmation procedure, there were no clear 
criteria applied by the courts to assess the legality of the reorganization plans. And in the 
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cram-down confirmation procedure, overwhelmingly, it was shareholders who were forced to 
accept the reorganization plans, and the courts tended not to give a detailed explanation on 
how the statutory tests had been passed.  
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
By comparison with most other provinces, Zhejiang did fare better in using the new 
corporate rescue regime to rehabilitate local troubled companies, but there were still many 
difficulties and challenges arising in practice. Some key points of the findings are 
summarised as follows.  
As to the relatively small number of corporate rescue cases, the almost insurmountable 
entry to the rescue procedure might be attributed to many factors. Because of the very weak 
political status of the judicial sectors, Zhejiang courts were considerably wary of accepting 
bankruptcy rescue filings, and they treated the corporate bankruptcy case as a quagmire; 
troubled debtors loathed the formal rescue procedure for fear of losing control; disgruntled 
creditors were unable to get a hand from the government to trigger a bankruptcy rescue 
process. 
The debtors’ fear of losing control was clearly vindicated by the manager-displacement 
model in most of the corporate rescues in Zhejiang. More importantly, even where the 
business was formally returned to the debtor, the administrator still retained the crucial 
powers in rescues, as it was usually the latter who drafted the reorganization plan. 
Furthermore, the debtor could be totally wiped out in value distribution plans, since in the 
vast majority of the cases (except the listed company reorganizations), the stringent 
application of the absolute priority principle meant that nothing would be left for the equity-
holders and especially the equity-managers.  
With regard to the reorganization plan confirmation, it was found there were not specific 
criteria used by the courts in Zhejiang to assess the reorganization plans when these plans 
were submitted for confirmation. Confirming the reorganization plans by the courts was more 
a waste of time, and caused delays in the corporate reorganization procedures.  
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So far, both the quantitative and qualitative data on the implementation of China’s 
corporate rescue law has been presented. The next two chapters will discuss these findings 




COMMENCEMENT AND CONTROL OF CHINESE CORPORATE 
REORGANIZATIONS 
1. INTRODUCTION   
The previous two chapters have presented the data on the implementation of China’s 
new corporate rescue law. Chapter 5 used quantitative research methods to collect a series of 
figures, providing a review of the rescue law enforcement in China nationally. Chapter 6 
applied qualitative research methods by interviewing corporate rescue participants to gain an 
understanding regarding the behaviours and concerns of interested parties in rescues in 
Zhejiang, a province of China.  
From the findings presented in the two last chapters, as for the first research question 
regarding the use of the new corporate rescue law in China, it has been found there were a 
small number of companies that entered the formal rescue process after the EBL 2006 took 
effect, i.e., the new corporate law was not frequently used. And the Zhejiang study more 
closely examined the obstacles that impeded the enforcement of the new rescue regime. 
Several practical obstacles were identified: the courts hesitated to accept corporate rescue 
filings due to a lack of judicial independence as well as the oversimplification of the EBL 
2006; troubled debtors distanced themselves from the formal rescue procedure because of the 
prevalence of the administrator-in-possession model and the rigorous application of the 
absolute priority principle (except in listed company rescues); creditors were unable to use 
the threat of liquidation to pressure debtors to take early rescue actions in court.  
With regard to the second research question of this thesis on control in China’s formal 
corporate rescues, it was found that in the majority (74%) of the existing corporate rescues in 
China the administrator-in-possession approach was used, i.e., debtors were virtually 
removed from the formal rescue processes. Several factors which led to the wide use of the 
administrator-in-possession approach were identified by the Zhejiang study. Most of the 
formal rescues were filed too late, and the troubled company was in fact abandoned by the 
debtor, especially by the controlling shareholder-manager; as a result, it was impractical to 
apply the debtor-in-possession approach. Meanwhile, eighty-four per cent of the existing 
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rescues in China used the going-concern sale to turn troubled companies around; namely, the 
debtor was not needed because the new company would be entirely operated and managed by 
the new owner, and even the Zhejiang study indicated that the old management was often 
deemed to be a nuisance in the eyes of the company buyers, because the former was 
suspected to be a threat to the latter’s prospective full control of the new company.  
As for the third research question on value distribution in the rescues, the national 
findings presented in chapter 5 demonstrated the striking contrast between listed and non-
listed company reorganizations. In listed company reorganizations, there was the routine 
deviation from the absolute priority principle, which was authorized by China’s Supreme 
People’s Court before the enactment of the EBL 2006; also, the pari passu principle was 
relaxed in forty-three per cent of listed company reorganizations. By contrast, in non-listed 
company reorganizations, these two basic value distribution principles were applied in almost 
ninety per cent of cases.  
In the Zhejiang study, it was found that many debtors, especially their controlling equity-
managers, had left or absconded before the formal rescues started; thus it was unnecessary for 
the administrators to consider rewarding them by relaxing the absolute priority principle in 
exchange for their continued service in the new companies. More importantly, partly because 
the reorganization process was operated in the shadow of the liquidation process, both the 
absolute priority and pari passu principles were largely applied in non-listed company 
reorganzations in China, although it should be noted that listed company reorganizations 
were the exception over value distribution because of excessive government intervention.  
As for the final research question regarding the court confirmation of the reorganization 
plans, in chapter 5, it was found that all reorganization plans were confirmed. Confirmation 
was likely to be guaranteed. More notably, the courts confirmed the reorganization plans very 
quickly, and in most cases it took only several days for the reorganization plan to get judicial 
confirmation. Serious concerns, however, were raised regarding how courts assessed the 
reorganization plans, especially when a cram-down was considered and issued. It was found 
that many courts in China failed to apply the fair and equity test when deciding to issue the 
cram-down, and the Zhejiang study indicated that courts generally did not, and did not have 
the capacity to, conduct the feasibility test. The less developed rule of law in China made the 
courts quite vulnerable to governmental intervention; thus confirming a reorganization plan 
in which the local government was deeply involved was largely a formality for the courts.  
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With these findings reported in the past two chapters, this chapter will use them to 
discuss the first two research questions on commencement and control of corporate 
reorganization procedures in China. Accordingly, the remainder of this chapter is arranged 
into two parts: (i) Part 2 concentrates on analysing the problems impeding entry into the 
corporate reorganization procedure, and (ii) Part 3 discusses the current control models in the 
existing corporate rescues. In the conclusion, some policy reform will be suggested.  
2. ENTRY CHALLENGES 
Shortly after the promulgation of the EBL 2006, Prof. Li Shuguang, a leading Chinese 
insolvency scholar, expressed his concern that the EBL 2006 itself may be bankrupt - be 
shelved - if the courts turn their backs on corporate bankruptcy filings.
1
 Given the small 
number of bankruptcy reorganization and liquidation cases in China, as reported in the 
previous chapters, it would be an exaggeration to say that the EBL 2006 itself has been 
totally shelved, but at least the EBL 2006 was not well enforced. This was largely because 
courts were unwilling to accept corporate reorganization filings. This section begins by 
analysing the difficulties of courts in handling corporate bankruptcy rescues; this is followed 
by a discussion of the concerns of debtors and creditors when they seek a corporate rescue 
solution. 
2.1. Establishing Court Confidence 
As noted before, there were a small number of corporate reorganization cases after the 
EBL 2006 took effect, partly because courts had much hesitation in accepting corporate 
reorganization petitions. Before discussing how to alleviate such hesitation, one fundamental 
question should be asked: what specific roles should a court plays in a formal corporate 
bankruptcy procedure? This is because much hesitation of the court appears to be caused by 
their deep involvement in the corporate bankruptcy procedures. 
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Generally speaking, in most jurisdictions, the corporate bankruptcy process is supervised 
by court. In recent decades, however, it has been increasingly recognized that the role of the 
court in the corporate bankruptcy procedure should be confined to only adjudicating disputes 
arising from the bankruptcy procedure, and that the courts should be freed from managing the 
company in bankruptcy.
2
 Judges are arbiters rather than managers in the corporate 
bankruptcy procedure. The company in bankruptcy should be managed by the trustee or the 
like, because the danger here is that, if the judges are deeply involved in managing the 
bankrupt company, their impartiality will be undermined. To this end, for example, in the UK, 
usually it is an insolvency practitioner who will be appointed as the liquidator or the 
administrator to manage the company in bankruptcy; in the US, in most bankruptcy 
procedures, this job is done by a trustee.  
As for the role of judges in handling the corporate bankruptcy matters, it seems that 
experience abroad should be learned by China, since its EBL 2006 established, on the 
contrary, excessive control of judges over detailed bankruptcy issues. Chinese judges are 
required to micromanage many administrative affairs in bankruptcy, and apparently many 
duties and powers of judges are unjustifiable and unnecessary. For example, under Article 62 
of the EBL 2006, the first meeting of creditors must be summoned by the court, and Article 
84 stipulates that the creditors’ meeting to vote on the reorganization plan should also be 
exclusively convened by the court. In fact, nearly all issues in the corporate bankruptcy 
procedure should obtain the permission of the judges. Judges are rather overwhelmed, and 




Thus, it seems that China’s policy-makers need to rethink what roles judges should play 
in corporate bankruptcy procedures in China. It is essential that there be a fundamental 
change. Judges are to hear disputes arising from bankruptcy, and all administrative issues 
should be dealt with and managed by appointed administrators. Without reducing the onerous 
burden of judges in corporate bankruptcy procedures, it will be considerably difficult to solve 
                                                 
 
2
 Vanessa Finch, ‘Control and Co-ordination in Corporate Rescue’ (2005) 25 Legal Studies 374, 396. See 
also Harvey R Miller, ‘The Changing Face of Chapter 11: A Reemergence of the Bankruptcy Judges as 
Producer, Director, and Sometimes Star of the Reorganization Passion Play’ (1995) 69 American Bankruptcy 
Law Journal 431.  
3
 Some judges defended their powers in corporate bankruptcy in China. See Huiyan Bi, ‘The Role of Judge 
in Corporate Reorganization’ (2009) 25 Shandong Justice 68 (in Chinese) (defending judge dominance in 
corporate rescue).  
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the following problems that are currently undercutting courts’ willingness to accept corporate 
rescue petitions.  
A. The Lack of Judicial Independence  
Corporate bankruptcy issues are commercial in nature rather than politically-sensitive. 
Chinese courts are assumed to be competent to accept and handle them in the same way as 
they manage other commercial and civil cases. One character of the corporate bankruptcy 
case, however, transforms it into a politically-sensitive case: the bankruptcy case always 




At present, in China, courts and judges are quite wary of a large number of people before 
them. Quite often, such groups could either gather before the court to protest collectively, or 
assemble before the local government to voice their grievances if they feel dissatisfied with 
the court’s service. Such protests are euphemised as mass incidents or mass petitions in China. 
In the current political context in China, both the court and the judges worry about the 
occurrence of such protests, because the court leaders and the judges in charge would be 
negatively assessed, disciplined, or even prosecuted by the local government or the local 
Communist Party committee in the event of such protests happening.
5
 Chinese authorities are 
excessively concerned with the maintenance of social stability for fear of that any small-scale 
social protests may spread and lead to regional and even national unrest. 
6
  
Thus, to a large extent, accepting a corporate reorganization filing means that the court is 
steering itself into trouble because of potential protests. Realistically, to avoid such a trouble, 
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it seems to be a tactic for most Chinese courts to distance themselves from handling this type 
of cases that involves a huge number of individuals.  
Even this tactic has been formalised in China. In 2004, for example, the vice president of 
China’s Supreme People’s Court, Mr Cao Jianming, warned in a national conference attended 
by all provincial supreme court presidents that law courts had to be very careful when 
handling legal disputes that involved a huge number of individuals. The tone of Cao’s speech 
was clear: the fewer this type of cases accepted, the safer the courts would be.
7
   
The clearer evidence is that in 2004 one provincial court, the Guangxi Supreme People’s 
Court, issued a formal notice according to which the courts in that province were not allowed 
to accept any cases that would involve a large number of peoples.
8
  
Obviously, it is not only corporate reorganization petitions but also a whole category of 
cases in which Chinese courts try to avoid becoming embroiled. On the face of it, this tactic 
for courts or judges is a self-protection measure; in essence, it is because of the lack of 
judicial independence that makes courts quite cautious. An independent judicial system still, 
however, has a long way to go in China, and it could not be achieved overnight. 
B. Government Cooperation  
The lack of government support may further undermine courts’ willingness to accept 
corporate reorganization filings.  
Under the old corporate bankruptcy regime enshrined in the EBL 1986, court acceptance 
of a corporate bankruptcy petition was conditional upon the permission of the local 
government;
9
 however, this has radically changed by the EBL 2006. At present, the prior 
consent of the government is not a prerequisite for a corporate bankruptcy procedure to 
commence in court, but the court needs the explicit support of the government as a condition 
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to decide whether to accept a corporate bankruptcy petition.
10
 Without local governments’ 
promises to support, it is very difficult for the court to progress corporate bankruptcy issues 
alone.  
On closer examination, it has been found that much government support that the court 
needs is because of the oversimplification of the EBL 2006. On the one hand, the EBL 2006 
is still too simple, lacking details for both courts and other interested parties to use to solve 
practical issues. On the other hand, the EBL 2006 has not been fully aligned with other 
statutes, and some conflicts between the EBL 2006 and other statutes will lead to the 
deadlock of the corporate bankruptcy procedure.  
For example, as mentioned before, the tax authorities will refuse to provide tax-approved 
receipts to the debtor company, if there is overdue tax payment; the tax authorities’ refusal is 
right and lawful.
11
 Under China’s current tax law, without tax-approved receipts, the debtor’s 
continued trading will be disrupted or even be halted, as customers can legally refuse to pay 
the bills.
12
 In spite of the fact that the continuity of trading is of importance in preserving the 
company’s going concern value, the EBL 2006 is too skeletal to provide a solution which 
could coordinate with tax authorities to tackle this predicament. In reality, when such a 
deadlock arises, it seems insurmountable for the administrator, usually a lawyer or an 
accountant, to persuade local tax authorities to give exemption; instead, the court has to use 
its own political influence to ask for exception.
13
 Sometimes, even the court will face the 
uncertainty regarding whether such exemption is available. In practice, many other similar 
predicaments trouble both judges and administrators.  
Such difficulties would be symptomatic of the lack of government support; however, the 
real cause is likely to be a lack of specific and precise rules in the bankruptcy law.  
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C. Manpower of Courts 
Many of China’s courts are understaffed, especially at local levels, and are unable to 
cope with corporate reorganization, a kind of new businesses. A typical understaffing 
example is the Hangzhou Intermediate People’s Court, Zhejiang province. According to an 
official report of the Court in 2009, during the past three decades, the annual number of cases 
filed in the Court increased eighteen times, whereas the number of judges only doubled.  
In addition to understaffing, most courts are also short of judges specialising in corporate 
bankruptcy.   
The lack of experience of judges is quite predictable, because there are no sufficient 
cases for judges to practise. For example, in Zhejiang although there are 103 courts that are 
liable to handle corporate reorganizations,
14
 twenty corporate reorganization cases during the 
past five years mean that the vast majority of courts in Zhejiang have never handled corporate 
reorganizations. To some extent, a vicious circle ensues: the lack of experience makes judges 
quite cautious to accept corporate reorganization filings, and in turn the shortage of practice 
further undermines judges’ confidence to hear such cases.  
To build the court’s confidence in accepting corporate reorganization filings, some local 
experience may be worth introducing. For example, in Hangzhou, the capital city of Zhejiang 
Province, the local Hangzhou Intermediate People’s Court persuaded the city’s Communist 
Party Committee to establish an interim panel at city level. This panel was led by the Party 
Committee and was comprised of several key government departments, such as the 
departments of business, tax, police, labour and land, etc. It was this panel that assisted the 
court to deal with all corporate reorganization cases. It was said that this approach effectively 
solved two main problems: concerns of judicial independence and the lack of government 
support.
15
 This could be a pragmatic solution in the short term.  
As to the lack of manpower and expertise of courts, there might be two ways forward. 
First, there should be special training courses tailored for judges; confidence comes from 
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knowledge. Second, and the foremost, judges should be freed from dealing with managerial 
issues of the corporate bankruptcies, and these issues should be handed over to administrators; 
this, as discussed above, requires a substantial amendment of the EBL 2006.  
2.2. Inducing Debtors 
Presumably, entering corporate reorganization would be a powerful lever for a debtor to 
keep creditors at bay, as the latter’s claims will be stayed if a formal court-supervised 
corporate reorganization procedure begins. This means that any destructive debt enforcement 
or liquidation initiatives by creditors will be suspended; however, as reported, troubled 
companies in China try to avoid entering into the formal rescue procedure instead. 
A. The Fear for Automatic Resignation  
In theory, the debtor can regain control from the administrator under the court 
permission during the reorganization procedure, but, in practice, it is highly unlikely for this 
to happen. In particular, at the national level, seventy-four per cent of China’s corporate 
reorganizations were under the control of the administrators. Bearing in mind that the 
reorganization plan was in fact proposed by the administrator in some cases where the control 
had been superficially returned, the debtors have been overwhelmingly excluded from the 
existing corporate rescues in China. In other words, the debtors’ fear regarding losing control 
in the formal rescues almost became a degree of certainty.  
With immediate resignation ahead, it seems to be optimal for debtors to postpone formal 
rescue filings until the company businesses deteriorate beyond the point of no return. The 
most recent report by Zhejiang’s Supreme People’s Court on corporate bankruptcy disclosed 
that many failed companies’ CEOs still, in late 2012, chose to abscond rather than to seek 
bankruptcy protection in court, although the EBL 2006 had been in force for over five 
years.
16
 One key point, however, was missed by this report: the indifference of debtors 
towards the formal rescue procedure was also attributed to the overwhelming administrator-
in-possession in formal rescues, which means filing for reorganization was, from the debtors’ 
perspective, not protection but a suicidal attempt. 
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As to whether the debtor should be replaced by an outside administrator in the formal 
rescue procedure, experiences learned from the US and the UK may be useful for China to 
enhance the understanding of the value of the debtor-in-possession model.  
In the US, prior to the Bankruptcy Code of 1978, there were, under the Chandler Act, 
two options of control in formal corporate rescue procedures: Chapter X for large companies 
where the management would be automatically replaced by an outside trustee, and Chapter 
XI for small and medium companies where the debtor could stay in control without 
appointing an outside trustee.
17
 In reality, however, it was a different story.  
To remain in charge, most large companies filed for Chapter XI instead of Chapter X to 
seek survival, because in Chapter XI they could maintain their own control.
18
 In particular, 
one empirical study revealed that there were less than ten per cent of corporate 
reorganizations in the US that resorted to Chapter XI for reorganization under the Chandler 
Act; namely, most debtors tried to avoid automatic resignation in Chapter Xs. Of course, not 
all large corporations could get the extra blessing of courts to enter Chapter XI in order to use 
the debtor-in-possession, as a result of which corporate reorganization filings for large 
corporations dropped sharply after the Chandler Act took effect.  
In the light of such hesitation by large companies to use management-displacement 
Chapter X, the reform was needed, and eventually the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 virtually
19
 
abolished Chapter X. Under the new Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978, it is the 
norm rather than the exception for a debtor to stay in control during the formal reorganization 
proceedings, whether the debtor is large or small.
20
 This is the US popular debtor-in-
possession model, which is said to have been immensely encouraged debtors in trouble to use 
the corporate reorganization law. 
21
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By contrast, the negative lessons could be learnt from the UK where there is a rigorous 
management-displacement approach in its main formal corporate rescue procedure, 
administration. In the UK, when a formal rescue procedure is entered, the management will 
be simultaneously replaced by an administrator, who is an insolvency practitioner, and it is 
the administrator staying in control during the whole rescue procedure. It was contended that 
mainly because of strict debtor-displacement, many troubled companies in the UK tend to 
delay formal rescue proceedings for fear of losing control.
22
  
In spite of the fact that there is wrongful trading which is aimed to warn company 
directors to take early rescue actions in the UK, this mechanism seems, arguably, not to be 
enough to force directors to file for rescue in a timely manner, because, in practice, wrongful 
trading encounters a range of barriers in enforcement.
23
 Thus, to avoid losing control in 
formal rescues, many UK troubled companies tend to use informal rescue procedures to 
weather financial storms, which would be far more difficult than formal processes.
24
   
In view of these lessons, it seems that China’s bankruptcy law could be somewhat 
lenient towards troubled companies. Indeed, , the EBL 2006 has paved the way for the use of 
the debtor-in-possession model, and the present problem is how to remove uncertainties 
regarding two options between the debtor-in-possession and the administrator-in-possession 
models. To encourage debtors to seek early and voluntary rescues, it seems to be desirable for 
China’s Supreme People’s Court to issue a new judicial notice - if a rescue petition is 
voluntarily filed by the debtor itself, the debtor-in-possession approach will be automatically 
available. If so, the uncertainty would be removed; debtors may gain greater confidence to 
enter a formal rescue procedure. 
To be sure, certain requirements should be set up and met if the debtor-in-possession 
approach is used. First and the foremost, the debtor must be honest. And such honesty should 
be interpreted in two ways: (a) the business failure must be because of honest mistakes, and 
(b) the debtor should, during the subsequent rescue process, honestly fulfil his obligations to 
disclose information to all interested parties. It seems that many of failed debtors in China 
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could be granted the debtor-in-possession in rescues. This assertion could be backed by the 
Zhejiang study of this thesis. In the Zhejiang study, in spite of the fact that most interest 
parties attributed failures of companies in reorganization to the companies’ mismanagement, 
most of these interest parties were reluctant to accuse the management of them of fraud or 
dishonesty. Namely, many debtors acted bona fide, trying to avoid bankruptcy but failing to 
succeed. Therefore, it seems that at least these debtors in Zhejiang could be given a chance of 
using the debtor-in-possession to seek staying in business.  
Second, whether the debtor can continue to stay in control is desirable to be subject to 
the decision of the creditors as a whole at a later stage, i.e., the creditors should have a say as 
to whether the debtor is indeed trustworthy.  
In some instances, if the creditors have confidence in the debtor, the latter might be 
rewarded with some equity in the new company for its continued service. This leads to a 
discussion of the absolute priority principle in rescues.  
B. The Rigorous Implementation of Absolute Priority 
The disinclination of debtors to use the corporate reorganization regime is also because 
of the rigorous application of the absolute priority rule in Chinese non-listed corporate 
rescues - the debtor and especially its equity-holders and equity-managers will get nothing 
from the rescue process. As a result, they are considerably rescue-averse.  
In theory, the application of absolute priority may only deter a debtor company that is 
equity-managed from voluntarily filing for reorganization; by contrast, a company that has a 
separation between ownership and control, especially a large public company, may not be 
affected by this because it is managed by professional managers rather than shareholders. But, 
in fact, even a professionally-managed large company may also worry about the 
consequences of applying the absolute priority principle in the formal rescue procedure.  
In large professionally-managed companies, some senior managers may not have equity, 
namely they are not shareholders; however, they have to look after shareholders’ interests 
when making a decision as to whether to file a formal reorganization petition, because it is 
shareholders who appoint these managers. These managers would be quite hesitant to make a 
decision to bring the company into a formal rescue process in which all the old equity of the 
shareholders will be cancelled due to the absolute priority rule.  
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Under Article 38 of Chinese Company Law 2005, the company’s decision to file for 
reorganization must be made by a meeting of shareholders rather than by the board of 
directors. Hence, even for a large public company, in view of the consequence of applying 
absolute priority in the bankruptcy procedure, it is still highly unlikely for the company to 
voluntarily file for reorganization itself.  
Moreover, leaving aside the relationships of appointment between them, these 
professional managers have to consider negative effects on their reputation if they pursue the 
company’s survival regardless of shareholders’ interests. In a word, it will not be an easy 
decision even for a large professionally-managed company to seek a formal rescue because of 
the absolute priority rule.  
Thus, the potential application of absolute priority
25
 will deter all companies from filing 
for reorganization in China, whether they are equity-managed or not.
26
 
C. Absence of the Wrongful Trading Mechanism  
Unlike in the US where there are carrot policies, such as the debtor-in-possession 
approach and the deviation from the absolute priority rule, to incentivise debtors to take 
voluntary rescue actions, in the UK, there is a stick policy, wrongful trading, which is forcing 
debtors to take rescue actions earlier.
27
 Although there are some difficulties in applying 
wrongful trading in the UK,
28
 it is still to some degree a threat to company directors.
29
 But, 
there is no wrongful trading or the like in Chinese corporate bankruptcy law.
30
  
It was once argued by Prof. Wang Weiguo, one of the drafters of the EBL 2006, that 
when the law drafters consulted businesses as to their expectation towards a new enterprise 
bankruptcy law, a strong voice from the business cycle was heard and directed to the then 
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weak investigation and prosecution of unscrupulous managers who steered companies into 
bankruptcy.
31
 Perhaps, bearing in mind that maintaining market morality
32
 is also one of the 
core principles of the corporate bankruptcy law,
33
 the EBL 2006 did include a director 
liability provision. Article 125 stipulates that directors should be held to account if the 
company’s bankruptcy is caused by their breach of duties. However, Article 125 does not go 
any further to clarify it, namely, holding rogue directors to account is only a general principle 
in the EBL 2006. The oversimplification of this provision makes it impossible to be enforced 
in practice.
34
 Thus, it can be argued that there is no wrongful trading in China’s bankruptcy 
law. 
Given the fact that, as noted before, ninety seven per cent of dissolved companies in 
China, which are supposed to use the bankruptcy procedures to settle unpaid debts, just walk 
away without using bankruptcy proceedings, it seems highly unlikely for unscrupulous 
directors to be held accountable for their wrongdoings. 
Shortly after the EBL 2006 took effect, the similar serious concerns were also raised by a 
famous Chinese judge who argued that the EBL 2006 has a fundamental flaw because it 
stipulates that filing for bankruptcy is a debtor’s right rather than its obligation.35 This means 
that there is no legal means to force the debtor that is already bankrupt to file for bankruptcy.  
Similar to the UK wrongful trading mechanism, many Eastern European countries have 
legislated that directors must file for bankruptcy in the event that their companies have 
defaulted on their debt for a certain period of time.
36
 For example, in Hungary, directors are 
obliged to file for bankruptcy if the company is unable to pay debts for over 90 days; 
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Given the deficiency of the EBL 2006 on this matter, it seems quite necessary for China 
to establish a similar wrongful trading mechanism to prevent directors from abusing the 
limited liability of companies. If so, an early bankruptcy rescue filing by debtors seems to be 
more likely.  
In sum, debtors are quite reluctant to file for reorganization duo to both management-
displacement and the rigid application of absolute priority in China. In the meantime, without 
pressure of wrongful trading in China, directors may continue to trade to the detriment of 
creditors until the company passes the point of no return.  
2.3. Helpless Creditors 
As demonstrated in chapter 5, there were, between June 2007 and November 2010, sixty 
one per cent of the existing Chinese corporate rescues were filed by creditors. This gives an 
impression that the formal rescue regime is more accessible for creditors. This conclusion, 
however, is wrong. In practice, choosing a party to file for reorganization was only a 
formality, because a formal rescue process could not be entered unless there is a prior 
agreement between the court and the local government. In other words, creditors alone were 
unable, or did not have the real power, to open a bankruptcy reorganization procedure in 
court. 
Apart from being unable to gain access to the corporate reorganization procedure in 
court, individual creditors may also lack incentive to seek a bankruptcy solution in court on 
the grounds that they will usually recover nothing through a formal bankruptcy process. As a 
consequence, they tend to avoid going to court to liquidate a defaulting debtor; individual 
debt enforcement would be a priority for them.
38
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Besides the lack of incentives to bring a debtor into bankruptcy reorganization, creditors 
also do not possess sufficient information to do that. In the real world, most creditors cannot 
access financial information of debtors; it is quite difficult for creditors to propose a viable 
rescue plan to rehabilitate a troubled company; so, granting creditors the right to file for 
reorganization is largely unsound.
39
 Some creditors, however, may be relied on to make a 
rescue effort – they are banks and main suppliers. 
Unlike general trade creditors, banks are usually better positioned to monitor a debtor, 
because it is common for the debtor’s business to be continuously inspected by its major bank 
under a loan contract.
40
 The bank is able to access the debtor’s business information, 
especially its financial documents, and even the debtor’s business strategies. Well informed 
of the debtor businesses, the bank may initiate a feasible rescue plan to rescue the distressed 
debtor.  
Concerns, however, are raised here as to whether banks have economic incentives to do 
so. In China, most bank loans are secured against debtors’ assets.41 Therefore it would be 
unnecessary for a bank to rescue a troubled debtor if the loan is secured on the assets. If the 
debtor is in trouble, the bank may simply foreclose its security. It is the encumbered assets 
rather than the rehabilitation of the debtor about which the bank is more concerned.  
Under narrowly-defined circumstances, banks may be quite keen to rescue troubled 
debtors. Where a bank loan is under-secured or entirely unsecured,
42
 the bank may use its 
gathered information and understandings to pursue a rescue outcome, such as a going concern 
sale, in order to recover its own debts. It, however, raises further concerns. If the company 
has only one under-secured or unsecured bank creditor, this bank may be motivated to rescue 
the company for a higher debt recovery rate, but if there is more than one such bank involved, 
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coordination between banks may remain a great challenge for the rescue effort.
43
 Under latter 
circumstances, it seems that China’s central bank, the China People’s Bank, could learn 
something from the Bank of England, which initiated the London Approach whereby banks 




Like banks, a main supplier may also have gained a deeper understanding of the 
company’s business operation and even its future viability. Unlike other small trade creditors, 
the main supplier may be more familiar to the debtor’s business operation through long-term 
contractual relationships. More importantly, sometimes the debtor is also the strategic 
customer of the main supplier; therefore, to a certain degree, the main supplier may be unable 
to afford to liquidate the debtor because of concerns of its own business sustainability. In 
such a situation, the supplier would be quite willing to raise a rescue motion in an attempt to 
save the debtor as well as itself.
45
  
Except banks and main suppliers, it can be argued that it is unrealistic to expect other 
creditors to file for reorganization because of their lack of information of debtor companies. 
Instead, the real problem in China is that creditors should be given the right to use liquidation 
either as a means to collect debts or as a threat to warn a defaulting debtor to take voluntary 
rescue actions earlier.  
In short, the small number of corporate rescues after the EBL 2006 took effect can be 
attributed to a set of factors. Because of the lack of judicial independence, Chinese courts are 
considerable hesitant about accepting corporate rescue filings. In anticipation of being sacked 
immediately, debtors try to avoid formal rescues. Some creditors may have incentives to 
rescue a troubled company but are deterred by the insurmountable threshold into the formal 
rescue procedure. 
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To improve the use of corporate bankruptcy law, it seems that China may learn 
something from Russia; there are many similarities between China and Russia regarding their 
legal and social development. Before 1992, Russia did not have a corporate bankruptcy law. 
Although Russian first bankruptcy law was enacted in 1992, it was rarely used, which was 
similar to China’s situation. In 1998, Russia had to amend this law and significantly eased the 
entry into the bankruptcy procedure. It seemed to be a success, as the Russian bankruptcy law 
of 1998 radically changed the landscape of corporate bankruptcies: there was a proliferation 
of bankruptcy cases after 1998.
46
 Considering the similar bankruptcy law histories and 
political systems, it seems that Russia may offer some useful experiences in this respect. But, 
due to the scope of this thesis, it is not possible to go further and make a comparative study, 
but in the future such a study seems to be fruitful. 
3. CONTROL IN CHINESE CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS 
Generally, it is possible to use the debtor-in-possession model and a practitioner-in-
possession model to describe control in the formal rescue proceedings. These two concepts, 
however, are actually polarised, because in practice, the control is far more complex than 
what these two concepts could explain. Meanwhile, the notion ‘control’ itself is also rather 
elusive. To simplify the arguments on control of this thesis, discussion will focus on several 
key players and their roles in the rescue procedure. In particular, there will be a focus on 
administrators, debtors and the creditors in China’s corporate rescues, respectively.  
3.1. Administrators 
Under the EBL 2006, an administrator will be appointed to take control of the company 
when a reorganization petition is accepted.
47
 As noted before, control can be regained by the 
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debtor on condition that the court agrees with the debtor’s request.48 In practice, however, the 
administrator continued to control the rescue process in most of the cases.  
A. The Administrator in Full Control 
As reported in previous chapters, in the majority of the existing rescue cases, it was the 
administrator in charge. In particular, the administrator continued to stay in control in 
seventy-four per cent of the corporate reorganizations in China. Put differently, the 
probability of the debtor to regain control is quite low.  
Moreover, the administrator’s control in Chinese corporate rescues may have extended 
beyond what the above figures demonstrate, because it was still the administrator who 
proposed the reorganization plan in some cases where the debtor had ostensibly regained 
control under the permission of the court.
49
 Under Article 80 of the EBL 2006, if a debtor is 
allowed to recoup control from the administrator, the exclusive right of proposing the 
reorganization plan will also be returned to the debtor. Under such circumstances, however, 
when the reorganization plan was still proposed by the administrator, this means that it was 
the administrator rather than the debtor who was really in charge, because at the heart of 
control is the right to prepare the reorganization plan for vote. Thus, given that the debtor did 
not propose the reorganization plan in the case that it was entitled to do, debtors as a whole 
were further marginalised in formal rescues in China. 
It should be remembered that Chinese bankruptcy administrators are not always 
qualified insolvency practitioners, as a local-government-organized liquidation committee 
can also be appointed as the administrator to control and manage a company in a bankruptcy 
procedure.
50
 This happens frequently in China: such committees have been ‘appointed’ by 
courts in forty-six per cent of corporate reorganizations nationally.
51
  
It seems to be a surprise, because it may have considerably undermined China’s initial 
commitment to establish and develop a body of insolvency practitioners. Some improvement, 
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however, has been made, as the composition of such committees has been moderately 
updated. Under the old EBL 1986, these committees were predominantly comprised of 
government officials.
52
 After the EBL 2006, there was apparently more involvement of 
professionals in these committees, since it has been found that, in at least sixty-four per cent 
of these committees, lawyers were hired and included as committee members. This is the key 
difference between liquidation committees before and after 2006. 
Appointing a local government organized liquidation committee seemed to be 
concessions made by courts in order to obtain support and cooperation from local 
government, because such a committee was usually chaired by local senior officials who 
were able to mobilize public resources to facilitate rescue issues.
53
 But appointing a local-
government-organised liquidation committee as the administrator is not free of controversy.  
Many
54
 have argued that although Article 24 of the EBL 2006 allows courts to appoint 
the administrator from a local-government-organised liquidation committee, the real intent of 
the law-maker, China’s People’s Congress, was to confine the use of local-government-
organised liquidation committees in SOE bankruptcies. Put differently, appointing local-
government-organised liquidation committees as administrators could only be used in 
bankruptcy of SOEs; it is equally important to address that such committees should not be 
appointed as administrators in bankruptcy of companies other than SOEs. But the trouble 
here is that the Congress did not clarify such boundaries in Article 24 of the EBL 2006. In 
other words, the floodgates were left open by the Congress probably unintentionally.  
Appointing local-government-organised liquidation committees as administrators also 
raises concerns on the rights of creditors to request an administrator replacement. Under 
Article 22 of the EBL 2006, a meeting of creditors can ask the court to replace the 
administrator if they can prove that the incumbent administrator is unable to discharge duties 
adequately. However, the problem is that if the administrator is a local-government-organised 
liquidation committee chaired by a local senior official who is even politically superior to the 
president of the court, would it be realistic for the court to back the replacement request of 
                                                 
 
52
 Charles D Booth, ‘The 2006 PRC Enterprise Bankruptcy Law: The Wait is Finally Over’ (2008) 20 
Singapore Academy of Law Journal 275, 293-4.  
53
 Roman Tomasic and Zinian Zhang, ‘From Global Convergence in China’s Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 
2006 to Divergence in Implementation’ (2012) 12 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 295, 316.  
54
 Guoguang Li, ‘The Administrator is the Legal Representative of Estate’ (2007) 6 Shanghai State 
Capital (in Chinese) 52, 54.  
 195 
 
creditors to order the liquidation committee to leave? There is no doubt that this may place 
the court in a very difficult position, especially in the context of the current China’s political 
and judicial systems. Even it may be safe to say most Chinese courts have not confidence to 
say no to local government.  
After appointed, the administrator’s first priority would be to resume the company’s 
business operation, since there were sixty-six per cent of companies in reorganization which 
had ceased trading before entering the rescue process. Resuming or continuing the company’s 
trading seemed to be vital for the success of the rescues, because this is of significance to re-
establish the confidence of both suppliers and employees.
55
 In fact, the main function of the 
administrator seemed to be to investigate the company’s assets and liabilities as well as to 
join litigations on behalf of the debtor.  
The role of the administrator may culminate in proposing the reorganization plan. Under 
the EBL 2006, the administrator is empowered to propose the reorganization plan where the 
company’s control has not been returned to the debtor.56 Given that the going concern sale 
took place in eighty-four per cent of Chinese corporate reorganizations, the main terms of 
these plans would be how to distribute company value rather than how to restructure 
company businesses, because the business restructuring issues might be entirely left for the 
company buyer to solve afterwards.  
B. Advantages of the Administrator-in-Possession Approach  
Impartiality would be the first and foremost advantage of the administrator-in-possession 
model in China’s corporate rescues,57 because the procedure of appointing the administrator 
has ensured the administrator’s neutrality. 
As has been reported in the previous chapters, the administrators in all reorganizations 
were directly appointed by courts.
58
 Although a creditors’ meeting was empowered to 
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 in practice, however, such a challenge has never effectively 
raised. In a sense, it seems to be pointless for a creditors’ meeting to question the 
appointment, because the successor administrator will still be selected by the court rather than 
by the creditors’ meeting. Namely, creditors could not select the administrator on their own 
initiative; any challenge would not be fit for purpose. .  
Except creditors, other parties, including the debtor, is not allowed to challenge the 
court’s administrator appointment. So, the administrator is virtually immune to the influence 
of all parties but the court. 
The worry here, however, is that if there is heavy local government presence in the 
rescue the administrator’s impartiality would be undermined. In particular, where it is a local 
government organized liquidation committee appointed as the administrator, such impartiality 
would be rather diminished, because local government tends to put the local economy and 
local employment before protecting creditors.
60
 And this might be further aggravated if the 
main creditors are central-government-owned banks or trade creditors from outside the region.  
Thus, the administrator’s impartiality in Chinese corporate rescues should be understood 
in its backdrop of the identity of the administrator. Without the intervention of local 
government, the administrator can be expected to be fully impartial to strike a fair balance 
between creditor and debtor; however, when local government joins the game, striking the 
right balance might be not easy.  
Moreover, in general, the administrators are competent to process the existing corporate 
rescues in China most of which are essentially court-supervised merger and acquisitions 
(M&A). As noted above, the going concern sale was used in eighty-four per cent of the 
existing corporate reorganizations. In the light of the composition of the administrators, 
where lawyers were mainly involved, it seemed that they would be quite capable to conduct 
these rescues, since advising M&As was likely to be the day-to-day business of most 
corporate lawyers in China.
61
 The worry here, however, is that the competence of the 
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administrator can be doubted if there is a traditional corporate reorganization rescue, not a 
going concern sale rescue, because the former requires the administrator to have more firm-
specific knowledge and information regarding restructuring the troubled company’s business 
operations.  
C. Downsides of the Administrator-in-Possession Model  
First, administrators, in general, have no knowledge and experience to manage 
companies in rescues, let alone turn troubled businesses around.
62
 The comments of one of 
the director interviewees in the Zhejiang study are worth mentioning here. He said that the 
administrator, a group of lawyers in that case, would be capable of safeguarding the 
company’s assets and ensuring the company’s financial resources to be properly used; but 
rehabilitating the company’s business largely fell outside the administrator’s knowledge and 
expertise, since it was the debtor itself instead of the administrator who knew the company, 
its business operation and even the relevant market.  
It was also found that many administrators, in particular lawyers, did not have basic 
accounting knowledge; hence it was quite difficult for them to establish an understanding of 
the company’s business operation during the rescue processes. Perhaps, because of the lack 
of expertise, knowledge and information, selling these companies might be an optimal choice, 
since substantial restructuring jobs would pass over to the company buyers. This might partly 
explain the prevalence of the going concern sale rescues in China. 
The administrator’s weakness in this regard might be attributed to two factors. The first 
is that given that most of the administrators were local government organized liquidation 
committees, undoubtedly, the composition of such committees have suggested its degree of 
expertise. Most of them were government officials. Running a business would be far different 
from operating a government department. So in such circumstances, lacking expertise seemed 
to be certain. The second factor is that insolvency practitioners in China were not trained and 
examined before being qualified. Different from most other countries,
63
 insolvency 
practitioner lists in China are largely superficially made, because there are no qualification 
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training programmes and examinations before naming these professionals as insolvency 
practitioners.  
Second, the administrators’ difficulty to get cooperation from the old management 
should also be borne in mind. The EBL 2006 stipulates that, in order to continue the 
company’s trading, the administrator can hire the old management, or part of them, to run the 
company in reorganization.
64
 This may open the door for the administrator to solicit the 
expertise and information possessed by the old management with a view of making a feasible 
rescue.
65
   
In practice, however, cooperation from old management is highly unlikely. This is 
because, in over half of existing corporate reorganizations in China, the company has ceased 
trading before entering into the rescue proceeding, and in most of these cases, the company’s 
old management have left. Most of these companies were de facto abandoned by the debtors. 
It meant that the information or expertise sources had disappeared, which made the 
administrators unable to seek cooperation. The Zhejiang interviews revealed that inviting 
some previous managers to resume company’s operation was even a challenge for many 
administrators, let alone to ask them to give managing advice.  
In the meantime, the key business information is probably in the hands of companies’ 
former CEOs, but in most rescues, the CEO has been driven away by the automatic dismissal 
at the time of the administrator’s appointment. In some cases, the CEO would be available to 
answer the administrator, but it should not be forgotten that most of the CEOs are also 
shareholders, and even the main shareholders, and that, given the strict application of the 
absolute priority principle, they may have no economic incentives to fully collaborate with 
the administrator and disclose the company’s information.  
Third, the administrator-in-possession model deters debtors from filing for 
reorganization in a timely manner
66
 in China. Under the administrator-in-possession approach, 
filing for the formal rescue amounts to the automatic resignation for company directors; as a 
result, the debtors will try to avoid formal rescues. It would be premature to jump to the 
                                                 
 
64
 Article 74 of the EBL 2006.  
65
 See Gerdes (n 57) 10.  
66
 See generally Lynn M LoPucki and William C Whitford, ‘Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy 




conclusion that the small number of formal corporate rescues in China was due to the widely-
used administrator-in-possession approach, but it is certain that such a control model 
substantially undermines debtors’ willingness to voluntarily enter into the formal rescue 
procedure. 
In a word, Chinese current corporate rescues largely used the administrator-in-
possession approach but such a control model could be only function reasonably when there 
is a business sale rescue, and when there is no local government intervention. Except in these 
situations, the administrator-in-possession approach seems to do more harm than good in 
China’s corporate rescues.  
3.2. Debtors in Rescues 
As noted, the debtor, especially its old management, was largely excluded from most of 
China’s existing formal rescue processes. In theory, the debtor can ask for the court’s 
blessing to regain control; however, this only happened in twenty six per cent of corporate 
reorganizations in China.  
Occasionally, the company’s control was superficially returned to the debtor, but it was 
the administrator instead of the debtor who proposed the reorganization plan. It means that 
the returned control was largely in name only. As discussed before, this further marginalized 
debtors in rescue processes.  
It can be argued excluding the debtor, in particular its old management, may not severely 
jeopardise the rescue if it is undertaken as a going concern sale rescue; however, the rescue 
could be definitely adversely affected if there are no company buyers coming in business 
auctions, as has frequently happened in China. In other words, retaining the debtor in office 
would be critical for the future of the troubled company, if the traditional reorganization is 







A. Benefits of Retaining Debtors 
First and foremost, allowing the debtor to remain in control will induce it to voluntarily 
file for reorganization in a timely manner.
67
 When the company is in trouble, if the debtor, 
mainly its directors, is sure that the debtor-in-possession approach is available, the company 
may be more confident to file for reorganization in court; otherwise, a voluntary rescue filing 
would be deterred, because it seems to be suicidal for the debtor to file a reorganization 
petition.  
The increased confidence of the debtors to voluntarily file for reorganization was vividly 
demonstrated by a recent corporate rescue law reform in South Korea. In 2006, South Korea 
amended its bankruptcy rescue law, introducing the debtor-in-possession approach as the new 
rescue control model. Not surprisingly, the number of rescue filings, as a result, soared from 
seventy-six in 2006 to 670 in 2009, almost a ten times increase in only four years.
68
  
The experiences of South Korea may be useful for China’s bankruptcy law reform. 
Currently, the main concern is how to remove the uncertainty regarding the availability of the 
debtor-in-possession model in the EBL 2006, because under Article 73 the debtor-in-
possession model is only one possibility and must be conditional upon the court’s permission. 
Ideally, the company could be automatically managed and controlled by the debtor itself if 
the rescue is voluntarily filed, as argued before. If so, China’s corporate rescue landscape 
might be significantly revamped, although it is only a slight modification of the EBL 2006. 
Second, under the debtor-in-possession approach, the rescue would be more feasible 
because a viable rescue needs the information and experience of the debtor.
69
 As discussed 
before, an outside administrator would be impartial, but the key weakness of the 
administrator is that it lacks the firm-specific experience and knowledge to restructure an 
individual company’s business. Put differently, restructuring a company’s business, which is 
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at the heart of a corporate rescue process, has to depend on the information and experience of 
the debtor itself.
70
   
Retaining the debtor in control does not mean that the entire managing team should be 
kept intact.
71
 Instead, there must be a change regarding the key decision makers, in particular 
the CEO, of the company. Restructuring a troubled company would not be complete if there 
is no restructuring or refreshing of its managing team. Even in the US, where there is a 
default debtor-in-possession approach in the formal rescue, one empirical study revealed that 
over half of the debtors’ chief managers were removed before or during the formal rescue 
process.
72
 So it is desirable for the debtor’s managing team to have a reshuffle although under 
a debtor-in-possession approach.  
Third, the debtor-in-possession approach may substantially encourage the spirit of 
entrepreneurship in society.
73
 To a large extent, doing business means risk taking.
74
 Giving a 
second chance to failing but honest entrepreneurs may considerably inspire business ventures. 
More importantly, lessons learned from the first time failure would be vital to the future 
success; otherwise, such valuable lessons will be simply wasted.
75
  
It, however, is worth addressing that a second chance, in the form of the debtor-in-
possession approach, can only be granted to a debtor who has made honest mistakes.
76
 If the 
business failure is because of fraud or dishonesty, the debtor should be held to account rather 
than be rewarded with a second chance. Granted, in some instances, the business failure 
might be caused by fraud, but if fraudulent individuals have been removed, the old 
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management as a team can still be retained in office; fraudulent managers should be penalised, 
but their honest and innocent colleagues should not be scapegoated.
77
    
Notwithstanding that the debtor-in-possession approach has these merits, some effective 
measures should be taken to prevent or counteract potential abuse.  
B. Dangers of the Debtor-in-Possession Approach  
First of all, the debtor-in-possession approach raises concerns as to whether it may create 
a moral hazard.
78
 If the debtor who has brought the company into trouble is allowed to 
continue managing the company in the formal rescue procedure, it means that the debtor will 
not be held to account for its own failure. This may send a wrong message in business circles, 
since it give the impression that business failures are rewarded rather than punished. Partly 
because of such attitudes, in the UK, a much-quoted response to the debtor-in-possession 
approach is that allowing a debtor in control in the formal rescue procedure is likened to 
allowing an alcoholic to run a pub.
79
 And the similar sentiment is also commonplace in most 
European continental countries
80
 where the general public seem not to be sympathetic to 
failed businessmen.   
In China, as reported before, most of the interviewees believed that company failures 
were somewhat caused by mismanagement - debtors received little sympathy and it seemed 
to be unacceptable to retain them in rescues. 
It, however, appears premature to conclude that moral hazards will be created by the 
debtor-in-possession approach, since such a view has failed to appreciate that business failure 
is usually contributed by a mixture of causes.
81
   
Generally speaking, causes of business failure can be observed and understood at two 
distinct levels, as has been argued in chapter 2. At the first level, reasons for business failure 
can be endogenous or exogenous;
82
 as a result, if business failure is attributed to exogenous 
factors, it would be unfair to blame and punish the innocent management by banning and 
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excluding them from a formal rescue procedure. For example, a global financial crisis may 
have led to massive closure of businesses,
83
 and undoubtedly some failed businesses in the 
economic crisis should be treated in a different way. At the second level, even when causes of 
business failure are endogenous, it may have been occasioned by an honest mistake, business 
speculation, recklessness or fraudulence.
84
 Obviously, under such circumstances, debtors 
should be judged and dealt with differently according to their different intent in mind. The 
debtor must be penalized and expelled from the rescue process if its business failure is due to 
fraudulence; but where it is honest mistakes which lead to the business failure, it would be 
disproportional to punish and remove the debtor during a rescue process. 
Hence, it can be contended that it appears to be a one-size-fits-all judgement that the 
debtor-in-possession approach always generates moral hazards. In fact, moral hazards can 
only be caused in the situation where a company’s failure is endogenous and involves 
fraudulent or reckless business conducts, but the debtor is still permitted to stay in control. 
But the key point here is that the debtor-in-possession has never been intended to be used in 
such circumstances.  
The second worry over the debtor-in-possession approach is that the debtor may, during 
the rescue process, abuse the control by engaging in high-risk-and-high-reward ventures at 
the expense of creditors.
85
 The debtor, in particular the equity-managers, will obtain 
something if the venture succeeds; on the contrary, it is the creditors who have to bear the full 
costs if it fails, because the company’s business risks have shifted from shareholders to 
creditors since the company became insolvent.
86
 It would be another form of moral hazard 
involved.  
Such concerns, however, may be natural but miss the points. It seems to be too early to 
label or categorise the shareholders, especially shareholder-managers, as the party that has no 
interests in the company when a formal reorganization process starts. It is worth recalling that 
a plausible candidate for reorganization is a financially distressed company, which means that 
the company suffers an illiquidity crisis. That is to say, by the bankruptcy cash flow test, the 
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company is bankrupt because it is unable pay debts that become due; however, by the 
bankruptcy balance sheet test, the company may still be solvent, since its assets may still 
exceed its liabilities in real terms.  
Even the balance sheet test is also controversial. The balance sheet test itself sounds 
robust, because it examines and assesses whether the company’s assets can meet its 
liabilities;
87
 however, the key weakness here is that the value of assets is predominantly 
gauged on a hypothetical basis, instead of being derived from a real market sale.
88
 In other 
words, the balance sheet test is dependent on the accurate asset valuations. But as is widely 
witnessed, asset valuations are always subjective and speculative in nature. Hence, using 
highly subjective valuations to exclude the debtor and especially shareholders before the end 
of the bankruptcy game seems to be unjustifiable.  
In addition, it should not be forgotten that to encourage debtors to use the corporate 
reorganization procedure, the EBL 2006 allows a debtor which in not bankrupt to enter this 
procedure with the view of promoting early, feasible rescues. In other words, some 
companies in reorganization are not bankrupt in both legal and economic senses. This further 
suggests that automatically excluding the debtor before or during the reorganization 
procedure seems to be inappropriate and unfair.  
In short, it is too early to conclude that the debtor has no interests in the company when a 
formal bankruptcy rescue procedure is entered. 
Meanwhile, the debtor-in-possession model does not mean that the debtor can run the 
company’s business entirely on its own discretion. Instead, the debtor-in-possession approach 
is designed to be under strict supervision by the court and creditors when the rescue process 
is ongoing. There are already monitoring mechanisms available to prevent its abuse. In the 
US, for example, to supervise debtors, before 1978, it was mainly the court monitoring the 
debtor - the debtor could only carry on normal businesses in the rescue process, and any 
substantial asset disposals or entering large contracts have to be subject to the court’s 
permission; after 1978 it was largely the United States Trustee, a public body, which is 
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responsible of overseeing the whole debtor-in-possession regime.
89
 In China, under the EBL 
2006, a debtor-in-possession should also be intensely supervised by a court-appointed 
administrator.
90
 Apart from courts or administrators, creditors via creditor committees will 
also monitor the debtor-in-possession to avert it from being abused. 
91
  
Therefore, the concerns about possible abuse by debtors engaging in risky business 
ventures are necessary, but have been considered and taken into account when designing the 
debtor-in-possession regime; so these concerns could not be used to deny the use of the 
debtor-in-possession.  
In brief, for the sake of a viable rescue, debtors, in particular their old management, 
should be allowed, and even motivated, to join the rescue processes. In view of its demerits 
and merits, apparently many criticisms against the debtor-in-possession approach have been 
either accommodated or are untenable.  
Granted, the debtor-in-possession model seems not to be needed if the rescue is 
conducted as a going concern sale. Difficulties of going concern sales, however, should not 
be forgotten: on the one hand, a business sale rescue has to face market illiquidity for 
troubled companies at first, i.e., there may be no buyers emerging, as has also frequently 
happened in China’s corporate rescue practice; on the other hand, removing the old 
management will lead to the loss of the company’s going-concern value, which in turn will 
undermine the fundamental justification of the rescue regime in preserving going concern 
value of troubled companies. And as a result of reduction of the company’s going-concern 
value, creditors will correspondingly be further disadvantage.  
Arguably, the debtor-in-possession model seems to be universally useful and should be 
one of foundations of a contemporary corporate rescue system.  
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3.3. Creditors in Rescues 
Whatever the creditors’ bargaining or risk sharing theories, increasing creditor recovery 
rates is always at the top of the corporate rescue objectives.
92
 But maximising creditor 
recoveries does not mean that creditors should be invited to control and manage the company 
during the rescue processes, because allocating control must take into account the ability and 
competence of the chosen parties in conducting rescues.
93
 In general, creditors are unable to 
manage a debtor company in the rescue process because they are short of understandings and 
experiences to the debtor’s business. Instead, creditors are protected by the corporate 
reorganization regime in a different way.  
Creditors are given a powerful lever to make their voice heard and counted - the 
reorganization plan must be voted by the creditors’ meetings. And before voting on the 
reorganization plan, creditors could also organize a creditors’ committee – an executive body 
- to scrutinize the rescue process on the periodical basis. In practice, however, this is easier 
said than done.  
 A. Creditors’ Positions 
The main chance for creditors to make a collective decision in Chinese corporate rescues 
is at the meeting of creditors.
94
 The key weakness of this meeting, however, is that it is 
limited in times. Even it is not unusual for the creditors’ meeting to be held only once in the 
existing corporate rescues in China.
95
  
Meanwhile, it is too late for the first creditors’ meeting to be held. Under Articles 45 and 
62 of the EBL 2006, the first meeting of creditors will be held at least one month later after 
the formal rescue process begins. In other words, before the first creditors’ meeting, there is a 
supervision vacuum of creditors.  
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More importantly, for creditors, obtaining sufficient information about the company 
would be crucial for them to make an informed judgement during creditors’ meetings; 
however, as reported in the previous chapters, generally, creditors were not allowed to access 
the company’s books and other financial documents. Without knowing what has exactly 
happened before and after the company is bankruptcy, creditors would be unable to make a 
sound decision when attending creditors’ meetings. It should also be noted that in general 
creditors are not familiar with each other. Therefore the lack of coordination between 
creditors may further undermine the ability or capacity of creditors as a whole to reach a 
rational collective decision.  
Bearing in mind that creditors’ meetings cannot conduct day-to-day supervision of the 
company, the EBL 2006 stipulates
96
 that a creditors’ committee can be established by the 
creditors’ meeting. The creditors’ committee is expected to represent creditors as an 
executive body. But, such committees are not widely used in practice. 
Meanwhile, like creditors’ meetings, such a committee is also formed at a very late stage. 
Under Article 67 of the EBL 2006, a committee of creditors has to be proposed by the 
creditors’ meeting; this means that it is always formed after the first meeting of creditors is 
held. So, the creditors’ supervision vacuum before the first creditors’ meeting still remains 
unfilled. More significantly, it is optional rather than compulsory to establish a creditors’ 
committee in Chinese corporate bankruptcy processes; therefore, it remains uncertain 
whether such a committee will be formed to supervise the daily operation of the company in 
rescue.  
In reality, as has been seen in Zhejiang, the creditors’ committee was only reportedly 
found in twenty per cent of the rescue cases. Therefore, generally, the committee is not 
widely used. More importantly, even if there is a creditors’ committee, all members are 
unpaid, and they serve all the other creditors on a volunteer basis. The problem arises as to 
whether such a committee can operate as effectively as expected.  
By and large, creditors in China’s corporate reorganizations appear to be considerably 
vulnerable.  
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B. Enhancing Creditors’ Participation 
Primarily, the creditors’ meeting and committee are two main platforms through which 
creditors can monitor and influence the rescue procedure. In order to improve creditors’ 
participation in rescues, in response, consideration must be given to both the creditors’ 
meeting and committee. 
At present, although the EBL 2006 does not make clear that it is mandatory to form a 
creditors’ committee, it seems to be necessary for China’s Supreme People’s Court to 
interpret that it is the norm rather than the exception to have such a creditors’ committee in 
corporate reorganization procedures,
97
 because it is desirable to have this committee so as to 
make creditors better represented in rescue processes. To be sure, in Chinese corporate 
rescues, establishing a creditor committee seems to be more than needed, because nearly all 
companies in reorganization are large, involving a large number of creditors. For example, in 
the reorganization of Dadi Paper Co. Ltd. Zhejiang, the company had 427 creditors.  
Hence, it can be argued that there should be a guidance according to which it is 
compulsory to form a creditor committee if creditors are over a certain number in the case, 
e.g., when there is over fifty creditors in a case, there must be a creditor committee; below 
this figure, whether to form such a committee is subject to creditors themselves.  
With regard to supervision vacuum as noted, ideally, a provisional creditors’ committee 
can be appointed by the court or the administrator in advance of the first meeting of 
creditors.
98
 More importantly, the committee should be allowed, and be encouraged, to hire 
professionals paid out of the company.
99
 Without hiring professionals such as lawyers, 
accountants or business consultants, forming a creditors’ committee is only a halfway 
measure to increase the effective participation of creditors. This is because, on the one hand, 
the committee members are not sufficiently motivated to represent creditors as a whole due to 
the collective action problem and, on the other hand, these members are not professionally 
capable to investigate and analyse the company’s businesses and make a sound judgement.  
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S Meir and Theodore Brown, Jr., ‘Representing Creditors’ Committees under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy 
Code’ (1982) 56 American Bankruptcy Law Journal 217.  
 209 
 
Many other problems could also be solved if professionals could be hired by the 
creditors’ committee. For example, these professionals could investigate causes of the 
company’s bankruptcy. This is what many creditors in Chinese corporate rescues are keen to 
know but cannot afford to investigate individually. Meanwhile, it could also overcome the 
deficient supervision of creditors against the administrator. Most administrators are lawyers 
or accountants; they are qualified and have special expertise and knowledge. Compared with 
lawyer and accountant administrators who are repeat players, the creditors in the creditors’ 
committee lack knowledge and experience in corporate bankruptcy; therefore, it make their 
supervision on the administrator very weak and inadequate. However, the supervision may be 
considerably improved if the creditors’ committee has its own lawyer or accountant advisors. 
The knowledge asymmetry will be materially rectified, and insiders’ supervision could be a 
more effective way to serve and protect creditors.  
With regard to creditors’ meetings, it should be admitted that it is costly and time-
consuming to hold them on a regular basis.  But the problem here is not how frequently such 
a meeting is held. It is not a matter of quantity. Instead, the current challenge is how to ensure 
that individual creditors are properly informed of the company’s position before they attend 
the creditors’ meeting. At present, the two main problems arise regarding creditors’ 
information rights in China’s corporate rescues.  
The first is that creditors, in most cases, are only provided with a very general audit 
report without any detailed description of the company’s assets and liabilities. Reading an 
audit report that contains skeletal financial data and few or no explanations, according to 
many disgruntled creditors, cannot provide a full account of the company’s situation. 
Secondly, creditors are usually given the audit report as well as a proposed reorganization 
plan at the time when they attend the creditors’ meeting. It is too late. It is not a good practice 
to provide creditors these documents one or two hours before they are required to cast their 
votes on the reorganization plan. It is highly unlikely for them to assimilate these materials 
within such a time limit. To address these problems, at least the administrator should provide 
relevant documents to creditors in advance of creditors’ meetings, allowing the latter to study 
and fully appreciate them before attending creditors’ meetings.  
In sum, among most of the existing China’s corporate rescues, the administrator-in-
possession model was used. The only advantage of the administrator-in-possession model is 
that, without the involvement of local government organized liquidation committees 
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appointed as administrators, administrators can be neutral before debtors and creditors. But 
the major disadvantage of installing an administrator in control is that the administrator is not 
professionally capable to restructure troubled companies, because they do not have a specific 
stock of information about troubled companies, and because they are not knowledgeable in 
business management.  
A fine corporate rescue regime in China has to give more consideration to allowing and 
incentivising debtors to contribute their information and understandings to the rescue. 
Currently, most debtors are either removed or sidelined in the rescue procedure, and much 
reform in this regard seems to be needed.    
4. CONCLUSIONS  
This chapter has examined and discussed issues and problems regarding the first two 
research questions, i.e., entry and control of corporate rescue procedures under China’s new 
corporate rescue law. 
Concerning the start of a formal rescue procedure, it is largely the inaction of Chinese 
courts which almost stifles entry into formal rescue processes.
100
 At the heart of courts’ 
hesitation is the lack of judicial independence as well as the oversimplification of the EBL 
2006. This is further exacerbated by the indifference or hostility of debtors to the formal 
rescue regime due to the prevalence of the administrator-in-possession approach and the rigid 
application of absolute priority in rescues. Moreover, without effective liquidation pressures 
from creditors, it is not surprising that debtors delay the commencement of the formal rescue 
as long as possible, thereby placing creditors’ interests in jeopardy.  
With regard to control in China’s rescues, a set of factors lead to the widespread 
administrator-in-possession approach in rescues. Notwithstanding that administrators might 
be impartial in striking a balance between various parties, they could do little to substantially 
rehabilitate troubled companies, because they are technically incapable of doing so. An 
effective rescue has to rely on debtors themselves. More importantly, it can be contended that 
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the debtor-in-possession approach could be universally applicable, since many of the 
concerns regarding its demerits have been properly addressed and accommodated. China’s 
corporate rescue landscape will be immensely updated and refreshed if the debtor-in-
possession approach can be established as the default control model in the rescue processes.  
The following chapter will discuss the next two research questions: value distribution 




MAKING FAIR AND FEASIBLE REORGANIZATION PLANS 
1. INTRODUCTION  
The last chapter discussed the difficulties of launching a corporate rescue procedure in 
Chinese courts as well as the practice of control in China’s corporate rescue procedure. 
Obviously, more can be done to clear the hurdles hindering the commencement of the rescue 
procedures. Moreover, debtors can be encouraged to play a greater role in corporate rescues; 
otherwise the rescue regime could be negatively affected. In this chapter, the discussion will 
turn to analysing value distribution that occurs in rescues and the court confirmation of 
reorganization plans in China.  
At the heart of a corporate reorganization plan is the issues on how to distribute the 
company’s value as well as how to restructure the company’s business.1 Given the prevalence 
of the going-concern sale rescue in China, it seems that restructuring the company’s business 
operations has been largely left to the company’s buyer, i.e., most of reorganization plans 
may mainly deal with value distribution issues.  
Whether it is a business sale rescue or a traditional rescue, the reorganization plan should 
be ultimately subject to the court’s confirmation at the final stage. A cram-down might even 
be imposed if the court believes that the plan could pass the statutory tests enshrined in the 
EBL 2006.  
To discuss these two issues, the remainder of this chapter is divided into three Parts: (i) 
Part 2 analyses the present value distribution practice in China’s corporate rescues. In 
particular, it centres on two basic value distribution rules: the pari passu and absolute priority 
rules. The discussion of going concern value preservation will also be included in this Part, 
and the strengths and weaknesses of the current rescue practice in preserving going concern 
value will be re-evaluated. (ii) Part 3 critiques court confirmation of reorganization plans; it 
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will highlight the use of the cram-down in forcibly confirming reorganization plans. (iii) Part 
4 concludes.  
2. VALUE DISTRIBUTION IN CHINA’S CORPORATE RESCUES 
Prior to discussing value distribution in rescues, it is useful to analyse the importance of 
China’s corporate reorganization regime in preserving going concern value, since going-
concern value preservation lies at the core of the rescue regime. Without preserving going-
concern value of companies, the rescue regime as a whole would be built on sand.  
2.1. Going-Concern Value Preservation  
A company’s going-concern value can be preserved by means of preventing the 
company, its business or its assets, from being dismembered; in other words, the going-
concern value that is generated between diverse relationships, internal and external, will not 
be lost. Ideally, the company as an entity can be preserved, because retaining the integration 
between human resources and assets will maximise going-concern value preservation. If 
unachievable, a going concern sale would be the second best choice, although it will rather 
undermine going-concern value preservation.  
A. Increased Recovery Rates 
As reported, the national average recovery rate for unsecured creditors in China’s 
existing corporate rescues, between June 2007 and November 2010, stood at thirty-three per 
cent; in Zhejiang, it was slightly higher, at thirty-six per cent. It is worth noting that, in these 
rescues, secured and preferential debts were paid in full.
2
  
Such debt recovery rates in corporate reorganizations are quite promising, especially 
when compared with their counterparts in corporate liquidations. As mentioned in chapter 5, 




 unsecured creditors in China’s 
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 Xianchu Zhang and Charles D Booth, ‘Chinese bankruptcy law in an emerging market economy: the 
Shenzhen experience’ (2001) 15 Columbia Journal of Asian Law 1, 10.  
 214 
 
corporate liquidations recovered on average less than ten per cent of their pre-bankruptcy 
claims, and even it was not uncommon for them to recover nothing in most individual 
liquidation cases. A recent study by Wang and Yi
5
 further confirms that it is not exceptional 
for unsecured creditors to have zero recovery in China’s corporate liquidations.  
Apparently, China’s new rescue regime has shown its strength in preserving going-
concern value, since it substantially increased the unsecured creditor recovery rate from less 
than ten per cent in liquidations to thirty-three per cent in reorganizations. It is also worth 
noting that until now there has never been zero recovery to unsecured creditors in the existing 
corporate rescues in China. These figures send a clear message: corporate reorganizations 
serve creditors’ interests better than liquidations do. 
In addition, the social effects of saving these troubled companies should not be forgotten, 
since, by turning troubled companies around, external or social going-concern value of these 
companies is also preserved.
6
 The company’s continued existence and trading have prevented 
a chain reaction that is detrimental to its suppliers and other business partners. Local 
communities and even local revenue authorities also benefit much from this.
7
 Therefore, 
taking into account both increasing recovery rates for creditors and avoiding the ripple effects 
that would harm the community interests, China’s new corporate rescue regime is a success.  
Concerns, however, are also raised as to how to better preserve going-concern value of 
troubled companies in China’s corporate rescue processes.  
B. Challenges 
Among all other challenges, the widespread going concern sale rescue is probably the 
foremost concern, because it is definitely not the most optimal instrument for preserving 
going-concern value in a modern corporate rescue regime. As reported, between June 2007 
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and November 2010, eighty-four per cent of existing corporate rescues in China were 
conducted as the going concern sale. 
A going concern sale is one of the ways to preserving going concern value but is not the 
most ideal. Arguably, there seems to be a ranking of methods to preserve going-concern 
value. At the top is it to save a company as an entity; in the middle is it a going concern sale; 
and at the bottom is it to sell assets that are combined as a unit.
8
 As previously discussed, a 
company’s going concern value is generated among various relationships, such as business 
connection between the company and its customers, the relationship among managers and 
employees, etc. Saving a company through maintaining a bundle of relationships would be 
the most desirable way to preserve its going concern value. Selling the company’s business or 
assets, by contrast, may inevitably lead to breaking some of these relationships, as a result of 
which the going concern value of the company will have some degree of loss.  
Two factors of the going concern sale rescue may considerably detract from going 
concern preservation. First, the going concern value generated from the relationship between 
management and companies’ assets9 will be lost in the going concern sales. In nearly all 
China’s going concern sale rescues, the management were entirely removed before or during 
the rescue processes, as a result of which so much of these companies’ going concern value 
evaporated. At the same time, along with the removal of old management, these companies’ 
external business connections were also adversely affected, because these connections were 
firmly related with individual managers.
10
 So, further loss of going concern value was made.   
Second, the going concern sale rescue has to face market illiquidity for troubled 
companies. In general, there is not a well-functioning market to sell troubled companies in 
China. This is partly because buying troubled companies is complex in nature and involves 
considerations regarding ownership, control and even the possible legal disputes flowing 
from a purchase. Sometimes there might be hidden liabilities which cause more uncertainties. 
These considerations and uncertainties may deter many potential buyers from coming 
forward. For example, during the reorganization of Yijiaxiang Food Co. Ltd. Zhejiang in 
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2010, several potential buyers contacted the administrator, but eventually all of them left, 




Admittedly, in some cases, an auction can be held if there are over three serious buyers. 
For example, in the reorganization of Zhonggu Sugar Co. Ltd. Guangdong in 2009, there 
were five serious bidders; the possible highest price of the going concern sale was achieved 
through the auction.
12
 But, in most of the going concern sales, an auction was impossible 
because there was usually only one buyer.
13
 Under China’s auction regulations, an auction 
cannot be held if there are less than three bidders. This means that most business sale rescues 
cannot achieve the highest price through an auction process. Instead, most of the sales were 
privately negotiated.  
Even in extreme cases, a buyer would intentionally exploit market illiquidity and the 
company’s dire state by offering so low a price. For example, in the reorganization of 
Changhong Special Steel Co. Ltd. Jiangsu in 2010, an offer made by the only buyer was even 
lower than the company liquidation value appraised by the evaluator; there was no doubt that 
this offer was outright refused by creditors.
14
  
Thus, when a going concern sale is considered and pursued, it has to bear in mind that it 
will cause loss in the company’s going concern value because of the departure of the old 
management and because of market illiquidity.  
In the US, an empirical study reveals that a going concern sale rescue could only, on 
average, preserve thirty-five per cent of the company’s book value, the net asset value in 
British sense, and that, by contrast, a traditional reorganization, namely saving a company as 
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an entity, could retain eighty per cent of the book value.
15
 Such a gap is likely to be caused by 
the two problems analysed above. 
In brief, to preserve going concern value of troubled companies, more consideration 
should be given to pursuing the traditional reorganization rather than the going concern sale 
rescue. Preserving going concern value of a troubled company is only the first step to serve 
creditors and debtors, the next step regarding how to distribute it among interested parties 
would be more challenging.  
2.2. The Absolute Priority Principle 
The absolute priority principle is the default norm in distributing value in corporate 
reorganizations but is mandatory in corporate liquidations. In most jurisdictions, the absolute 
priority rule is taken for granted, partly because it is deemed to be the fundamental equity 
norm in distributing residual assets of a company when it is bankrupt.
16
 For example, in the 
UK, a well-developed jurisdiction in bankruptcy law, there are few academic debates as to 
controversies of applying the absolute priority principle, largely because the UK bankruptcy 
law virtually rules out deviating from this principle in corporate bankruptcies. 
17
   
Deviations from absolute priority, however, always exist in one way or another in both 
liquidation and reorganization processes. This is a fact. For example, in Sweden where there 
is no corporate reorganization procedure, when a company is bankrupt, an automatic and 
compulsory auction will be held. A deviation from absolute priority, however, was often 
found when assets were sold back to old equity managers.
18
 In the UK, a deviation can also 
be frequently identified in some pre-packaged administration procedures
19
 and in informal 
rescues.
20
 Thus, the absolute priority principle is not as absolute as its name indicates. 
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Under the EBL 2006 in China, it is also clear that the absolute priority norm is treated as 
the default rule in corporate reorganizations, and a deviation is possible but should be with 
the consent of the disadvantaged parties.
21
 Given the less-developed rule of law in China,
22
 
however, in practice, this principle was not rigorously complied with in some company 
reorganizations.  
A. Applications 
As reported, the deviation from absolute priority was found in fifty-three per cent of 
China’s corporate reorganizations studied. This is rather unsettling. Closer inspection, 
however, reveals that most of these deviations took place in listed company rescues. In 
particular, a deviation was the norm rather than the exception in listed company 
reorganizations. By contrast, in non-listed company rescues, such a deviation was rarely used, 
as it was only found in about fifteen per cent of non-listed company reorganizations.  
As for listed company reorganizations, it seems that China’s central government intends 
to prioritise the maintenance of social stability at any costs,
23
 and this is reflected in China’s 
Supreme People’s Court’s decree according to which equity of general public investors 
(shareholders) must be given special protection in corporate reorganizations regardless of 
whether listed companies in reorganization are insolvent or not. This is mainly because 
shareholders of listed companies are large in number. If they are unsatisfied with the 
cancellation of their equity, namely the rigid application of the absolute priority principle, in 
reorganizations, they may launch mass petitions or street protests to express their grievances. 
Mass petitions are what China’s government are trying to avoid. For the sake of maintaining 
the social stability, thus, the absolute priority principle is formally relaxed in listed company 
reorganizations. But such an exemption decree has brought at least two main worries.   
The first is a clash of legal rules. The Automatic deviation from absolute priority in 
listed company reorganizations was authorised in a conference speech given by a senior 
judge of China’s Supreme People’s Court, Mr Song Xiaoming, in April 2006. Although it is 
not a formal decree, it is clear that Mr Song gave this policy instruction on behalf of the 
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Court. So, this guidance can be interpreted a decree or a judicial notice issued by the Supreme 
Court of China.
24
   
But, both the letter and the spirit of this decree are not consistent with the EBL 2006 that 
was promulgated four months later. Song gave the speech in April 2006, and the EBL 2006 
was enacted in August 2006. Under 87 of the EBL 2006, a deviation from absolute priority is 
allowed but must be conditional upon the consent of disadvantaged parties. In other words, 
the EBL 2006 requires that a deviation must be based on consent in all company 
reorganizations. The decree, however, removes the condition of the consent set up by the 
EBL 2006 in listed company reorganizations. In principle, this decree has already been 
invalidated by the EBL 2006, because the law enacted by China’s People’s Congress prevails 
in the event of a clash with any decrees issued by China’s Supreme People’s Court, and 
because the EBL 2006 was promulgated later than this decree. In reality, however, this decree 
is still in force at the time of writing. 
The second worry is that this decree is somewhat abused in practice. In his speech, Mr 
Song made it clear that it was small-and-medium shareholders in listed company 
reorganizations who can retain some of their equity.
25
 It could be literally understood that 
controlling and institutional shareholders are not included on this special protection list. In 
spite of the fact that small-and-medium shareholders can be subject to broad interpretation, 
given that this decree was aimed to maintain social stability, presumably, Mr Song’s real 
intent was defining small-and-medium shareholders as general public shareholders. In other 
words, Song’s speech must be interpreted in the context. In reality, however, all shareholders 
of listed companies in reorganization were allowed to retain certain percentage of their equity, 
although all these companies were bankrupt and unable to pay creditors in full.  
 Leaving listed company reorganizations aside, the deviation from absolute priority in 
non-listed company reorganizations was exceptional, since it only, as noted above, took place 
in fifteen per cent of these rescues. Under such circumstances, the deviation was carried out 
mainly for two purposes. First, a deviation took place because the rescue process was firmly 
controlled by the debtor. Debtors, especially their equity-managers, have an incentive to use 
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their control, if they can regain it, in rescue processes to maximize shareholders’ interests by 
pursuing deviations from absolute priority. For example, in the reorganization of Dadi Paper 
Co. Ltd., Zhejiang, the company was returned to the debtor in the rescue process, and the 
reorganization plan was also proposed by the debtor itself, so it was not surprising that the 
absolute priority principle was put aside in that case.
 26
  
Second, it is market illiquidity for trouble companies which leads to deviations. As noted 
before, although most of China’s corporate rescues rely on the going concern sales, it is not 
always easy to find buyers. When there are not company buyers, a deviation seems to be a 
necessity, because it is the only way to increase the creditor recovery rate by inviting and 
rewarding equity-managers to turn troubled companies around. For example, in the above 
Dadi case, the attempt to find a company buyer failed, and the only realistic option for 
creditors was to allow the debtor to continue to run the company, since the latter promised to 
pay creditors more than they could have in liquidation. In the reorganization of Xingxing 
Artefacts Co. Ltd., Fujian, the equity-manager was also, in fact, invited by the creditors to 
restructure the company; in this case, although creditors took a significant haircut, with the 
company’s ownership untouched, they were better off than in a piecemeal liquidation.27  
However the absolute priority principle is applied or relaxed, the primary aim should be 
to improve the feasibility of corporate reorganization, and this must be the bottom line. In 
some situations, however, the application of absolute priority seems to be counterproductive. 
B. Controversies  
At first glance, as discussed, the absolute priority norm must be applied rigorously, 
because it is a matter of investors’ certainty and predictability in the wider market. Without 
strictly applying this rule, market efficiency will be undermined, because creditors would 
hesitate to extend credit, and debtors are unable to borrow. In practice, however, its stringent 
                                                 
 
26
 Dadi Paper Co. Ltd. Zhejiang, ‘The Reorganization Plan of Dadi’ (Hangzhou Zhejiang China, 28 
December 2009, in Chinese).  
27
 Jinxiong Zhen, Haitao An and Jizhou Chen, ‘Corporate Reorganization Helps Company to Revive’ 
People’s Court Daily (Beijing China, 25 December 2009, in Chinese) 
<http://oldfyb2009.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=134675> accessed 27 September 2012 
 221 
 
application may produce unfairness because of the flaws of the supporting mechanisms. 
Inaccurate asset evaluations can be the first of these concerns.
28
    
In corporate liquidations, a company’s assets or business will be sold in the open market, 
so almost no doubt can be cast upon the value of the assets, because it is simply determined 
by a real sale. In corporate reorganizations, especially traditional corporate reorganizations, 
by contrast, there is no real sale; instead the sale is hypothetical. The company’s price is set 
according to the valuation of its tangible and intangible assets.
29
 If the appraised value 
exceeds the company’s liabilities, there would be a happy end, because after creditors are 
paid in full, there is still something left for shareholders, but this is a highly unlikely event. In 
most corporate reorganizations, however, the appraised value of the company’s assets is 
lower than its liabilities. Shareholders will, thus, be deemed to be the parties who have lost all 
their interests in the company due to the absoluter priority norm.  
So, asset valuations are critical in applying absolute priority in corporate reorganization. 
But the danger is, as noted before, that asset valuations are always inaccurate, because they 
are largely based on subjective estimates. One study in the US shows that, when a bankrupt 
company is appraised, sometimes its ‘estimated value to market value varies from less than 
twenty per cent to greater than two hundred fifty per cent’.30  
In China’s corporate reorganizations, company valuation inaccuracies could also be 
easily identified. There are two extreme cases worth noting. In 2008, there was a high-profile 
reorganization case in Jiangsu province where Yaxing Electronic Co. Ltd. Suzhou entered the 
corporate reorganization procedure. The company’s assets were initially evaluated at RMB 
0.4 billion. The subsequent auction, however, ended at the final price of RMB 2 billion, five 
times the evaluated one.
31
 In the same province in 2009, the assets of Chang Hong Special 
Steel Co. Ltd. Jiangsu were appraised at RMB 88 million; however, a serious buyer was only 
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willing to pay up to RMB 50 million for the company, i.e., the real value of the assets seemed 
to have been considerably inflated by the evaluator.
32
  
Now, it seems clear. Asset valuations are largely tentative in character. The danger here 
is that if we use such tentative valuations to apply absolute priority in reorganization, in most 
cases, at least shareholders will be excluded prematurely at a very early stage. Shareholders, 
thus, are unfairly treated and are even victimised by inaccurate valuations. Absolute priority 
was made to pursue fairness and equity, but applying it by using inaccurate valuations will 
backfire at least from some junior parties’ perspective.  
One may ask whether China’s corporate rescues were not adversely affected by 
inaccurate valuations, because most of them used the going concern sale rather than the 
traditional rescue approach. In theory, the going concern sale could minimise, if not eliminate, 
price inaccuracies associated with valuations, because the market is thought to be best place 
to set a fair price for assets. But as noted, there is no well-functioning market for troubled 
companies. And the only effective way to achieve the market value of the company assets is 
to hold an auction.
33
 In other words, if an auction had been held in all going-concern sales in 
China’s corporate reorganizations, applying absolute priority would have not been negatively 
affected by asset valuation inaccuracies. But it is not the case.  
As noted before, most of China’s going concern sales were, in fact, negotiated between 
the company buyer, the administrator and other main parties. An auction was only used in 
exceptional cases, because there were not enough buyers or bidders to hold an auction. There 
was no regular market for troubled companies in China. Without an auction, it means that it 
was still the outcomes of asset valuations which determined the price of the going concern 
sale. So the potential unfairness was still followed.  
The very subjective nature of valuations can be further aggravated by conflicts of 
interest in China’s corporate reorganization. In theory, secured creditors tend to 
underestimate assets so as to exclude unsecured creditors and shareholders from sharing the 
value of the company, whereas the latter often overestimate them in order to get something in 
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 In China’s corporate reorganizations, however, such a bias seems to be 
eliminated, because it is always a court-appointed administrator who hires a licensed auditor 
to evaluate company assets. The independence of both the administrator and the evaluator 
could ensure the impartiality of valuations. In practice, however, the story is different.  
In practice, asset undervaluations have been long contested by creditors in Chinese 
corporate reorganizations, and this has also been noticed by China’s Supreme People’s Court 
in 2009 that required that judges be serious to creditors’ complaints on this. 35 
Notwithstanding there is no concrete evidence that administrators would manipulate asset 
valuations through evaluators, it seems that administrators tend to see as low valuations as 
possible. This is because, on the one hand, with a low asset evaluation, the administrator will 
find that it is far easier to pass the creditor-best-interest test when the reorganization plan is 
submitted to the court for confirmation, and on the other hand, accordingly, the low asking 
price in selling the company will be more attractive for potential buyers. If these doubts are 
true, inevitably, undervaluations of assets will undermine what the absolute priority principle 
is aimed to pursue.   
Moreover, the rigid application of the absolute priority rule would create a dilemma. 
Fairness and equity may be achieved by preventing shareholders, in particular shareholder-
managers, from sharing the company’s value, because there are even no sufficient assets to 
meet all claims of creditors. But the feasibility of the rescue is sacrificed, because 
shareholder-managers whose experience and information are critical to the ongoing operation 
of the company’s business will leave due to the cancellation of their equity under the absolute 
priority rule. In corporate reorganizations of SMEs,
36
 this dilemma becomes more acute. This 
can be exemplified by the predicament encountered in a recent reorganization case in China. 
In the reorganization of Nanwang Group Co. Ltd., Zhejiang in 2008, the shareholder-
manager, Zhang Jiang, who was also the company’s CEO, was removed, because the 
absolute priority rule required that all his equity had to be cancelled. Some creditors, however, 
immediately realised that, without his continued service, the reorganized new company 
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would become an empty shell, since the company’s business was heavily dependent on his 
personal relationships with several key customers.
37
 The most valuable asset of the company 
is its equity-manager’s customer connection. Excluding this equity-manager meant the 
considerable loss of the company’s value. 
The Nanwang case demonstrated that the rigid application of the absolute priority 
principle is, sometimes, a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it is a breach of absolute 
priority to give something to old shareholder-managers if creditors are not paid in full; on the 
other hand, the company’s future will become precarious because absolute priority forces 
shareholder-managers, who may be the most capable people knowing how to run the business, 
to leave the company.
38
 Indeed, this dilemma has long been debated in the US. Should the 
former equity-manager be given some equity in the new company in exchange for his or her 
continued service?
39
 The US case law, however, made it clear that the equity-manager’s 
continued service does not constitute a new value, so he or she is not eligible to share equity 
in the new company.
40
  
This judgement might be right, as the going concern value flowing from equity-
managers’ involvement in the company has already existed before the reorganization 
procedure starts, i.e., such value is not newly created. But this judgement does not solve the 
problem. Admittedly, such value is not freshly created but will be definitely lost if equity-
managers leave the company. Both policy-makers and practitioners have to strike a balance 
when faced with this dilemma. 
In brief, applying absolute priority in corporate reorganizations raises serious concerns 
regarding fairness for junior parties, especially shareholders, as well as feasibility of rescues. 
Some reforms seem to be needed, or the new understandings should to be established. 
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C. Ways Forward 
The absolute priority rule is one of the most fundamental principles in distributing 
company value. Where a company is closed either through bankruptcy or outside bankruptcy, 
creditors must be paid before shareholders. But the key point, it can be argued, is that the 
absolute priority principle is designed and applied upon the assumption that the company is to 
be dissolved. Rather than dissolving a company, however, corporate reorganization is 
intended to revive and continue the company’s business. In other words, in corporate 
reorganization, the assumed precondition of applying absolute priority has been changed. In 
theory, this rule should, accordingly, be modified to accommodate such a change.  
As for the future of this rule in China’s corporate rescues, some suggestions may be 
given for listed and non-listed company reorganizations separately, because this rule has been 
applied differently between them.  
With regard to listed company rescues, the routine deviation from absolute priority 
makes rescues unfair, because the automatic deviation means that reorganizations of listed 
companies are conducted entirely at the expense of creditors, especially unsecured creditors. 
More importantly, as discussed before, one principle should be made clear. A deviation from 
absolute priority must only be used to support the preservation of going concern value and to 
improve the viability of rescues. By such benchmarks, apparently, retaining all previous 
shares intact in listed companies’ rescues appears to be unjustifiable.  
Moreover, the main objective of China’s such policy was to highlight the maintenance of 
social stability, but it seems to be inappropriate to force creditors to bear the cost for the 
government’s intent. In addition, given that this policy violates the EBL 2006, in the near 
future, this is expected to be seriously reviewed. 
Regarding non-listed company rescues, as noted, the application of absolute priority 
seems to be polarized; most of them rigorously complied with this rule, whereas a small 
percentage of them entirely ignored it. In general, the rigid application of the absolute priority 
rule seems to be a direct result of the going concern sale rescues. It can, however, be argued 
that the going concern sale is not the most plausible approach for reorganization, as it has to 
encounter the market illiquidity for troubled companies and the loss of company going 
concern value by virtue of the departure of the old management. The circumvention of 
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absolute priority, by contrast, also appears to be inappropriate, because at least there should 
be a risk-sharing mechanism between creditors and shareholders.  
To tackle this dilemma, it seems to be desirable for administrators to explain the vices 
and virtues of absolute priority for creditors at first, and then it is at the option of the latter to 
decide whether to invite equity-managers to join the rescue and share the losses. This is 
because, up to the present, in almost all non-listed company deviation cases in China, the 
reorganization plan has, deliberately or inadvertently, avoided explaining how to deal with 
the company’s ownership after rescue. In other words, creditors were not explicitly informed 
that it is them who bear the full costs of the rescue, and that shareholders have not shouldered 
any cost. Perhaps, because of the lack of legal expertise, creditors were unknowingly harmed.   
2.3. The pari passu Principle 
By comparison with the absolute priority principle, the pari passu principle appears to be 
less problematic. In general, this principle is treated in two different ways in many 
jurisdictions. In the UK corporate reorganizations, the pari passu rule is deemed to be a 
public policy, and interested parties are not allowed to contract out;
41
 put another way, it is 







 this principle is treated as a default rule, namely, the pari 
passu can be contracted out. 
Under Article 81 of the EBL 2006, there are not specific rules regulating value 
distribution in corporate reorganizations - it is surprising, and it is at the option of impaired 
parties to vote on whether the pari passu principle
45
 should be applied or not. But there is one 
restriction. Under Article 87 of the EBL 2006, when a cram-down is sought, the pari passu 
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principle must be applied;
46
 otherwise the plan will be rejected by the court because it cannot 
pass the fair and equitable test.  
As reported, the deviation from the pari passu principle took place in twenty-six per cent 
of the existing corporate reorganizations in China. In particular, the deviation was used in 
forty-three per cent of listed and fifteen per cent of non-listed company reorganizations.  
By and large, deviating from the pari passu principle was used for two purposes. The 
first was to canvass small unsecured creditors to accept reorganization plans. Small creditors 
might be insignificant in claims but are definitely matter in number. This is because, under 
Article 84 of the EBL 2006, the reorganization plan will not be passed unless it is accepted by 
a majority (two-thirds in claims and one-half in number) of each class of impaired parties. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that reorganization plan proponents bent the pari passu 
principle in favour of small creditors in exchange for their votes.  
The second purpose seemed to be controversial. It was made in order to maintain social 
stability by paying a higher percentage to creditors who were individuals. Maintaining social 
stability per se was understandable and even justifiable, but it seemed inappropriate to let 
creditors to bear the costs of maintaining social stability, because creditors have no obligation 
to tackle and pay for the problem of social stability and because the potential social stability 
troubles were not caused by them. 
Whatever soliciting the votes of small creditors or maintaining social stability, the 
bottom line is that deviating from the pari passu principle must be under the consent of 
disadvantaged parties, and this requires courts to ensure that this principle is adequately 
followed when the reorganization plan is submitted for confirmation. This will be further 
discusses in the following Part on court confirmation of reorganization plans.  
Finally, at present, a serious concern is raised when applying the pari passu principle in 
China’s corporate reorganizations: there is no equitable subordination mechanism in the EBL 
2006. This means that all unsecured creditors are paid pro rata, regardless of whether some 
of them may be insiders or connected parties. Without equitable subordination, superficially, 
fairness seems to have been achieved by paying all unsecured creditors in the same 
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proportion; however, substantially, great unfairness may have been produced.
47
 This is, in 
effect, a breach of the spirit of the pari passu principle. Given there is not an equitable 
subordination mechanism in statute in China, it is essential that some academic research be 
conducted at first in the foreseeable future. 
To sum up, China’s corporate reorganization regime has materially preserved going 
concern value of troubled companies, since it prevented troubled but viable companies from 
being piecemeal liquidated. The main challenge to preserving going concern value, however, 
is that most of China’s corporate rescues resorted to the going concern sale rescue, which 
seems not to be the ideal way to preserve such value. To establish an effective corporate 
culture, consideration should be given to promoting more traditional corporate 
reorganizations in China.  
To value distribution in China’s corporate reorganizations, in the first place, the 
automatic deviation from absolute priority in listed company reorganizations gave rise to 
unfairness and also undermined the rule of law in China; in the second place, concerning the 
pari passu principle, it is recommended that an equitable subordination mechanism be 
installed in statute with a view to filling the gap left by the pari passu principle.  
3. COURT CONFIRMATION OF REORGANIZATION PLANS  
Under Articles 86 and 87 of the EBL 2006, there are two different reorganization plan 
confirmation procedures: the normal, consensual procedure to confirm a plan which has been 
voted for by all classes of impaired parties, and the cram-down, non-consensual procedure for 
a plan which has been rejected by one or more classes of impaired parties.
48
    
Before discussing concerns raised from court reorganization plan confirmation in 
China’s corporate reorganization, it seems to be necessary to examine why a reorganization 
plan should be subject to court confirmation.  
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Why a reorganization plan should be confirmed by the court? To this question, there are 
different approaches in the US and the UK. Under Chapter 11 in the US, a plan must be 
confirmed ultimately by the court.
49
 In UK administrations, the main corporate rescue 
procedures, an administrator’s proposal, which is equivalent to a reorganization plan under 
Chapter 11 in the US, take effects immediately after being approved by a meeting of creditors, 
i.e., there is not a court confirmation procedure in the UK corporate reorganizations.
50
  
Given the prevalent debtor-in-possession system in the US (under Chapter 11), it appears 
warranted for courts to supervise debtors by scrutinizing reorganization plans and to ensure 
that fairness and equity are not breached. In the UK, by contrast, with a professional and 
unbiased insolvency practitioner in charge acting as the administrator, it seems to be 
unnecessary for judges to make a second assessment by confirming reorganization plans.
51
  
In the light of these different approaches, the question must be asked as to why 
reorganization plans under the EBL 2006 should be approved by courts, especially given that 
there is already an independent, professional, court-appointed administrator who either 
supervises a debtor-in-possession or directly manages rescue issues.
52
 In fact, asking this 
question is to examine how far the court intervention in corporate reorganization can go. This 
is a more fundamental and profound question. Due to the scope of this thesis, more detailed 
debate cannot be expanded here. But this question deserves more researches in the future.  
3.1. Normal Confirmation Procedures 
In China’s corporate rescues, as noted, where the reorganization plan has been accepted 
by a majority (one half in number and two-thirds in claims) of each class of impaired parties, 
it has to be confirmed by the court. Article 86 of the EBL 2006 stipulates that the court will 
confirm the plan if it is in line with the EBL 2006, however, the key uncertainty here is that 
Article 86 does not specify the requirements whereby the court could rely to assess a 
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reorganization plan. It can be argued that courts might have a great deal of leeway to decide 
whether a reorganization plan could be confirmed or rejected.
53
    
In reality, the reorganization plan in all China’s existing corporate rescues has been 
confirmed by the court. It, thus, seems that Chinese courts were considerable lenient towards 
submitted reorganization plans. This can be juxtaposed to the low confirmation rate in the US. 
In the US Chapter 11s, it might not be easy to get courts’ blessings, as one empirical study 
reveals that the confirmation rate was usually lower than fifty per cent, i.e., over half of 
reorganization plans were eventually rejected by courts in the US.
54
  
The 100 per cent court confirmation rate in China might be ascribed to the following 
reasons.  
First, there were a very small number of troubled companies in China that could enter 
the corporate reorganization procedure under the EBL 2006. Because of the excessively 
narrowly-interpreted requirements for entry into the formal rescue procedure, the vast 
majority of troubled companies that could seek a formal rescue solution were in fact excluded 
from the formal rescue regime.
55
 It is, as a result, not surprising that the success of a small 
number of companies in the rescue process seemed to be guaranteed.  
Second, many corporate reorganizations in China were essentially pre-packs. In other 
words, the formal procedure was largely used to execute pre-packaged rescue agreements. It 
is noteworthy that, unlike pre-packaged rescues in the UK and the US,
56
 China’s pre-packs 
were court-involved, that is to say, courts joined pre-trial rescue negotiations. As noted before, 
for example, in Hangzhou’s Intermediate People’s Court, Zhejiang, during an ad hoc period 
before accepting a rescue filing, the court would summon main interest parties to discuss a 
potential reorganization proposal and would not formally accept the rescue filing unless a 
blueprint reorganization plan had been agreed.
57
 In the light of frequently used pre-packs in 
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which courts were also involved, it seemed to be attendant for courts to give the green light to 
these plans at the final stage.  
Third, almost automatic confirmation might also be because courts were deeply involved 
in rescue processes, including formulating reorganization plans. As reported in chapter 6, it 
was not uncommon that courts in China even participated in reorganization plan negotiations 
between major parties. So, to a large extent, courts’ objecting views would have been 
considered and absorbed in proposed reorganization plans at earlier stages. Courts, as a result, 
had no reason to reject a reorganization plan in which the judicial opinions had already been 
included. 
Although all reorganization plans were confirmed by courts in China, there are still some 
issues that need to be addressed. 
The first is that there is, during a confirmation process, no hearing in court where 
dissenting or objecting parties could raise their voices which may be critical for the court to 
make a sound judgment. Under Article 86 of the EBL 2006, after receiving a voted 
reorganization plan, the court will assess it behind closed doors, without listening to any 
objecting parties. 
Strictly speaking, under Article 64 of the EBL 2006, an individual creditor can request 
the court to revoke a reorganization plan on the grounds that it violates the law, but in reality 
such a motion has not, reportedly, filed by creditors. This might be partly because of the 
dilemma of collective action, and partly because of that creditors had no confidence of courts’ 
impartiality, given that the latter had been deeply involved in formulating reorganization 
plans.  
The second issue is that the court’s plan confirmation cannot be challenged before a 
higher court, i.e., there is no appeal procedure. The EBL 2006 is silent on whether an 
individual party has the right of appeal against a confirmation ruling.  Under Article 147 of 
the China Civil Procedure Law 1991, however, in principle, any decisions made by a court 
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Without an appeal procedure, the reorganization procedure might operate more 
efficiently, but efficiency must always be weighed against fairness. In view of local 
protectionism and the less-developed judicial independence in China, an appeal dealt with by 
a higher court seems to be quite necessary. To strike a fair balance, it can be contended that a 
compromise could be made. A court’s confirmation ruling will take effect immediately, but 
objecting parties can still have the right to appeal. The court’s confirmation ruling stands if 
the appeal is rejected, and equally the confirmation should be revoked if the appeal is allowed 
by the high court.  
3.2. Cram-Downs 
Sometimes a reorganization plan fails to be accepted by a majority of voters, so, the 
plan’s proponent may file a motion with the court requesting a cram-down.  
The first question that needs to be asked is whether a cram-down can be requested if the 
plan has been rejected by all classes of impaired parties in China’s corporate reorganizations. 
Article 87 of the EBL 2006 states that a cram-down may be requested in the case that the 
reorganization plan has been voted against by ‘some’ classes of impaired parties. Literally, 
this can be interpreted that a cram-down cannot be requested if the reorganization plan has 
been rejected by ‘all’ classes of impaired parties. It was argued by a Chinese judge that 
Article 87 should be interpreted as that a reorganization plan must be accepted by at least one 
class of impaired parties before it can be submitted for the cram-down consideration, and if 
the plan is rejected by all classes of voters, its proponent is not allowed to ask for a cram-
down.
59
 A recent reorganization case, however, gave an opposite interpretation.  
In November 2011, the Yinchuan Intermediate People’s Court, Ningxia, issued a cram-
down confirming the reorganization plan of Yin’guang’xia Co. Ltd., although the plan had 
been rejected by all classes of voters, including both creditors and shareholders. This cram-
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down ruling sent a very confusing message as to how to interpret Article 87. Unless there is a 
new judicial interpretation made by China’s Supreme People’s Court, such an ambiguity will 
remain. 
In China’s corporate reorganizations, under Article 85 of the EBL 2006, regardless of 
insolvency, a reorganization plan should also be voted by a class of shareholders if their 
equity is impaired by the plan.
60
 Allowing shareholders to vote on the reorganization plan 
may at least ensure their rights to participate in the rescue process; in practice, however, it 
produces many controversies which will be discussed later.
61
  
Unlike a normal and consensual confirmation procedure whereby there are no specific 
requirements for courts to confirm reorganization plans, a cram-down procedure has a set of 




A. Cram-downs in Practice   
As chapter 5 reported, the cram-down was issued by courts in forty-one per cent of the 
corporate reorganizations in China at national level. A closer examination revealed that it was 
shareholders who bore the brunt. More precisely, fifty-nine per cent of the cram-downs were 
to override shareholder objections; forty-one per cent of them were to silence unsecured 
creditors; and thirty-one per cent were to overrule dissenting secured creditors. It should be 
noted that these figures overlapped, as in some cases more than one class of impaired parties 
were forced to accept the reorganization plans.  
As noted shortly before, in most cases of using the cram-down, the main difficulty is 
how to deal with shareholder rights to vote on the reorganization plan, particularly in the 
context of the company’s insolvency. To many judges and insolvency practitioners, it is a 
thorny issue. The insolvency status of the company means that the shareholders’ equity in the 
company is worthless or has lost its real value; however the EBL 2006
63
 requires that 
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cancellation and even a reduction of the equity should be agreed by shareholders and is 
subject to a vote of them.
64
  
 In the early drafts of the EBL 2006, there were no provisions giving shareholders the 
right to vote on the reorganization plan, probably because of the consideration that the 
company in reorganization has already been insolvent. Shortly before the bill was passed by 
China’s People’s Congress in 2006, however, there was a motion raised by China’s Supreme 
People’s Court stating that shareholders should be allowed to vote on reorganization plans if 
their equity is impaired by the plan. This motion was accepted by the Congress and was 
included in the EBL 2006, but both the Congress and the Supreme Court did not explain the 
justification of this provision.
65
  
A year earlier, in 2005, Prof. Wang Liming, a leading Chinese scholar, argued that the 
reorganization plan must be voted by shareholders irrespective of the company’s insolvency, 
because they have a stake in the company.
66
 It is unknown whether China’s Supreme 
People’s Court’s such motion was influenced by Wang’s view. But Wang’s stance on this 
issue seems to be controversial.  
Undoubtedly, shareholders have a stake in the company, but their stake, in the form of 
equity, has no value at the time when the company becomes bankrupt. Where the company is 
in a bankruptcy reorganization procedure, it appears to be unjustifiable for shareholders, 
whose interests have been substantially extinguished due to the company’s insolvency and 
under the absolute priority rule, to join the decision making process which will reshape the 
company’s future.  
Admittedly, if the ‘stake’ is broadly defined, shareholders do have stake in the company: 
their names are still listed as company shareholders in the government company registration 
office, and they can even receive the residual value if creditors are paid in full by the end of 
the bankruptcy process. But, such a possibility will not realise in practice due to the 
company’s insolvency. Even, this broad definition gives rise to a further question on whether 
other stakeholders, such as employees, should also be allowed to vote on the reorganization 
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plan, because they also have a stake in the company. Obviously, this assertion has gone too 
far. Therefore, the notion of a ‘stake’ cannot be too broadly interpreted.  
The intention of China’s Supreme People’s Court to allow shareholders to vote on the 
reorganization plan appears to be understandable, since it aims to protect shareholders in 
bankruptcy reorganization processes. The Court, however, might not have chosen a proper 
means to accomplish this goal. Giving them a right to vote on the reorganization plan, as a 
result, seems to be excessively generous. But, the problem here is that it causes unnecessary 
delay. 
In practice, as reported, in anticipation of the application of the absolute priority rule, 
most shareholders in China neglected the notices which invited them to vote on the 
reorganization plans. This has undermined the efficiency of existing rescues. Apart from the 
delay caused by shareholders in the voting process, further delays were caused because 
shareholders refused, in many rescues cases, to cooperate in conveying the company’s 
ownership to the company’s buyer before government company registration agencies. Ideally, 
when a reorganization plan is being voted by creditors, shareholders should be informed and 
allowed to attend the meeting, but they could not be allowed to vote on the plan unless they 
can prove that the company is still solvent, or creditors have been substantially paid more 
than they claimed. 
B. The Cram-Down Tests 
As noted, there are three main tests for the court to assess a reorganization plan when a 
cram-down is requested. For the first creditor-best-interest test, it appears to be very easy. In 
China’s corporate rescues, it is normal practice for the administrator to hire a licensed auditor 
to prepare an auditor report in which both the liquidation and reorganization value of the 
company will be appraised. And in nearly all cases, creditors, in particular unsecured 
creditors, have been paid more than they were in hypothetical liquidation. But the liquidation 
value was based on a valuation rather than a genuine market sale, and this gave rise to a great 
deal of contention in practice.  
Like controversies of asset valuations when applying the absolute priority principle, 
there are similar problems caused by valuation inaccuracies when conducting the creditor-
best-interest test for the cram-downs. And the problems here may even be worsened because 
of conflicts of interest.  
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The first, and foremost, concern is the potential devaluation of companies’ assets. In 
theory, any bias of valuation could be minimized, if not eliminated, on the grounds that an 
auditor, usually an accounting firm, is hired by the independent administrator. As analysed 
before, the appointing process could enable the administrator to be free from the influence or 
manipulation of either creditors or shareholders. Thus, in principle, a valuation could be 
objective and trustworthy.  
As discussed earlier, however, administrators, who commission evaluators, may have a 
tendency to give as low a valuation as possible because of several reasons. First, the lower a 
valuation is, the easier the creditor-best-interest test is passed. Second, with a lower valuation, 
more buyers could be solicited because of the more attractive asking price. Although, as 
noted, there is no strong evidence that there is any collusion between the administrator and 
the evaluator, the alleged devaluation has indeed caused many disputes.
67
 In the 
reorganization of Wugu Daochang Food Co. Ltd. Beijing in 2008, for example, the 
administrator was questioned by many creditors on asset valuations. In particular, they 
contended why the company’s trademark ‘Wugu Daochang’, a national household name, was 
only assessed at the price of RMB 1 million,
68
 however, months ago, a buyer was willing to 
buy it for RMB 10 million, ten times the evaluated price.
69
 The devaluation was also 
frequently disputed by creditors in other corporate rescue cases.  
On the face of it, thus, creditors seem to be better paid because the creditor-best-interest 
test is passed; however, in substance, they may be harmed. In other words, the creditor-best-
interest test fails to accomplish its goal to defend creditors’ interests in reorganizations.  
The second is the fair and equitable test. Presumably, this test centres on the pari passu 
and absolute priority principles, as the US Chapter 11 does;
70
 however, it may be premature 
to jump to the conclusion that these two principles are what the fair and equitable test is 
concerned with in China’s corporate reorganizations. Serious concerns are raised regarding 
whether these two principles are really included in this test.  
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One can argue that the pari passu principle is included in the fair and equitable test in 
the EBL 2006, because its Article 87 stipulates that voters, mainly creditors, within the same 
class must be treated fairly if a cram-down is sought, but no further clarification is given to 
specify what constitutes ‘fairly’ under such circumstances. This contrasts with the plain 
description of value distribution in liquidations wherein Article 113 of the EBL 2006 clearly 
demonstrates that creditors in the same class must be paid pari passu. If it is believed that 
equality is at the heart of fairness, the pari passu principle must be included in the fair and 
equitable test. But, the implementation of the rescue law in China does not seem to support 
this assertion.  
In 2007, there was, for example, a high-profile case in China, the reorganization of 
Chuangzhou Chemical Products Co. Ltd. Hebei. In this case, a cram-down was imposed by 
the Chuangzhou Intermediate People’s Court, Hebei Province, overriding the unsecured 
creditors’ objection to the reorganization plan, although the pari passu principle was 
breached in this plan.
71
 The most striking point of this case is that the cram-down was, 
according to Prof. Li Shuguang, agreed in advance by China’s Supreme People’s Court.72 In 
other words, the pari passu principle is probably not recognised and included in the fair and 
equitable test, because China’s Supreme People’s Court has answered this question.  
After the Chuangzhou case, such an opposite understanding was enhanced by other cases. 
In 2009, for example, in the reorganization of Guangming Furniture Co. Ltd. Heilongjiang, a 




Thus, in view of both the statutory definition and the practice, there are two 
contradictory explanations. The first is that the pari passu principle is included in the fair and 
equitable test, and the problem is that Chinese law courts breached the law when imposing 
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cram-downs. The second explanation is that it is not, this thesis’ understanding of Article 87 
of the EBL 2006 is wrong. Nevertheless, many uncertainties remain.  
As far as the absolute priority principle is concerned, under Article 87 of the EBL 2006, 
literally, the absolute priority principle is included in the fair and equitable test, because 
Article 87 states that the payment ranking, namely the absolute priority principle, articulated 
in Article 113 (for liquidations) should be complied with in a reorganization plan if the plan 
seeks for a cram-down.
74
 Unfortunately, in reality, the absolute priority norm is neglected by 
many courts when issuing the cram-downs.  
In listed company reorganizations, as mentioned before, because China’s Supreme 
People’s Court’s decree75 has ‘overruled’ the absolute priority norm enshrined in the EBL 
2006, the cram-down was frequently used by the courts, although the absolute priority 
principle was relaxed. For instance, in the reorganization of Baoshuo Co. Ltd., Hebei, a listed 
company, in 2007, the deviation from the absolute priority principle in the reorganization 
plan did not prevent the court from issuing a cram-down that overrode the unsecured 
creditors’ objection.76 It seems that this cram-down is a breach of Article 87 of the EBL 2006.  
In non-listed company reorganizations, although a cram-down was occasionally used, 
the fair and equitable test was still not adequately conducted by courts. For example, in the 
reorganization of Fenghua Group Co. Ltd. Guangdong, a non-listed company, in 2007, a 
cram-down was sanctioned by the court, although unsecured creditors received twenty-two 
per cent of their claims, and all previous equity was kept intact.
77
   
Therefore, according to Article 87 of the EBL 2006, the absolute priority doctrine is 
included in the fair and equitable test, but in practice many courts failed to follow such rules. 
It is largely a matter of the less-developed rule of law in China, which is beyond the scope of 
this thesis. 
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The third is the feasibility test.
78
 This means that a reorganization plan should be feasible 
or have a high probability to be successfully executed, if it needs a cram-down to survive. 
The feasibility test is elaborated in Article 87 of the EBL 2006, under which a company’s 
business restructuring plan must be feasible if the reorganization plan’s proponent requests a 
cram-down.
79
    
In testing the feasibility of a reorganization plan, it seems that China’s courts do lack the 
proper guidance and experience to fulfil this task.
80
 As chapter 6 reported, in fact, courts did 
not conduct the feasibility test, since, as noted in Zhejiang, the feasibility test was largely 
dependent upon the involvement of local government business development departments. 
The inability of judges to undertake the feasibility test would be because of two reasons as 
follows.  
The first reason is that there is no specific guidance in the EBL 2006 that judges can use 
to apply the feasibility test. Article 87 of the EBL 2006 simply states that a plan must be 
feasible, but there is no detailed instruction. 
The second reason is that judges are professionally unable to test a reorganization plan’s 
feasibility, because it is a commercial judgement in nature. Judges are legal experts, and it is 
beyond their expertise to make a commercial judgement regarding whether a business 
restructuring project is likely to succeed. Even in the US where there is a relatively mature 
bankruptcy court system, regarding the feasibility of a reorganization plan, judges 
predominantly defer to the debtors’ own commercial judgements. 81  In other words, 
professional bankruptcy judges in the US are also unable to undertake the feasibility test of 
reorganization plans. This is not what judges are capable to do.  
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In Germany, perhaps, because of a lack of expertise of judges in this respect, its 
corporate rescue law does not require judges to assess a reorganization plan’s feasibility, and 
this issue is left to debtors and creditors themselves to decide.
82
   
Although the feasibility test is mainly a technical issue, some common sense can still be 
applied. For example, as analysed in chapter 2 (literature review), a cash injection is likely to 
be at the heart of a viable reorganization plan. The credibility of obtaining further financing 
would be one of the main criteria which could be used by the court to assess whether a plan is 
feasible.
83
 At the same time, creditors, especially banks or main suppliers, may have the 
knowledge about the feasibility of a reorganization plan, because they have gained much 
insight into the company’s sustainability over long-term business relationships. Courts, thus, 
could ask them for some valuable suggestions.
84
  
The cram-downs reflect strong state intervention in corporate rescues; therefore, certain 
remedies should be available for overruled parties to seek fairness and equity.  
C. Remedies 
Under Article 87 of the EBL 2006, it seems that a cram-down is final, as it does not state 
that an overridden party can appeal to a higher court, but equally it does state that an appeal is 
not allowed. However, Article 4 of the EBL 2006 stipulates that China’s civil procedural law 
is applicable in the case where there are not specific provisions regulating bankruptcy issues. 
Thus, given there is no specific rule in the EBL 2006, in theory, an overruled party can appeal 
against a cram-down by relying on Article 147 of China’s Civil Procedures Law 1991.  
Allowing objecting parties to appeal the cram-down may also be consistent with the 
international practice. In the US, for example, its bankruptcy law makes it clear that if a 
cram-down is imposed it may be still be revoked by the court if objecting parties can prove 
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that the reorganization plan involves fraud or dishonesty.
85
 In other words, there is a similar 
appeals procedure for disgruntled parties to seek remedies in the US.  
In the UK, technically, there is no cram-down confirmation mechanism. An 
administrator-proposed reorganization plan will take effect immediately after it has been 
accepted by a majority of creditors. Dissenting parties, however, can still file a motion 
requesting a court to revoke a reorganization plan if they believe they have been unfairly 
prejudiced in the plan.
86
  
In Germany, a de facto cram-down is also possible,
87
 and under such circumstances, an 
aggrieved party is also given a right of appeal to a higher court.
88
  
The specific approaches for remedies may vary in these three jurisdictions, but one point 
is common: there is always a procedure for dissenting parties to seek relief.  
Although it is also believed by some Chinese scholars
89
 that there should be a procedural 
remedy for dissenting parties to appeal to a high court under China’s Civil Procedures Law 
1991 against a cram-down. In reality, up to the time of writing, there have not been any such 
reported appeals in China. In practice, this right to appeal is virtually denied by courts.  
In sum, in confirming reorganization plans, China’s courts seemed to discharge their 
duties very efficiently, as it is not uncommon for a plan to be confirmed within days of being 
submitted. To confirm reorganization plans, courts frequently impose cram-downs. But, the 
main worry is that three basic tests were not well conducted by many Chinese courts.  
As for the creditor-best-interest test, it was seemingly applied in all reorganizations, but 
great unfairness might have arisen because of undervaluations of company assets. With 
regard to the fair and equitable test, the pari passu and absolute priority principles were often 
neglected by courts when deciding to impose cram-downs. Concerning the feasibility test, 
Chinese courts were actually unable to apply this test because of a lack of knowledge and 
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experience. One serious concern arises as to whether dissenting parties in cram-downs should 
be given a right to appeal in China’s corporate reorganizations. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
Although not widely used, China’s newly-established corporate reorganization regime 
has demonstrated its strength in preserving going concern value of troubled companies. In 
most cases, the going concern value has been preserved by preventing troubled companies 
from being piecemeal liquidated. Whether there is a going concern sale rescue or a traditional 
rescue, the integration of troubled companies’ hard assets, human resources and business 
networks have largely remained unbroken. This is exactly what a corporate reorganization 
regime aims to accomplish. The main challenge, however, is that there are too many going 
concern sale rescues, and ideally, attention should be redirected to promoting more traditional 
rescues in China.  
As for the third research question of this thesis concerning value distribution in China’s 
corporate rescues, generally, the main problems here are raised over listed company rescues. 
In listed company rescues, the absolute priority principle has been routinely put aside, and the 
pari passu principle has also been largely sidelined. 
In spite of controversies arising when applying absolute priority in corporate rescues, 
arguably, any deviation from this principle should, first, be based on the consent of 
disadvantaged parties and, second, aim to enhance the viability of rescues. For these ends, it 
seemed that the deviation from absolute priority in China’s listed company reorganizations 
was questionable, because it was mainly made for political reasons, i.e., the government 
sought to prioritise the maintenance of social stability rather than to increase the feasibility of 
rescues.  
Adjusting the pari passu principle in most listed company reorganizations occurred for 
two purposes. One was to give a higher recovery rate to creditors who were individuals 
because of the policy objective of maintaining social stability in China. The second was to 
offer a higher return to small creditors in exchange for their votes. This might effectively 
solve potential holdout problems caused by smaller creditors and make rescues more efficient. 
But the bottom line is that in making adjustments to the pari passu principle, this should also 
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be agreed by disadvantaged parties; this begs the question regarding how courts will 
safeguard the basic rules when confirming reorganization plans.  
Concerning the fourth research question of this thesis on court confirmation of 
reorganization plans, to a large extent, many courts were unable to fulfil their roles to ensure 
that the basic bankruptcy principles are applied in reorganization plans. In all existing 
reorganizations, there was no reorganization plan which has been rejected by the courts. But 
this did not mean that all reorganization plans were fairly and equitably made; instead, this 
might rather reflect the weaknesses of courts in playing their roles in assessing reorganization 
plans. 
For the normal confirmation process, it seems that the use of court confirmation has 
largely been to satisfy a formality, since courts were often very quick to approve a plan of 
reorganisation. But the key concern was raised when the cram-down was issued. The cram-
down was frequently imposed, but many Chinese courts have not fared well in applying three 
tests when assessing whether a cram-down can be lawfully delivered. In particular, as for the 
first of these, the creditor-best-interest test, because of widely alleged under-valuation of 
assets, this test might only be superficially passed in the reorganization plan, but creditors 
might, in substance, be victimised. Regarding the second fair and equitable test, the absolute 
priority and pari passu principles have usually been neglected by many courts, and this might 
have very negative effects on creditors’ certainty and confidence. In relation to the third of 
feasibility test, it virtually remains a dead letter in the statute, because China’s courts were 
technically unable to conduct this test.  
In short, most China’s courts have not fulfilled their roles in enhancing the goals of the 
corporate reorganization regime when confirming the plans of reorganization. Many 
problems were actually caused by the less developed rule of law in China. 
Up until now, all four research questions have been discussed. The next chapter will 
review these four research questions and examine the extent to which these questions have 
been adequately answered. Finally, some policy suggestions regarding this area of law will 






After coming into force in 2007, China’s new corporate rescue regime enshrined in the 
EBL 2006 has in general not been widely used; however, in spite of the small number of 
corporate reorganizations, many lessons have been learned from the first five years’ 
implementation with potential implications for the future. 
Three difficulties materially hamper the application of China’s new corporate rescue law. 
The first difficulty arises from the fact that the rule of law in China is still very weak.
1
 The 
new corporate rescue law was frequently either neglected or breached by state agencies; as a 
result, companies could not build confidence in using this new law. The second difficulty is 
that Chinese courts were not prepared to handle corporate rescues. Judges were not 
adequately trained, and more importantly, judicial powers in China have been too weak to 
manage corporate rescues. The third difficulty is that the rescue law itself has undermined the 
inclinations of relevant parties to use it, especially in the case of debtors. Without the active 
involvement of debtors, the rescue law is considerably undermined.  
Nevertheless, although it has not been frequently used, the new rescue regime has shown 
its strength in preserving the going concern value of troubled companies, as reflected in 
substantially increased creditor recovery rates in existing corporate reorganizations in China.  
  To conclude this thesis, the remainder of this chapter is divided into 4 Parts. (i) Part 2 
recalls the research questions raised in the first chapter, assessing the extent to which these 
questions have been answered. (ii) Part 3 highlights main, significant findings of this thesis. 
(iii) Part 4 suggests the potential for further reforms. (iv) Part 5 concludes the analysis.  
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2. ANSWERING RESEARCH QUESTIONS IN THE THESIS 
The four research questions raised in chapter 1 are summarized below. In fact, some 
answers are more like comments, given the complicated practice of the law in this area. 
Rather than being seen as ‘scientific proof’ of propositions in the thesis, the materials 
presented here provide strong evidence in support of arguments presented. 
2.1. Is China’s New Corporate Reorganization Procedure Frequently Used? 
In view of the small number of corporate rescue cases reported in this thesis, the answer 
is simple: the new corporate rescue procedure was not frequently used. In particular, it was 
only occasionally used to rehabilitate large troubled companies. Even the vast majority of 
China’s courts have never accepted corporate reorganization filings in the first five-year 
period after the EBL 2006 took effect. That is to say, most troubled companies were denied 
the chance to use this new law to seek relief.  
The current situation could be ascribed to several factors: first, it is because of the 
unwillingness of China’s courts to handle corporate rescue cases. In practice, courts were 
quite cautious about accepting corporate rescue filings.
2
 China’s judiciary has been too weak 
to manage corporate rescues by itself.
 3
 Meanwhile, the less-developed condition of the rule 
of law in China has further dampened the inclination of courts to engage with corporate 
rescue issues.
4
 In addition, the oversimplified and vaguely-worded EBL 2006 could not hold 
courts accountable if they refused to comply with the new rescue law, especially regarding 
accepting corporate rescue filings. 
Second, apart from courts, debtors have been deterred from voluntarily filing for 
reorganization in China; this is because the commencement of a rescue procedure means that 
the old management would be automatically replaced by an administrator, and that all the 
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interests of debtors would be cancelled according to the absolute priority rule. As discussed 
in earlier chapters, one of the key concerns of debtors is that they are afraid of exposing 
company books to outsiders. More importantly, in the absence of a wrongful trading 
mechanism in China, debtors are emboldened to continue trading until it is too late to bring 
troubled companies back from the brink.  
Third, creditors in China have lacked both the ability and the willingness to file for a 
debtors’ reorganization in court. In general, creditors do not have access to debtors’ 
information so that a feasible rescue proposal is unlikely to be made by them. Meanwhile, 
creditors generally prefer an individual debt enforcement system to a collective bankruptcy 
process.  
Consequently, deadlock has usually ensued; on the one hand, courts have turned their 
backs on corporate reorganization filings; on the other hand, both debtors and creditors have 
been unwilling and unable to file for reorganization in court.  
2.2. Who is Primarily in Control of China’s Corporate Reorganizations? 
When drafting the new law, China’s lawmakers probably sought to include a modified 
debtor-in-possession system in the new corporate reorganization regime;
5
 however, in most 
of the existing corporate rescue cases, it was the administrator-in-possession approach that 
was used.  
As argued before, the administrator-in-possession system may do more harm than good 
in a corporate reorganization regime, since it not only leads to the reluctance of debtors to file 
for early and voluntary rescues, it also causes the loss of going concern value of troubled 
companies because of the removal of the old management.  
Although, in most of China’s corporate rescues, it was the administrator-in-possession 
system that has been used, interference of government cannot be underestimated, especially 
when the administrator was a local-government-organized liquidation committee. Some 
scholars have argued that the new corporate rescue regime has been politicized by local 
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government so as to serve the local economy and to maintain local social stability in China.
6
 
This might have further exacerbated the downside of the administrator-in-possession 
approach in China’s corporate rescues.  
2.3. How is Preserved Value in Corporate Rescues Distributed? 
One of the many advantages of enforcing China’s new corporate rescue regime is that it 
has considerably preserved going concern value of financially troubled companies. Although 
not widely used, the new corporate rescue law has shown such strength. The average 
unsecured creditor recovery rate in rescues amounts to thirty-four per cent of their pre-
bankruptcy claims; this is far higher than the less than the ten per cent in liquidations in 
China. Corporate reorganization has provided a valuable alternative to liquidation.  
As to how preserved value in rescues is distributed, this thesis has focused on the two 
main distributional norms, namely the pari passu and absolute priority rules.  
To the pari passu rule, it was found that it was applied in seventy-four per cent of 
existing corporate reorganizations in China. A closer examination has revealed that this rule 
was more likely to be relaxed in listed company reorganizations; in particular, forty-three per 
cent of listed company reorganizations have relaxed the pari passu rule; by contrast, such a 
departure only happened in fifteen per cent of non-listed company rescues.  
Two main aims were identified that explained the intention of deviating from the pari 
passu rule. In most of the deviations , the pari passu principle was adjusted so as to buy votes 
from small creditors, since the number of their votes was material in gaining support for the 
passage of reorganization plans. In other cases, this principle was relaxed so as to facilitate 
maintenance of social stability, as usually, it was individual creditors who were paid in full so 
as to prevent them from protesting collectively.  
For the absolute priority principle, the departure from this principle was found in fifty-
three per cent of China’s corporate reorganizations. More specifically, in listed company 
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reorganizations, there was an automatic deviation from this rule because of the decree issued 
by China’s Supreme People’s Court; by contrast, such departures only occurred in fifteen per 
cent of non-listed company reorganizations.  
The departure from the absolute priority principle shared one common feature with the 
departure from the pari passu rule; this was the intent to maintain social stability. In listed 
company reorganizations, general public shareholders were shielded from the absolute 
priority rule, because the government was worried of the potential threat to social stability, 
given that there were usually large numbers of general public shareholders. 
2.4. Is Court Confirmation of Reorganization Plans Adequate to Fulfil Policy Goals? 
The thesis found that confirming reorganization plans by courts was largely to fulfil a 
formality, partly because courts were deeply involved in composing these plans. Put 
differently, the courts appeared to have lost their neutrality in approving these reorganization 
plans.  
More importantly, when imposing cram-downs, many Chinese courts superficially 
applied the creditor-best-interest test, failed to conduct the fair and equitable test, and unable 
to carry out the feasibility test.   
Thus, China’s courts have not fared as expected to accomplish the declared policy goals 
of protecting creditors and safeguarding some basic legal rules in China’s corporate 
reorganization cases.  
3. MAJOR FINDINGS OF THIS THESIS 
(i). Before the passage of the EBL 2006, China’s courts needed government permission 
before starting a corporate bankruptcy procedure. After the EBL 2006, such permission was 
dispensed with, but courts need government support to commence a corporate bankruptcy 
procedure. Although government permission was, literally, replaced by government support, 
the situation wherein China’s courts have felt unable to cope with corporate bankruptcy 
issues by themselves has not radically changed.  
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(ii). Because of difficulties in opening bankruptcy proceedings in court, using a 
liquidation petition as a powerful debt collection tool is generally not available for creditors 
in China. As a result, in the absence of liquidation pressure from creditors, troubled 
companies in China have no incentive to voluntarily enter a corporate reorganization 
procedure.  
(iii). Because there is no effective corporate bankruptcy system in China, ninety-five per 
cent of controllers of bankrupt companies in China choose to ‘walk away’, without using 
formal bankruptcy procedures to deal with outstanding debts.  
(iv). In existing corporate reorganizations in China, although there are two options of 
control, the administrator-in-possession model was preferred and was used in seventy-four 
per cent of cases, whilst the debtor-in-possession model was used in the remaining cases. 
More importantly, nearly half of administrators were appointed from local government 
organized liquidation committees. 
(v). China’s new corporate reorganization regime has shown its strength in preserving 
the going concern value of troubled companies, as it has increased the average debt recovery 
rate for unsecured creditors from below ten per cent in the case of liquidations to thirty-four 
per cent in the case of reorganizations.  
(vi). As for value distribution, in listed company reorganizations, the absolute priority 
principle was routinely bypassed because China’s Supreme People’s Court has given the 
green light to this, and the application of the pari passu principle has been relaxed in forty-
three per cent of these cases. In non-listed company reorganizations, by contrast, these two 
principles were largely complied with.  
(vii). It has been a formality for courts to confirm reorganization plans. Given the heavy 
presence of government in rescue procedures, China’s courts have never rejected 
reorganization plans, i.e., all reorganization plans were eventually confirmed. Cram-downs 
have been imposed in forty-one per cent of existing corporate reorganizations in China.  
4. THE POTENTIAL FOR FUTURE REFORM 
In regard to establishing an effective corporate rescue regime, China is still in a state of 
transition; the experiences of the last five years have been somewhat experimental in nature. 
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Given the importance of the corporate rescue regime, however, especially in case of a 
financial crisis, some reforms seem to be necessary for China to further develop its corporate 
rescue system. 
First, China’s current judicial service regarding corporate bankruptcy issues should be 
substantially improved and strengthened. As noted above, China’s corporate reorganization 
regime is strictly court-centred; however, given that courts are quite hesitant in accepting 
corporate rescue filings, it seems necessary to remove obstacles encountered by courts. The 
underlying cause of the courts’ hesitation seems to be the lack of judicial independence. 
There may well still be a long way to go regarding the development of fully-fledged judicial 
independence in China,
7
 since this will require political reforms.  
Pragmatically, however, the lessons gained from experience in some local areas may be 
worth applying more broadly in order to solve this problem. In one pioneering city, 
Hangzhou, the capital city of the economically advanced province of Zhejiang, the local 
intermediate court asked the local Communist Party Committee to establish an ad hoc co-
ordinating panel so as to support local courts in handling rescue cases. The panel included 
several relevant governmental departments, namely the business development service, the 
financial regulating authority, the police, the revenue authority, the land management 
department and the labour and pension service.
8
 This panel was responsible for assisting and 
backing local courts to process corporate rescues.  
Establishing such a co-ordinating panel would be very useful in encouraging courts to 
fully open the door to accepting corporate rescue filings; this is because it has at least 
overcome two main problems. First, the court’s fear of being negatively assessed in cases 
where a mass petition was brought by individual small creditors (such as employees) would 
be solved; this is because the Communist Party local committee and the government were 
also be involved in the process through their involvement with the panel. Second, and more 
importantly, this panel could effectively tackle the lack of cooperation from government 
departments, because nearly all relevant departments would have been directly required to 
participate in corporate rescue processes.  
                                                 
 
7
 See generally Liebman (n 4) 620. Also see generally, Randall Peerenboom, (ed), Judicial Independence 
in China, (Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
8
 Hangzhou Intermediate People’s Court, ‘Report on Corporate Reorganization’ (Hangzhou Zhejiang 
China, 5 January 2010, in Chinese).  
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Admittedly, this solution may seem to be myopic but is pragmatic in the context of 
China’s current social and judicial development. Such a panel may even fill the gap created 
by the absence of a bankruptcy administrative service in China.  
In many developed jurisdictions, bankruptcy issues at large are handled jointly by the 
court system, by insolvency practitioners and, more commonly, by the government’s 
bankruptcy administrative service. For example, in Britain, in addition to a group of 
insolvency practitioners standing beside the court system, the British central government has 
created the Insolvency Service, an executive agency of the Department of Business 
Innovation and Skills, to assist courts in dealing with bankruptcy issues.
9
 Similarly, the US 
has its own Trustee Program, which is part of the Department of Justice of the federal 
government, overseeing and regulating bankruptcy issues.
10
 But, in China, there is no 
administrative agency which bears responsibility on behalf of the government for dealing 
with bankruptcies. Such a panel might be an alternative mechanism that can be used to fill 
this gap.  
Opening the door of courts is essential but is not enough. Consideration should also be 
given to encouraging rescue petitions filed by debtors and sometimes by creditors.  
  Second, developing a debtor-friendly corporate rescue regime would be a crucial step 
in the right direction in China. As discussed earlier, debtors are rescue-averse because they 
fear for losing control and exposing their potential wrongdoings to third parties if a formal 
corporate reorganization procedure is entered. Under the current legal framework in China, it 
is desirable for a debtor to be allowed to automatically remain in control if it voluntarily files 
for reorganization. This is in line with Article 73 of the EBL 2006, although the court can 
appoint an insolvency practitioner as the supervisor monitoring the debtor-in-possession. If 
this is clarified in this way, the uncertainty over the use of the debtor-in-possession model 
may be eliminated, and as a result, it may tremendously encourage debtors to use the formal 
rescue regime. To prevent potential abuse, creditors should be empowered to appoint a 
trustee to exercise control over the company in the event that the company’s failure is caused 
                                                 
 
9
 The Insolvency Service, ‘Insolvency Service Framework Document’ (May 2013) 
<http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/insolvency/docs/about%20us/frameworkdocumentapril2013.pdf> accessed 12 
August 2013.  
10
 The United States Department of Justice, ‘The United States Trustee Program’ 
<http://www.justice.gov/ust/eo/ust_org/index.htm> accessed 12 August 2013.  
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by fraud or dishonesty; in other words, a fair balance should be struck between creditor and 
debtor.  
Granted, that a debtor-in-possession may not be sufficient to persuade debtors to file for 
reorganization, because this only gives control to debtors, they may receive nothing in the 
rescue processes under the absolute priority rule. Therefore debtors could be rewarded with 
some value in exchange for their experience and information. This gives rise to the possibility 
of deviating from the absolute priority principle in rescues. In this regard, China could learn 
something from Chapter 11 in the US, where deviations from absolute priority are possible 
but are subject to creditors’ consent. Put differently, creditors should be given the option to 
invite debtors to join rescue processes and even share something with them, if the debtors’ 
involvement could increase recoveries for creditors.  
Overall, to induce debtors to voluntarily file for reorganization, the debtor-in-possession 
approach is complementary to deviating from absolute priority in incentivizing debtors to 
take early and effective rescue action. But we should not forget the key role played by 
creditors in pressuring debtors to seek bankruptcy protection.  
As has been learnt from Chapter 11 in the US, in spite of the debtor-in-possession model, 
most voluntary Chapter 11 filings arise because of imminent liquidation threats from 
creditors.
11
 This suggests that the current debt enforcement system in China must be 
strengthened.
12
 In particular, creditors should be genuinely empowered to file a liquidation 
petition; otherwise a voluntary corporate rescue filing is still unlikely.  
In brief, in order to reform and improve China’s corporate reorganization regime, a 
regular and routine administrative service provided by government should be available. In the 
meantime, some pro-debtor rescue mechanisms, such as a debtor-in-possession system and 
the conditional deviation from the absolute priority rule, should be rationally used in the 
interests of both creditors and debtors.  
                                                 
 
11
 Lynn M LoPucki, ‘The Debtor in Full Control – Systems Failure under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy 
Code?’ (1983) 57 American Bankruptcy Law Journal 99, 100. 
12
 See generally Donald C Clarke, ‘Power and Politics in the Chinese Court System: the Enforcement of 




In answering four research questions, this thesis has sought to offer some insight over 
China’s newly-established corporate rescue law both in the books and in action. Some 
significant points made in this thesis are worth reiterating. First, the relatively infrequent use 
of China’s new corporate reorganization regime can be attributed to a range of factors, but the 
deep-rooted problem is that China has a less-developed approach to the rule of law.
13
 In the 
meantime, the prevalence of the administrator-in-possession system in China’s existing 
formal rescue processes considerably deters debtors from seeking a bankruptcy rescue 
solution. In addition, there is too much political intervention which affects value distribution 
in China’s formal corporate rescues, especially in the case of the reorganization of listed 
companies. 
Some future research questions are also raised. First, given that China has committed 
itself to building a profession of insolvency practitioners, it remains largely unexplored as to 
how these insolvency practitioners have contributed to the efficiency and fairness of Chinese 
corporate reorganization procedures.  Secondly, as the formal rescue threshold is still too 
high in China, the vast majority of corporate rescues may still remain informal. Little 
research has been conducted on how these informal rescues take place and on what the main 
difficulties of these informal rescues are. Further academic research in these areas could 
prove very fruitful. 
 
                                                 
 
13
 See generally Eric W Orts, ‘The Rule of Law in China’ (2001) 34 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational 
Law 34. See also Randall Peerenboom (ed), Judicial Independence in China: Lessons for Global Rule of Law 




CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS ACCEPTED IN CHINA 
(1 JUNE 2007- 30 NOVEMBER 2010) 
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06 May 2010  
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Private  Beijing  Early 2009  








Private  Beijing 21 Apr 2007  
33 Xingchan 
Real Estate  
(兴昌博达) 






















Private  Dongguan 
Guangdong 


































15 Jan 2010  


















































13 Aug 2008 Converted to 
Liquidation 











Private  Shenzhen 
Guangdong  
09 Aug 2007  
47  Zhonggu 
Sugar 
(中谷糖业) 
Private  Zhanjiang 
Guangdong  






Private  Daqing 
Heilongjiang 









Private  Zhuzhou 
Hunan  
23 Jul 2010 Consolidated 
with Two 
Subsidiaries  






























Privatized  Nantong 
Jiangsu 







Private  Suzhou 
Jiangsu 
25 Dec 2009  
 258 
 
































Wuxi Jiangsu  17 Jul 2008 Failed to 
Enforce the 
Plan 
60 Defa Dye 
(德发印染) 
 




Private  Xinghua 
Jiangsu  




Private  Xuzhou 
Jiangsu  




Privatized  Yangzhou 
Jiangsu 






















Privatized  Tongchuan 
Shaanxi 



















Private  Jiangyou 
Sichuan 
03 Feb 2009  
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Private  Kunming 
Yunnan 
10 Mar 2008  
72 Dadi Paper 
(大地纸业) 
Private  Hangzhou 
Zhejiang 




Private  Hangzhou 
Zhejiang 






Private  Hangzhou 
Zhejiang  




Private  Hangzhou 
Zhejiang  




Privatized  Hangzhou 
Zhejiang 




Private  Hangzhou 
Zhejiang 
15 Jul 2010  
78 Nongji 
(杭州农机) 
Private  Hangzhou 
Zhejiang 
15 Jul 2010  




Private  Hangzhou 
Zhejiang 




Private  Hangzhou 
Zhejiang 




















Privatized  Shaoxing 
Zhejiang  
01 Sep 2009  
84 Yalun Paper 
(亚伦纸业) 
Privatized  Quzhou 
Zhejiang  





Private  Zhoushan 
Zhejiang  




Private  Shaoxing 
Zhejiang  





Sequence Company Ownership Court Acceptance Miscellaneous  
87 Jiande Steel 
(建德镍合
金) 
Privatized  Hangzhou 
Zhejiang  
09 Oct 2010  
 
Notes:  
1. Taking into account twenty-four affiliated companies mentioned in the Table, there were 111 companies 
that entered the corporate reorganization procedure in China between 1 June 2007 and 30 November 2010.  
2. Within these 111 reorganized companies, there were twenty-nine companies that were listed in either 
the Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchanges (26.13%). 
3. There were thirty-nine reorganized companies which were state-owned, state-controlled or state-
participated out of all 111 companies (35.14%). And there were nine privatized companies (8.11%). Within 
these 111 companies, there were forty-four private companies (39.64%) and nineteen foreign invested 
companies (17.12%).  
 4. There were eight companies whose reorganization procedures ended in liquidation, which means that 
the failure rate was only 7.21% (eight out of 111). More specifically, four companies failed to propose 
reorganization plans, and the remaining four companies failed to enforce the confirmed reorganization plans. It 
is noteworthy that six out of all eight failed companies were foreign invested, and none of these eight companies 
had the direct state links, i.e., they were not state-owned, state-controlled or state-participated. 
5. The Trend of Corporate Reorganization Acceptance in China 
 
6. Most of the corporate reorganizations took place in the economically developed areas in China. The 
chart below gives a glimpse as to provincial differences in accepting corporate reorganization in China. There 
were no reported reorganizations in nearly one-third of China’s provinces. Probably, there were really no formal 
corporate rescues dealt with in these regions, such as Tibet and Anhui which are not well economically 





















The Trend of Corporate Reorganization Acceptance in 
China 
 (1 June 2007 to 30 November 2010)  



















































































































The Number of Companies in Rescue in Individual Provinces of China  
 (1 June 2007 to 30 November 2010)   
Source: Zinian Zhang's PhD Data Collection at Durham University in 2010
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 APPENDIX 2  
CORPORATE REORGANIZATION PETITIONS REJECTED IN 
CHINA 
(1 JUNE 2007- 30 NOVEMBER 2010) 
 













2  China 
Kejian 
(科健股份) 












Listed  Creditor  04 Feb 
2010 




n    
4 East Star 
Airlines 
(东星航空) 

















UNSECURED CREDITOR RECOVERY RATES IN CHINESE 
CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS 
















Yes  1,334,096.900 10%  
2 Stellar Mega 
Union 
(星美联合) 




Yes   2,158,314,805 21.77% Combination of 
Recovery Rates 
4 Hualong Group 
(广东华龙) 




Yes  1,265,300,068 20%  
6 Suntek Tech 
(新太科技) 





No  1,194,722,631 50.44% Combination of 
Recovery Rates 
8 Hebei Baoshuo 
(宝硕股份) 





Yes  5,091,953,300 14.28% Combination of 
Recovery Rates 
10 Dixian Textile 
(帝贤纺织) 





Yes  381,700,073 18% Combination of 
Recovery Rates 





















Yes  423,812,264 17.05% Combination of 
Recovery Rates 
14 Tianyi Science  
(天颐科技) 
Yes  N/A 10.07%  
15 Lanbao Science 
(兰宝科技) 








Yes  547,438,292 10%  
18 Jinhua Group 
(锦化化工) 





Yes  1,143,000,000 18%  
20 Qinling Cement 
(秦岭水泥) 
Yes  763,967,576 50% (20% in cash 





Yes  28,898,990 100%  
22 Jiufa Food 
（九发股份） 





Yes  2,240,374,233 14%  
24 Haina Sci-Tech 
(浙江海纳) 






Yes  2,162,375,585 30.05% Combination of 
Recovery Rates 
26  Powerise Tech 
（创智科技） 




























No  400,000,000 15.75%  
30 Xianju Hospital 
(仙琚医院) 
 
No  22,000,000 41%  
31 Xingchan Real 
Estate  
(兴昌博达) 
No  344,297,105 100%  
32 Xiamen Star 
(厦门星星) 
No (F) 95,820,000 16% Combination of 
Recovery Rates 
33 Fenghua Group 
(风华集团) 




















No  N/A 100%  
39 Zhonggu Sugar 
(中谷糖业) 






No  240,341,136 30%  
41 Taizinai Milk 
(太子奶) 
No  947,000,000 7.99%  
42 Haiji Lujian 
(海吉氯碱) 





No (F) 192,419,018 20.82% Combination of 
Recovery Rates 





















No (F) 351,994,490 100%  
46 Yaxing Blocks 
(雅新线路板) 




No (F) 600,000,000 40%  
48 Defa Dye 
(德发印染) 
Yes  N/A 50.8%  
49 Qiangshen Gas 
(强盛煤气) 





Yes  315,000,000 12.7%  
51 Qingta Trust 
(庆泰信托) 
Yes  850,713,224 10% Individual 
Creditors Paid 
at 100% 
52 Sanqin Cement 
(三秦水泥) 
Yes  184,088,073 3%  
53 Weidong Mine 
(卫东煤矿) 
 
Yes  150,000,000 90%  
54 Zhonghen Steel 
(中恒特钢) 
No  30,476,323 100%  
55 Dadi Paper 
(大地纸业) 
No  600,119,493 15%  
56 Hualun Group 
(华伦集团) 
















No  455,881,533 20%  
61 Nongji 
(杭州农机) 
No  171,346,431 20%  
62 Jiamei Food 
(佳美食品) 
















No  347,405,251 20%  
64 Jingxin Trust  
(金信信托)  
Yes  5,533,517,500 100%  
65 Huachen Real 
Estate 
(华辰君临) 
No (F) 325,661,406 100%  
66 Tianting Paper 
(天听纸业) 
Yes 403,520,359 15%  
67 Huatai Petrol 
(华泰石油) 
No  225,280,027 60%  
68 Zonghen Group 
(纵横集团) 
No  7,914,948,495 28%  
69 Jiande Steel 
(建德镍合金) 
Yes  938,000,000 4.625%  
    Average: 
33.67% 
 
      
 
 
 Notes:  
1. The average recovery rate for unsecured creditors in the listed company rescues was 24.15%, and it was at 
40.13% in the non-listed companies.  
2. Within the above sixty-nine reorganizations, the pari passu principle was relaxed in eighteen cases (26.09%). 
More specifically, the deviation took place in twelve out of twenty-eight listed company reorganizations 
(42.86%), and it happened in six out of forty-one non-listed company reorganizations (14.63%).  
3. Out of the above sixty-nine reorganizations, there were thirty reorganizations that dealt with the private 
companies, and in the remaining thirty-nine cases, the companies were state owned, state controlled, state 
participated, or privatized former state owned companies. The average recovery rate for unsecured creditors in 
the reorganizations of entirely private companies was 41.70%, and this rate was 27.45% in the reorganizations 
of state linked companies.  
4. There were nine foreign invested companies in reorganization, and their average recovery rate for unsecured 




 CEASING TRADING BEFORE THE CORPORATE 
REORGANIZATION PROCEDURE IN CHINA 
(1 JUNE 2007- 30 NOVEMBER 2010) 
 
Sequence Company Trading Ceased? Information 
Source  
Miscellaneous  
1 Zarva Technology 
(朝华科技) 
Yes  People Court 
Daily  
 
2 Stellar Mega 
Union 
(星美联合) 
Yes  Chongqing Court 
Report 
 
3 Amoi Electronics 
(夏新电子) 
Yes  Shanghai Stock 
Daily 
 
4 Hualong Group 
(广东华龙) 






No   Its Reorganization 
Plan 
 
6 Suntek Tech 
(新太科技) 




Unknown    
8 Hebei Baoshuo 
(宝硕股份) 




Yes  Shanghai Stock 
Daily 
 
10 Dixian Textile 
(帝贤纺织) 




Unknown    
12 Beiya Industry 
(北亚集团) 
 Unknown    
13 Xi’an Technology 
(鑫安科技) 
Yes  Its Reorganization 
Plan 
 
14 Tianfa Petroleum 
(天发石油) 
 
Unknown    
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Sequence Company Trading Ceased? Information 
Source  
Miscellaneous  
15 Tianyi Science  
(天颐科技) 
Yes  Dehen Law Firm 
Study 
 
16 Lanbao Science 
(兰宝科技) 
Yes  Oriental Morning 
News 
 
17 Liaoyuan Dehen 
(辽源得亨) 






 Yes  Ifeng Finance 
Analysis 
 
19 Jinhua Group 
(锦化化工) 
No Its 2009 Annual 
Report 
 
20 Changling Group 
(长岭集团) 
No  Its 2008 Annual 
Report 
 
21 Qinling Cement 
(秦岭水泥) 






Yes Yikuo Daily 
Finance 
 








No  Its 2009 Annual 
Report 
 
25  Haina Sci-Tech 
(浙江海纳) 
No Legal Daily  
26 Sunrise Holdings 
(广东盛润) 
Yes Its Own Public 
Notice 
 
27  Powerise Tech 
（创智科技） 
Yes Its Reorganization 
Plan 
 
28 Guangxia Industry 
(银广夏) 






Yes Shanghai Stock 
Daily 
 
30 Huaqiang Real 
Estate 
(华强房产) 
Unknown    
31  Wugu Daochang 
Food 
(五谷道场) 
Yes Democracy and 
Legal Daily 
 
32 Xianju Hospital 
(仙琚医院) 
Yes Legal Daily 
Weekend  
 
33 Xingchan Real 
Estate  
(兴昌博达) 





Sequence Company Trading Ceased? Information 
Source  
Miscellaneous  
34 Xiamen Star 
(厦门星星) 
Yes  Haixia City News  
35 Fenghua Group 
(风华集团) 










Yes  Dongguan Daily  
38 Yaban Electronics  
(雅邦电子) 








Yes Dongguan Daily  







42 Wanghai Yikang 
(旺海怡康) 
Yes Nanfang City 
News  
 
43  Zhonggu Sugar 
(中谷糖业) 
Yes Life Weekly 
Magazine  
 
44 Huabao Forage 
（华宝饲料） 
No  The 
Reorganization 
Plan of Taifeng  
 
45 Huabao Industry 
（华宝实业）  
No  The 
Reorganization 
Plan of Taifeng  
 
46 Taifeng Tech 
（泰丰科技）  
No  The 
Reorganization 
Plan of Taifeng  
 
47 Xibu Real Estate 
（西部房产）  
Yes  The 
Reorganization 
Plan of Taifeng  
 
48 Anxing Tongwei 
(安信酒精) 
Yes Siyang Law Firm  
49 Maisui Food  
（麦穗味精） 
Yes  Jinshi Court   



























53 Kehong Steel 
(常熟科弘) 
Yes  Daily Economy 
News  
 
54 Nantong Steel 
(南通有色) 
Yes  Gangzha Court, 
Nantong 
 
55 Changhong Steel 
(长鸿特钢) 
Yes  Its Auction Notice   
56 Jiatong Tech  
（佳通科技） 




 No  Its Reorganization 
Plan 
 
58 Yaxing Blocks 
(雅新线路板) 
Yes  Its Reorganization 
Plan  
 
59 Changchun Steel 
(长椿金属) 
Yes  Yangzi Evening 
News  
 
60 Defa Dye 
(德发印染) 
Unknown    
61 Xiangjuan Real 
Estate 
(香娟房产) 
Unknown     
62 Qiangshen Gas 
(强盛煤气) 
No  People’s Court 
Daily 
 
63 Yangdong Engine 
(江苏扬动) 




Yes  Pingxiang Daily   





Economy News  
 
66 Qingjian Real 
Estate 
(秦建房产) 
Yes  Huashang Daily   
67 Sanqin Cement 
(三秦水泥) 
Yes  Its Reorganization 
Plan  
 
68 Juxing Electronics  
(钜鑫电子) 
Unknown    
69 Weidong Mine 
(卫东煤矿) 
Unknown    
70 Zhonghen Steel 
(中恒特钢) 
No  Mianyan Evening 
News  
 
71 Jurenxin Rubber 
(聚仁兴橡胶) 
Yes  City News   
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Sequence Company Trading Ceased? Information 
Source  
Miscellaneous  
72 Dadi Paper 
(大地纸业) 
No  Its Reorganization 
Plan  
 
73 Hualun Group 
(华伦集团) 
Yes  Chengdu 
Commercial News  
 
74 Guangsai Power 
(广赛电力) 
 No  Its Reorganization 
Plan  
 










No  Xiaoshan Daily   
77 Yijiaxiang Food 
(溢佳香) 





Yes  Xinhua News 
Agency  
 
79 Jiamei Food 
(佳美食品) 





Yes  Xinhua News 
Agency  
 
81 Jingxin Trust  
(金信信托)  
Yes  Economy 
Reference Daily  
 
82 Huachen Real 
Estate 
(华辰君临) 
Yes  People’s Court 
Daily  
 
83 Tianting Paper 
(天听纸业) 
Yes  Jinghua Daily   
84 Yalun Paper 
(亚伦纸业) 
Yes  Zheshang 
Magazine  
 
85 Huatai Petrol 
(华泰石油) 
Yes  Pingzhen Henlian 
Law Firm  
 







87 Jiande Steel 
(建德镍合金) 
Yes  Xinyun Law Firm   
 
Notes:  
1. Out of the above eighty-seven reorganizations, there were at least fifty-seven reorganized companies 
whose trading ceased before the formal rescue process (65.52%). This means that their formal rescue petitions 
were filed too late. 
2. In all listed company reorganizations, there were sixteen out of these twenty-nine companies where the 
trading ceased prior to the formal rescue (55.17%). In all non-listed company reorganizations, there were forty-




 APPLICANTS AND COURT JURISDICTIONS FOR CORPORATE 
REORGANIZATIONS IN CHINA 
(1 JUNE 2007-30 NOVEMBER 2010) 
 
Sequence Company Applicant  Court  Miscellaneous  



















3 Amoi Electronics 
(夏新电子) 




4 Hualong Group 
(广东华龙) 







Creditor  Shenzhen 
Intermediate 
Court  
Applicant is a son 
company of the 
debtor 
6 Suntek Tech 
(新太科技) 










8 Hebei Baoshuo 
(宝硕股份) 











10 Dixian Textile 
(帝贤纺织) 



















Sequence Company Applicant  Court  Miscellaneous  
13 Xi’an Technology 
(鑫安科技) 




14 Tianfa Petroleum 
(天发石油) 




15 Tianyi Science  
(天颐科技) 




16 Lanbao Science 
(兰宝科技) 




17 Liaoyuan Dehen 
(辽源得亨) 











19 Jinhua Group 
(锦化化工) 




20 Changling Group 
(长岭集团) 
Debtor  Baoji Intermediate 
Court  
 
21 Qinling Cement 
(秦岭水泥) 











23  Jiufa Food 
（九发股份） 











Court of Shanghai 
 
25  Haina Sci-Tech 
(浙江海纳) 
 




26 Sunrise Holdings 
(广东盛润) 




27  Powerise Tech 
（创智科技） 










Sequence Company Applicant  Court  Miscellaneous  
28 Guangxia Industry 
(银广夏) 











Court of Shanghai 
 
30 Huaqiang Real 
Estate 
(华强房产) 
shareholder Fangshan Lower 
Court 
 
31  Wugu Daochang 
Food 
(五谷道场) 
Debtor  Fangshan Lower 
Court  
 
32 Xianju Hospital 
(仙琚医院) 
Debtor  Haidian Lower 
Court 
 
33 Xingchan Real 
Estate  
(兴昌博达) 
Shareholder  Changping Lower 
Court  
 
34 Xiamen Star 
(厦门星星) 
Debtor  Haichuang Lower 
Court  
 
35 Fenghua Group 
(风华集团) 




36 Huabao Fodder 
(华宝饲料) 




37 Taifeng Tech 
(泰丰科技) 




38 Huabao Industry  
（华宝实业） 




39 Xibu Real Estate 
（深信西部） 


















42 Yaban Electronics  
(雅邦电子) 























45 Wanghai Yikang 
(旺海怡康) 




46  Zhonggu Sugar 
(中谷糖业) 




47 Anxing Tongwei 
(安信酒精) 
Debtor  Datong Lower 
Court  
 
48 Maisui Food  
（麦穗味精） 
Debtor  Jinshi Lower 
Court 
 






50 Haiji Lujian 
(海吉氯碱) 







Debtor  Changshu Lower 
Court  
 
52 Kehong Steel 
(常熟科弘) 
Creditor  Changshu Lower 
Court  
 
53 Changhong Steel 
(长鸿特钢) 
Creditor  Changshu Lower 
Court  
 
54 Jiatong Tech  
（佳通科技） 






Creditor  Wuzhong Lower 
Court 
 
56 Yaxing Blocks 
(雅新线路板) 
Creditor  Wuzhong Lower 
Court 
 
57 Changchun Steel 
(长椿金属) 




58 Qiangshen Gas 
(强盛煤气) 
Creditor  Jiawang Lower 
Court 
 
59 Yangdong Engine 
(江苏扬动) 






Debtor  Anyuan Lower 
Court 
 
61 Qingta Trust 
(庆泰信托) 
Debtor  Qinghai Supreme 
Court  
 
62 Sanqin Cement 
(三秦水泥) 





Sequence Company Applicant  Court  Miscellaneous  
63 Juxing Electronics  
(钜鑫电子) 
Debtor  Minghang Lower 
Court, Shanghai  
 
64 Weidong Mine 
(卫东煤矿) 
Debtor  Pinding Lower 
Court 
 
65 Zhonghen Steel 
(中恒特钢) 
Debtor  Jiangyou Lower 
Court  
 
66 Jurenxin Rubber 
(聚仁兴橡胶) 
Debtor  Kunming 
Intermediate 
Court   
 
67 Dadi Paper 
(大地纸业) 
Creditor  Fuyang Lower 
Court 
 
68 Hualun Group 
(华伦集团) 
Creditor  Fuyang Lower 
Court  
 
69 Guangsai Power 
(广赛电力) 




70 Nanwang Group 
(南望集团) 







Creditor  Xiaoshan Lower 
Court  
 
72 Yijiaxiang Food 
(溢佳香) 










74 Jiamei Food 
(佳美食品) 










76 Jingxin Trust  
(金信信托)  




77 Huachen Real 
Estate 
(华辰君临) 




78 Tianting Paper 
(天听纸业) 
Debtor  Pujiang Lower 
Court  
 
79 Yalun Paper 
(亚伦纸业) 
Debtor  Longyou Lower 
Court 
 









Sequence Company Applicant  Court  Miscellaneous  
81 Zonghen Group 
(纵横集团) 




82 Jiande Steel 
(建德镍合金) 





1. As for applicants of the existing reorganizations, there were eighty-two reorganizations whose relevant 
information was publicly available; there were fifty reorganizations that were filed by creditors (60.98%), 
twenty-eight filed by debtors (34.15%) and four by shareholders (4.88%).  
 
2. As to the court jurisdictions, there were sixty-nine companies in rescue that were dealt with by 
intermediate courts (65.09%), thirty-six companies were processed by lower courts (33.96%), and one company 
was handled by a provincial supreme court (0.94%).  
Nearly all listed company reorganizations were supervised by intermediate courts. There was just one case, 
the reorganization of Xingtai Co. Ltd, which was handled by Panyu Lower Court, Guangdong out of all 29 listed 




Applicants of Corporate Reorganizations in China  
(1 June 2007 to 30 November 2010) 
Filed by Creditor (50)
Filed by Debtor (28)




 ADMINISTRATOR APPOINTMENTS AND MANAGEMENT IN 
CHINESE CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS 

















N/A Debtor Professionals 







N/A Administrator  Professionals 

















Law Firm  N/A Administrator   








































No  Administrator  Professionals 


































































No  Administrator  Professionals 
















Included (Zhong He 









Debtor  No Professionals in 
Liquidation 
Committee 

















No  Administrator 

























by the Old 
Management) 








Debtor   




























No  Administrator   






N/A Administrator  Professionals 
Included  
32 Xingchan 






Administrator  All Liquidation 
Committee Members 
Are Local Officials  













































King & Wood 
Law Firm  













King & Wood 
Law Firm  
N/A N/A  




King & Wood 
Law Firm  




























N/A Failed   











N/A Administrator   
46  Zhonggu 
Sugar 
(中谷糖业) 


































N/A Administrator   












Firm   
No 
 











































Ernst & Young 
Accounting 
Firm 





Ernst & Young 
Accounting 
Firm 






























Administrator   



































































Yes Debtor   




















































Administrator   

































Yes  Administrator  






















(not the debtor) 
 

























Administrator   







Administrator   
 
Notes:  
1. In the above eighty-three reorganizations, liquidation committees were appointed as administrators in 
thirty-nine rescues (46.99%), law firms were appointed in twenty-six reorganizations (31.33%), accounting 
firms were appointed in thirteen reorganizations (15.66%), law and accounting firms were jointly appointed in 
three reorganizations (3.61%), and professional liquidation firms were appointed in two reorganizations (2.41%).  
2. In the majority of listed company reorganizations, it was liquidation committees appointed by courts as 
administrators. Specifically, liquidation committees were appointed in twenty-six out of the total twenty-nine 
listed company reorganizations (89.66%). By contrast, there were only thirteen out of fifty-six non-listed 
company reorganizations (23.21%) where the liquidation committees were made the administrators.  
3. In thirty-nine reorganizations that had the liquidation committees as the administrators, there were at 
least twenty-five rescues that had professionals, especially lawyers, included as members of such liquidation 
committees. This means that there was more involvement of professionals in China’s corporate reorganizations.  
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4. As to whether the company’s control was returned to the debtor, there were fifty reorganizations where 
such information was publicly available. Debtors regained control in thirteen reorganizations (26%), and 
administrators continued managing reorganization processes in the remaining thirty-seven reorganizations 
(74%).  
5. As for which parties proposed reorganization plans, there were seventy reorganizations where such 
information was publicly available. Reorganization plans were proposed by administrators in fifty 
reorganizations (74.29%), by debtors in twelve reorganizations (17.14%), jointly by debtors and administrators 





CRAM-DOWNS AND DEVIATIONS FROM ABSOLUTE PRIORITY 
IN CHINESE CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS 
(1 JUNE 2007-30 NOVEMBER 2010) 
 








1 Zarva Technology 
(朝华科技) 
Yes  No  Yes  
2 Stellar Mega 
Union 
(星美联合) 
Yes  No  Yes  
3 Amoi Electronics 
(夏新电子) 
Yes  No  Yes 
4 Hualong Group 
(广东华龙) 




Yes  No  Yes  
6 Suntek Tech 
(新太科技) 




Yes  No  Yes  
8 Hebei Baoshuo 
(宝硕股份) 











10 Dixian Textile 
(帝贤纺织) 
Yes  Yes 







Yes  Yes  





12 Beiya Industry 
(北亚集团) 
Yes  No  No  
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13 Xi’an Technology 
(鑫安科技) 
Yes  No  Yes  
14 Tianfa Petroleum 
(天发石油) 
N/A Yes 




15 Tianyi Science  
(天颐科技) 
N/A Yes  




16 Lanbao Science 
(兰宝科技) 
Yes  No  Yes  
17 Liaoyuan Dehen 
(辽源得亨) 




Yes  No  Yes  
19 Jinhua Group 
(锦化化工) 
Yes  Yes 
(Both secured and 
unsecured ones)  
Yes  
20 Changling Group 
(长岭集团) 
Yes  No  Yes  
21 Qinling Cement 
(秦岭水泥) 




Yes  No  Yes  
23  Jiufa Food 
（九发股份） 




Yes  No  Yes  
25  Haina Sci-Tech 
(浙江海纳) 
 
Yes  No  Yes  
26 Sunrise Holdings 
(广东盛润) 
Yes  No  Yes  
27  Powerise Tech 
（创智科技） 
Yes  No  Yes  
28 Guangxia Industry 
(银广夏) 




















Yes  No  Yes  
30 Huaqiang Real 
Estate 
(华强房产) 
N/A N/A Yes  
31  Wugu Daochang 
Food 
(五谷道场) 
No  No  Yes  
32 Xianju Hospital 
(仙琚医院) 
No  No  Yes  
33 Xingchan Real 
Estate  
(兴昌博达) 




34 Xiamen Star 
(厦门星星) 
Yes  No  No  
35 Fenghua Group 
(风华集团) 
Yes  Yes  







Yes  Yes  







No  No  Yes  
38 Yaban Electronics  
(雅邦电子) 
No  No  Yes  
39  Yongsheng 
Computer 
(永胜电脑) 
N/A No Yes 
40 Wanghai Yikang 
(旺海怡康) 
No  No  Yes  
41  Zhonggu Sugar 
(中谷糖业) 
No  No  Yes  
42 Anxing Tongwei 
(安信酒精) 
No  No  Yes  
43 Maisui Food  
（麦穗味精） 
N/A Yes  




44 Taizinai Milk 
(太子奶) 
 
No  No  Yes  
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45 Haiji Lujian 
(海吉氯碱) 







No  No  Yes  
47 Kehong Steel 
(常熟科弘) 
N/A No  Yes  
48 Nantong Steel 
(南通有色) 
N/A N/A Yes  
49 Jiatong Tech  
（佳通科技） 




No  Yes  
(shareholders) 
Yes  
51 Yaxing Blocks 
(雅新线路板) 
No  Yes  
(shareholders) 
Yes  
52 Changchun Steel 
(长椿金属) 
N/A No  No  
53 Defa Dye 
(德发印染) 
N/A N/A Yes  
54 Qiangshen Gas 
(强盛煤气) 
N/A N/A Yes  
55 Yangdong Engine 
(江苏扬动) 






N/A No  Yes  
57 Qingta Trust 
(庆泰信托) 
No  No  Yes  
58 Sanqin Cement 
(三秦水泥) 






59 Weidong Mine 
(卫东煤矿) 
N/A No  No  





61 Jurenxin Rubber 
(聚仁兴橡胶) 
N/A No  N/A 
62 Dadi Paper 
(大地纸业) 
Yes  No  No  
63 Hualun Group 
(华伦集团) 













64 Guangsai Power 
(广赛电力) 
 
No  Yes  
(shareholders) 
No  
65 Nanwang Group 
(南望集团) 






No  No  Yes  
67 Yijiaxiang Food 
(溢佳香) 





No  Yes  
(shareholders) 
Yes  
69 Jiamei Food 
(佳美食品) 





No  Yes  
(shareholders) 
Yes  
71 Jingxin Trust  
(金信信托)  
No  Yes  
(shareholders) 
Yes  
72 Huachen Real 
Estate 
(华辰君临) 
No  Yes  
(shareholders) 
Yes  
73 Tianting Paper 
(天听纸业) 
No  Yes   
(shareholders) 
No  
74 Huatai Petrol 
(华泰石油) 
No  No  Yes  
75 Zonghen Group 
(纵横集团) 
No  Yes  
(shareholders) 
Yes  
76 Jiande Steel 
 (建德镍合金) 





1. With regard to deviating from absolute priority, there were sixty-two reorganizations where the relevant 
information was publicly obtainable. Deviations took place in thirty-three reorganizations (53.23%). In fact, 
most of the deviations happened in listed company rescues. In particular, there was a routine deviation from 
absolute priority in listed company reorganzations, because China’s Supreme People’s Court had a decree that 
authorised this. Deviating from absolute priority, however, was less likely in non-listed company 
reorganizations. Specifically, it was found that deviations were only found in five out of the thirty-four non-
listed company reorganizations (14.71%).  
2. As to cram-downs, this thesis examined seventy-one reorganizations where such information was 
publicly accessible, and it was found that cram-downs were imposed in twenty-nine reorganizations (40.85%).  
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Specifically, in these twenty-nine cram-downs, seventeen of them were used to override shareholders’ 
objections; twelve were to force unsecured creditors; nine against secured creditors; two against revenue 
creditors and one was to overrule the objection of employee creditors. It should be noted that these figures 
overlap, because one cram-down was sometimes to override more than one class of impaired parties, e.g. a 
cram-down was used to override the objections of both shareholders and unsecured creditors. 
3. As for so-called strategic investors, which were essentially company buyers, there were seventy-three 
reorganizations examined by this thesis because the related information was publicly available, and it was found 
that company buyers were successfully solicited in sixty-one out of these seventy-three reorganizations 
(83.56%), which means that going concern sale rescues were used in 83.56% of the existing China’s corporate 
reorganizations.  
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 APPENDIX 8  
 DURATION OF CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS IN CHINA 
(1 JUNE 2007-30 NOVEMBER 2010) 
 
Sequence Company Acceptance Plan 

































30 Apr 2010 290 Listed  








































24 Apr 2008 81 Listed  
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Sequence Company Acceptance Plan 































































7 May 2010 163 Listed  











17 Dec 2008 66 Listed  











22 Oct 2010 169 Listed  






27 May 2011 276 Listed  
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Sequence Company Acceptance Plan 















29 Nov 2008 67 Listed  













1 Jun 2007 42  
32 Xingchan 




4 Sep 2008 293  





























15 Jan 2010 30 Apr 2010 105  












1 Feb 2010 533  
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Sequence Company Acceptance Plan 









26 Nov 2009 470  
42  Yongsheng 
Computer 
(永胜电脑) 






9 Nov 2007 91  









30 Jul 2007 30 Nov 2007 123  









23 Jul 2010 8 Nov 2011 472  
















































19 Dec 2008 234  
 297 
 
Sequence Company Acceptance Plan 
















































10 Nov 2008 245  






























15 Jul 2010 29 Jun 2011 349  
70 Nongji 
(杭州农机) 
15 Jul 2010 29 Jun 2011 349  
71 Jiamei Food 
(佳美食品) 
15 Jul 2010 29 Jun 2011 349  
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Sequence Company Acceptance Plan 



































16 Dec 2009 151  





20 Apr 2011 193  
 
Notes:  
1. Regarding how long reorganization processes took on average, there were seventy-eight reorganizations 
where such information was publicly available. This thesis measured efficiency by calculating the period of time 
from the date of acceptance to that of the reorganization plan confirmation. In these seventy-eight 
reorganizations, it took on average 198.77 days to complete a reorganization process.  
A further investigation found that there was, in relation to efficiency, a considerable difference between 
listed company and non-listed company reorganizations. It took on average 120.76 days to conclude a listed 




 ZHEJIANG INTERVIEWS 
 
Venue: Zhejiang Province, P. R. China 
Time: January 2012 
Interviewer: Zinian Zhang 
Supervisor: Professor Roman Tomasic 
Interviewees: ten lawyers and accountants who were appointed as administrators in 
Zhejiang corporate reorganizations, five creditors or creditor representatives in corporate 
reorganizations, three judges handling corporate reorganizations, one government official 
involved in a corporate reorganization procedure, and one director of a debtor company in 
reorganization. 
For anonymity and simplification, these interviewees are marked as administrator, 




Question 1: What are the causes of the failure of the company that enters the rescue 
procedure? 
Interviewee Response 
Administrator 1:   To a large extent, it was because of the incompetence of the 
management. 
 
Administrator 2: It was the inconsistency of the local government’s land plan that led 
the company to bear unexpected and unaffordable costs. Of course, 
the poor management should also be counted.  
Administrator 3: It was the industry downturn that hit the company hard, and the 
company was also a victim of shark loans in Zhejiang. 
Administrator 4: Over-expansion might be the key reason for the company’s failure. 




Administrator 5: Over-expansion and the sudden economic recession led to the 
company’s irreversible distress.  
Administrator 6:  Over-expansion and poor cash flow management of the company 
caused its deep distress. 
 
Administrator 7: The incompetence of the management.  
Administrator 8: The major reason was likely to be the internal mismanagement, and, 
as a result, the company was considerably vulnerable when there was 
an economic recession. Meanwhile, over-expansion should also be 
taken into account. The company was a victim of shark loans.  
Administrator 9:  The poor cash flow management.  
Administrator 
10: 
The internal mismanagement, especially the cash flow management.  
Creditor 1: The failure was largely due to over-expansion. And the lack of 
supervision to the board was also liable to the failure. The 
management were irresponsible.  
 
Creditor 2: Over-expansion might be the culprit. At the same time, the shark 
loans expedited the distress of the company.  
  
Creditor 3: Poor management caused business trouble.  
 
Creditor 4: Poor management together with economic recession.  
 
Creditor 5:  Over-expansion caused the company’s distress.  
  
Judge 1: The failure was largely exogenous. Because of the unexpected 
withdrawal of the bank loans, the company resorted to the shark loan 
financer to solve the short-term cash problem, but unfortunately the 
company failed to get rid of the unhealthy, and even toxic, shark loans 
quickly, and it was brought down instead.  
 
Judge 2: Over-expansion would be the main reason for the companies’ failure.  
 
Judge 3:  It was likely to be the industry distress which struck the company 
hard. It should also be noted that the shark loans exacerbated and 




Official 1: Over-expansion would be the culprit of the company’s failure. The 
previous CEO was a diligent and responsible businessman, but he was 
absolutely irresponsible to his fellow shareholders.  




order. Not surprisingly, the company was deeply distressed because of 
excessive interest payment to shark loans.  
 
        
 Question 2: Is government support critical for the reorganization petition to be accepted by 
the court? 
Interviewee Response  
Administrator 1:   
 
In the past, without the government’s guarantee to tackle the 
social stability trouble, courts were too cautious to accept 
corporate bankruptcy filings. At present, however, the 
government may be pleased to see as many corporate 
reorganizations as possible, because corporate reorganizations 
are in the interests of local economy.  
  
Administrator 2: It is impossible for courts to accept corporate reorganization 
filings without government support.  
Administrator 3: The court’s acceptance of a corporate reorganization filing is 
conditional upon an agreement reached by local government and 
the court. No agreement, no acceptance. 
 
Administrator 4: Without local government support, the court would never accept 
a corporate reorganization petition. 
 
Administrator 5: The court only deals with the legal affairs, whereas the 
government handles the local economic development. There was 
no government support in this case.  
 
Administrator 6:  An interim committee formed by the local government to back 
the corporate reorganization procedure.  
 
Administrator 7: The court lacks confidence in processing corporate 
reorganization without local government support.  
 
Administrator 8: Without government support, the court will not accept corporate 
reorganization filings. 
Administrator 9:  The corporate reorganization procedure cannot be entered if 
there is no government support. 
Administrator10: The government support must be available, because, without the 
involvement of local government, the court cannot obtain the 
cooperation from the government agencies whose regulation 
services are critical to handling corporate bankruptcy issues. The 
court alone is basically helpless.  
 302 
 
Interviewee Response  
 
Judge 1: Government support is very important. The court itself cannot 
mobilize the governmental administrative services in aid of 
corporate bankruptcy procedures, as bankruptcy affairs need the 
cooperation of many governmental departments. These 
departments will not listen to the court unless there is a strong 
government body involved. For example, the police service is 
vital to investigating properties of the company, as we lack the 
means and human sources to do that. In the absence of the 
government support, however, we are unable to obtain the police 
service.  
 
Judge 2: When a corporate reorganization filing is petitioned to our court, 
we will focus on assessing whether the application meets legal 
requirements. Of course, when deciding to accept or to reject a 
petition, we will seriously take into account government support, 
the rescue proposal agreed between the debtor and main 
creditors and its potential impacts on the local economy.  
 
Judge 3:  For fear of the social stability troubles directed to the court, we 
tend to avoid the trouble by rejecting corporate bankruptcy 
petitions. As to the acceptance of a corporate reorganization 
petition, we draw attention to whether the company’s going 
concern value could be preserved through a rescue process. 
 
Official 1: Without our support, the court would have definitely rejected the 
reorganization petition. The government intervention is essential 
to redeploy the company’s assets, and in particular, our purpose 
is to prevent the chain reaction of bankruptcy, to maintain the 
social stability and to avert the destructive damage to local 
economy.  
 
Director 1: Government support is the prerequisite for the rescue petition to 










Question 3: What factors can explain courts’ hesitation to hear corporate reorganizations? 
Interviewee Response  
Administrator 1:   
 
The court fears mass petitions or protests launched by people in 
huge number involved in corporate bankruptcy procedures 
including corporate reorganization ones. In practice, to handle 
the potential mass petitions, the administrator will contact with 
the local government for helps if a corporate bankruptcy process 
starts.  
 
Administrator 2: Courts do not have sufficient judges to handle corporate rescues.  
Administrator 3: The court cannot afford the human resources. 
Administrator 4: Bankruptcy is like a hot potato, and courts will get into trouble if 
they accept bankruptcy petitions. Meanwhile, the lack of detailed 
bankruptcy rules makes it difficult for courts to manage 
corporate bankruptcy.  
 
Administrator 5: It is a complicated project for both courts and administrators. 
Administrator 6:  Corporate bankruptcy or reorganization is firmly related with 
social stability concerns, and obviously courts are unable to deal 
with social issues that should be handled by the government. At 
the same time, bankruptcy needs a large amount of manpower of 
courts, and courts do not have enough judges to do this job.  
 
Administrator 7: Maintaining social stability associated with corporate bankruptcy 
is an insurmountable challenge faced by courts.  
 
Administrator 8: Potential mass petitions are the main worries of courts when they 
decide whether to accept a corporate reorganization filing.  
Administrator 9:  To courts, corporate bankruptcy is excessively time-consuming. 
Administrator 
10: 
Corporate reorganization involves intense conflicts, and courts 
are unable to deal with them properly. Apart from social stability 
concerns, too many government administrative services are 
needed in bankruptcy procedures, but courts are unable to 
persuade these government agencies to give full cooperation. 
 
Judge 1: Government support is very important. The court itself cannot 
mobilize the government services in support of corporate 
bankruptcy. But bankruptcy processes need the cooperation of 
many government departments. These departments will not listen 
to the court unless the local government is directly involved. 
Judge 2: When a corporate reorganization petition is filed to our court, we 
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Interviewee Response  
will focus on assessing whether the petition meets the legal 
requirements. Of course, to decide to accept or reject the petition, 
we will seriously take into account the availability of 
government support, a draft rescue agreement between the debtor 
and the main creditors and its economic impacts on the local 
economy.  
 
Judge 3:  We try to avoid corporate bankruptcy for fear that we will put 
ourselves in difficult situations because of potential bankruptcy-
related mass petitions. If we accept a corporate reorganization 
filing, we mainly consider whether the company’s going concern 
value can be preserved through a formal corporate rescue 
procedure.  
 
Official 1: Corporate reorganization is complex and time-consuming. And 
more importantly, courts do not have political and financial 
incentives to deal with corporate reorganizations. Accepting and 
supervising corporate reorganization may make courts get into 
trouble, because corporate reorganization may involve protests of 
disgruntled parties, such as unpaid employees and creditors. 
Such protests will negatively affect courts in China’s political 
performance assessment system.  
 
 
Question 4: Why are there so few early rescues? 
Interviewee  Response  
 
Judge 1: The government will not pay attention to companies that are in trouble 
unless a business failure causes a political problem where there is either a 
mass petition launched by unpaid employees or seizure of the company’s 
property by disgruntled creditors. Without government intervention, a 
formal corporate rescue procedure cannot be entered.  
 
 
Judge 2: To avoid exposing business misbehaviours, companies are reluctant to 
file for reorganization because they have to give the control on the 
company’s assets, books and accounts to a court-appointed administrator 
if a formal reorganization procedure is entered. They cannot accept 
losing control in rescue. 
 
Judge 3:  There were many rescue efforts made by the companies before the 
formal rescue process, but all these efforts failed. 
 
Administrator 4 Debtors fear exposing tax evasion, because they will lose control on 
business operation and books to administrators if they enter a formal 
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corporate reorganization procedure. Most companies commit tax evasion 
in China, so they fear that the books are inspected by a third party. 
 
Director 1: Actually, the company was a family-run business, and regrettably we did 
not want to spoil family harmony by sacking the chief manager earlier. 
 
 
Question 5: Why is the involvement of government officials important to the 
effectiveness of the corporate reorganization? (This was designed to government official 
interviewees) 
Interviewee  Response  
 
Official 1: The government is reliable, so our involvement can give confidence to 
impaired parties in support of a rescue. More importantly, the 




Question 6: If there is a debtor-in-possession, or if your company itself can appoint an 
administrator, will the company be more confident to file for reorganization earlier to the 
court?  
Interviewee  Response  
 
Director 1: Definitely.  
 
 
Question 7: What factors are essential for your firm to be included in the Zhejiang 
insolvency practitioner list? (This question was designed for administrator interviewees)  
Interviewee  Response  
Administrator 1:   My firm is large, and our high quality lawyers also played an 
important role in making us to be included.  
   
Administrator 2: The number of accountants was essential for our firm to be 
selected. As for experience, honestly, we did not have, since all 





Interviewee  Response  
Administrator 3: The large number of lawyers in my firm played the crucial role 
in making us to be selected. And our good business reputation 
was also considered by the authorities when they made the 
decision. 
 
Administrator 4: The number of accountants was critical for our firm to be listed. 
With regard to the prior experience in dealing with bankruptcy, 
actually, we did not have.  
 
Administrator 5: A combination of the size, experience and the authority-rewarded 
credentials made our firm succeed in being listed. 
Administrator 6:  It was the size of our firm which occupied the attention of the 
selecting authorities. At the same time, our firm’s commercial 
expertise and the high quality lawyers were also considered by 
the authorities.  
 
Administrator 7: First, it was the size of the firm; second, our expertise in 
commercial and civil law made us more competitive.  
  
Administrator 8: It should be admitted that the size of our firm was the main 
factor. Furthermore, our high quality lawyers and our good 
business reputation were also considered by the authorities. 
Administrator 9:  The size of our firm and the similar business law experience 
were critical for our firm to be listed.  
  
 
Question 8: As the administrator, can you fully access the company’s books and other 
financial records? (This question was designed for administrator interviewees) 
Interviewee Response  
Administrator 1:   We had the full access to the company’s books. The books could 
not be inspected or examined by creditors as these books 
contained trade secrets.  
  
Administrator 2: Full access. In my opinion, an auditor report may be unnecessary 
if the administrator is an accounting firm because we are already 
experts in this area.  
Administrator 3: We could fully access the company’s books.  
Administrator 4: Yes.  
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Interviewee Response  
Administrator 5: Of course. And all the company’s books and financial documents 
were physically in the custody of the administrator.  
Administrator 6:  Yes.  
Administrator 7: Yes. There was an accounting firm hired by us to audit the 
company, and the accounting firm analysed and reported the 
causes of bankruptcy. As to whether there were commercial 
crimes committed by the company, the accounting firm would 
have drawn their conclusions. 
 
Administrator 8: Yes.  
Administrator 9:  Definitely.  
Administrator 
10: 
Yes.   
 
Question 9: Are the company’s books and other financial records available for creditors 
to inspect so as to increase transparency?  
Interviewee  Response 
 
Administrator 1:   No.  
  
Administrator 2: In three reorganizations handled by us, there were no specific 
requests from creditors to examine or inspect the company books. 
But, it would be meaningless to examine them, as these books had 
been fabricated. These books did not accurately record and reflect 
company transactions.  
 
Administrator 3: The request to examine the record of an individual transaction may 
be allowed, but a general request to examine all books will not be 
allowed.  
Administrator 4: No.  
Administrator 5: In theory, creditors should be allowed to inspect the books, but in 
fact there were no requests from creditors. Some creditors once 
asked to verify their own transactions and were allowed. 
 
 
Administrator 6:  There were requests to inspect the company’s books from 
creditors and their lawyers, but such requests were refused. They 
could read the auditor report which was the formal information 
disclosure document made for all interested parties, and creditors 
did not have the right to inspect the company books.  
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Interviewee  Response 
 
Administrator 7: In principle, creditors could access the books, however, in fact 
there were no creditors requesting to inspect the company’s books. 
I remembered that there were some banks which examined some 
of the company’s transactions. Reading the books was allowed, 
but photocopying was prohibited, because we did want them to be 
disclosed to third parties.  
 
Administrator 8: All the company’s books were available for creditors to inspect, as 
they had been audited.  
Administrator 9:  No. Creditors were not permitted to access the books to assess the 




Some creditors requested to inspect the books to verify their own 
transactions and were allowed.  
  
Creditor 1: Of course, we wanted to know the real causes of the company’s 
failure, but we could not afford to do so individually. The costs 
would outweigh the potential gains.  
 
Creditor 2: The company information provided to us was very general. And, 
the company’s books and other financial records were not 
accessible to us. Inspecting the company’s books was, under the 
current law, impractical for creditors.  
 
Creditor 3: We could access the company’s books.  
Creditor 4: In theory, we could inspect the company’s books, but in fact it was 
the secured creditors that were interested in examining the 
company’s books. By contrast, unsecured creditors, in anticipation 
of low recovery rates, had no intention to do that.  
 
Creditor 5:  We have never considered inspecting the company’s books, and, 
for an individual creditor, it was uneconomic to do that; it was not 
cost-effective.  
 
Judge 2: In theory, company books should be available for inspection by 
creditors.  
Judge 3:  There were not specific requests from creditors to inspect these 
books. But these books did not reflect real business activities, as 







Question 10: Who proposes the reorganization plan in the rescue process?  
Interviewee  Response  
Administrator 1:   It was the administrator who proposed the reorganization plan in 
reorganizations of Nanwang and Guangsai. In the reorganization 
of Haina, it was the company’s buyer who prepared the 
reorganization plan.  
  
Administrator 2: In my case, it was the local government that proposed the main 
elements of the reorganization plan.  
Administrator 3: It was the debtor that prepared the reorganization plan to a vote.  
Administrator 4: The administrator.  
Administrator 5: The administrator. During the process of drafting the plan, the 
strategic investor, local government and creditors were also 
involved. The local government played a critical role in facilitating 
the rescue process, as it provided some benefits to the company. 
 
Administrator 7: In the reorganizations of International Hotel and Hualun Paper 
Group, it was the administrator who proposed the reorganization 
plan. In the reorganization of Dadi Paper Co. Ltd., the plan was 
proposed by the debtor itself.  
 
 Administrator 8: The plan was prepared by the administrator, as we were in charge.  
Administrator 9:  The administrator.  
Administrator 
10: 
The administrator.   
Judge 2: The plans were prepared by the administrators.  
 
Judge 3:  It was the administrator who prepared the reorganization plan, as 
the debtor had exhausted all its rescue efforts before the formal 




Question 11: Is there evidence of fraud committed by the company before bankruptcy? 
(This was designed for administrator interviewees) 
Interviewee  Response  
Administrator 1:   I did not have the duty to investigate the company’s potential 
fraud. Even if there were evidence of fraud, I would have not 
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Interviewee  Response  
reported to police. 
In the reorganization case dealt with by me, I found that the old 
equity-manager used the company’s money to buy him houses, 
but I have not reported to police in spite of that it was an alleged 
criminal offence, because I was not obliged to do that. 
  
Administrator 2: I was unwilling to report any criminal offences to police, in spite 
of the fact that there was the evidence of unlawful capital 
withdrawal in the reorganizations of Huatai Oil, Yongji Ship 
Manufacturing and Ouweibao.  
 
Administrator 3: We did not find any evidence of fraud in the reorganization case.  
 
Administrator 4: There was the evidence of commercial crimes in the 
reorganization case, but I was not bothered.  
 
Administrator 5: There was no evidence of commercial crimes in the company.  
 
Administrator 6:  No any evidence of commercial crimes was found.  
Administrator 7: There was the evidence of unlawful capital withdrawal, a 
criminal offence under China’s criminal law, in the 
reorganization of Xiaoshan Int’l Hotel before bankruptcy, but 
we did not report to police. 
  
 
Administrator 8: There appeared to have commercial crimes, such as 
embezzlement or capital withdrawal, but we, as the 
administrator, were concerned with maximising the company’s 
value, instead of reporting crimes to police.  
 
Administrator 9:  The police had investigated the crimes before the formal 
reorganization procedure started, and the old equity-manger and 




We did not find any evidence of commercial crimes in the case. 
But, it would be a grey area if shareholder-managers put the 
company’s money into his own pocket, since there were no well-
defined boundaries between controlling shareholders’ personal 






Question 12: Do you think the creditors’ committee has well represented all creditors? 
(This was designed for creditor interviewees) 
Interviewee  Response  
 
Creditor 1: It was impossible for them to represent us. They represented themselves 
and prioritised their own interests.  
 
Creditor 2: The creditors’ committee played its role reasonably.  
 
Creditors 3: Generally, it could represent creditors as a whole.  
 
Creditor 4: It largely represented the secured creditors. It was always unsecured 
creditors that suffered heavy financial losses.  
 
Creditor 5:  As the creditor’s representative, I have never directly contacted the 
creditors’ committee. Instead, I contacted the administrator several times 
to get up to date information about the progress of the reorganization.  
 
 
Question 13: Do you think that the administrator is impartial in striking a balance 
between debtor and creditor? 
Interviewee  Response  
 
Creditor 1: The administrator was impartial, but I was concerned with the recovery 
rate that was disappointing. 
 
Creditor 2: The administrator represented the local government, acting on behalf of 
local government.  
 
Creditor 3: Generally speaking, the administrator was unbiased.  
 
Creditor 4: As an unsecured creditor, we felt hopeless and reluctant to meet the 
administrator. The administrator only focused on how to maximise his 
service fees. Apart from being paid out of the company’s value, the 
administrator charged the secured creditors much through selling the 
mortgaged assets.  
  
Creditor 5:  The recovery rate was unacceptable, and we did not know the genuine 
causes of the company’s bankruptcy. Meanwhile, we knew little about 





Question 14: Do you agree that creditors would be better protected if the creditors’ 
committee could hire a lawyer paid out of the company’s assets? 
Interviewee  Response  
 
Creditor 1: There was a lawyer in the creditors’ committee, but it was useless.  
 
Creditor 2: Of course, it would be very useful.  
 
Creditor 3: Definitely.  
 
Creditor 4: Given the fact that the members of the creditors’ committee just 
represented themselves, hiring a lawyer paid out of the company’s assets 
might only increase these individual members’ interests. It might make 
things worse to hire a lawyer. 
 
Creditor 5:  I agree.  
 
Question 15: What can the administrator do to improve the transparency of the 
reorganization? 
Interviewee  Response  
 
Creditor 1: It was already transparent.  
 
Creditor 2: Creditors should be allowed to examine the company’s books, and the 
books should be audited by professionals. More importantly, the 
administrator must disclose the genuine causes of the company’s failure as 
well as all transactions between the debtor and creditors.   
Creditor 3: I was satisfied with the transparency of the reorganization process.  
 
Creditor 4: I was given some documents that contained skeletal financial data and few 
or no explanations. The real causes of the company’s bankruptcy were not 
explained by the administrator.  
 
Creditor 5:  Some documents were available, but the real causes of the company’s 
failure were not disclosed. 
  
 




Creditor 1: Definitely, the fee was extortionate, and it did echo my view that both the 
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administrator and the members of the creditors’ committee represented 
themselves and served their individual interests.  
 
Creditor 2: It was normal.  
 
Creditor 4: It was too high.  
 
Creditor 5:  It was reasonable.  
 
Director 1: Yes, it was too high.  
 
Question 17: Do you think the administrator is competent to deal with the corporate 
reorganization affairs? 
Interviewee Response  
 
Judge 1: It varied from case to case. 
 
Judge 2: The commitment of the administrators, especially the lawyers and 
accountants, could not be questioned; however, they did lack experience 
in this area.  
 
Judge 3:  Basically, they could cope with the reorganization issues.  
 
Director 1: The administrator would be competent to investigate the company’s 
debts and assets and to supervise cash management activities during the 
reorganization process; however, as to restructuring the company’s 
business, it was the debtor, instead of the administrator, that could 
construct a feasible plan.  
 
Question 18: In your experience, which party is in control of the corporate 
reorganization case? 
Interviewee  Response  
 
Judge 1: The corporate reorganization procedure was a collective bargaining 
forum, because all parties including the administrator, the government 
officials and the court played their own roles so as to achieve the rescue 
objectives.  
 
Judge 2: The administrator had the full control of the company, although there 
was a heavy presence of local government.  
 
Judge 3:  The reorganization procedure was controlled by the court and 
participated by other interested parties.  




Question 19: Do you think that shareholder-managers should be rewarded something in 
exchange for their continued service in the new company? 
Interviewee  Response  
 
Administrator 1:   The old shareholder-manager, the CEO, left the company after 
the reorganization procedure began. The company’s business 
areas have changed, so it seemed unnecessary to retain him in the 
new company.  
Administrator 2: The old shareholder-manager was a gentleman, but we have 
never considered distributing some value to him in the 
reorganization plan.  
Administrator 3: It was impossible for me to consider distributing something to 
him (the old equity-manager). But, I would not object if the 
company’s buyer had agreed to give him something for his 
continued involvement in the new company.  
 
Administrator 4: In my case, the old chief manager retained his position as the 
manager, but all his old shares were cancelled.  
Administrator 5: It depended on whether the company continued its business 
model after rescue. The old equity-managers may be rewarded 
something for their continued service if the company’s business 
model was kept intact; otherwise, it might be meaningless to give 
them something in the form of either equity or control.  
 
Administrator 7: Yes, old equity-managers could be incentivized to engage in the 
new company because they have the experience and information 
of running the company.  
 
Administrator 8: In principle, I agree with this idea. The old management are vital 
for the company’s business if it is a traditional reorganization, 
but if it is a business sale rescue, they would be nuisances, 
because the new owner will set up its new management team. 
Administrator 9:  All old shareholders had left before the formal rescue procedure 
started, so we did not consider rewarding something for their 




It would be very difficult to persuade creditors to accept the 
deviation from absolute priority. And more importantly, the old 
shareholder-manager would play a less important role in the new 
company.  
  
Creditor 1: Yes. The old shareholder-mangers would have incentives to 
improve the company’s business if they had been given share 
options in the new company, such as management incentive 
 315 
 




Creditor 2: I don’t think so. The new management team should be appointed 
by the new owner, and the old chief manager was not trustworthy 
any more.  
  
Creditor 3: Yes. The departure of the old chief manager would have 
definitely affected the company’s going-concern value.  
 
Creditor 5:  It is worth considering. But, the then situation did not allow 
giving anything to the shareholder-manager for his continued 
involvement in the company, since so many creditors during the 
creditors’ meeting fiercely condemned him of his wrongdoings 
that brought the company into bankruptcy.  
 
Judge 2: It is a good question worth considering.  
 
Judge 3:  We desperately needed the old equity-manager to involve in the 
reorganization process, because he knew the company most. 
Unfortunately, he was arrested and placed behind the bars at that 
time, so we could not access the information possessed by him.  
  
 
Question 20: How do you assess the feasibility of the reorganization plan? Have you 
consulted some management experts to support your judgement? (This was designed for 
judge interviewees) 
Interviewee  Response  
 
Judge 1: In fact, the feasibility of the reorganization plan had been assessed before 
the plan was voted, because many parties, including the court, local 
government and main creditors, had been involved in preparing the main 
elements of the plan.  
The court did not consult any management experts, as local government 
business development department would be the best party to make such a 
judgement.  
   
Judge 2: We only assessed the plans’ legality.  
 
Judge 3:  When selecting the company’s buyers, the local government business 
development departments had considered whether it was feasible for the 
potential buyer to turn the company around. The government assessed 
the buyers’ business experience and their financial capacities. So, the 
feasibility of the reorganization plan had in fact been assessed and 
ensured by local government. 
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Interviewee  Response  
 





  APPENDIX 10 
ZHEJIANG CORPORATE REORGANIZATONS  
(1 June 2007 to 31 December 2011) 
Source: Zinian Zhang’s PhD Data Collection 
 









2 Dadi Paper 




3 Hualun (华伦集团) 
In combination with 







































11 Jinxing Trust 
 (金信信托) 
Jinghua 
 Intermediate Court 
20091026  
12 Huachen Junling 
 (华辰君临)  
Beilun Lower Court 20090429   









20090622 Converted to 
Liquidation 





Putuo Lower Court 20100108  
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16 Zonghen Group 
 (纵横集团) 
In combination with 




17 Jiande Special Steel  
(建德镍合金) 
Jiande Lower Court  20101009  
18 Ouweibao (欧威宝)  
in combination with 
its 2 related 
companies 
Putuo Lower Court  20110829 Converted to 
Liquidation  
19 Hengyu ship (恒宇
造船)  
In combination with 
its 3 related 
companies 
Putuo Lower Court  20111021 Pending at the 
time of writing 
20 Yongji ship 
 (永吉造船) 
Putuo Lower Court  20111129  Pending at the 
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